One of those uncertainties is that the outcome of a coup or uprising may lead to a military government not all that much different from Iraq's current government. Even with Saddam and his sons out of the picture, an Iraqi military regime could desire nonconventional weapons and even the inclusion of Kuwait as Iraq's 19th province. Alternatively, an uprising that succeeds in installing a regime dominated by Shi'a, or that fails and results in the mass slaughter of Shi'a, could stir unrest among Shi'a communities elsewhere in the region. An uprising, too, runs a risk of inadvertently producing a loss of central government control, perhaps even chaos, in large parts of Iraq. But it is hard to see how either would pose more of a threat to Iraq's neighbors or to the United States than continued Ba'athi rule under the looming shadow of biological and nuclear weapons.

Moreover, the collapse of central government control in Iraq is unlikely to adversely affect the stability of neighboring states. The one neighbor that stands to be most affected-Turkey--has been effectively dealing with the consequences of a lack of central government control in northern Iraq for a decade already. The most likely consequence of a collapse of central government control in Iraq is the emergence of regional warlords, and competition among neighboring states for influence among them. In other words, Iraq is more likely to implode than to explode. While certainly not a desirable outcome, and not an outcome that U.S. policy should seek, the implosion of Iraq would not necessarily be a disaster for the Iraqi people, the region or for core U.S. interests. Even the continued extraction and export of Iraqi oil might not be much affected, since a number of its major oil fields are located in the far north and south of the country, in regions that could be seized by pro-Western Kurdish factions or U.S. forces now in Kuwait.

Although Washington might not be able to decisively influence the process of regime change once started, it would have some influence over a new government, which it could use to bring Baghdad to accept relevant UN resolutions related to disarmament, Kuwait's borders and terrorism. Progress toward compliance on these issues should remain a precondition for an end to sanctions. The United States should also underscore its readiness to build a new relationship with a post-Saddam Iraq, to include very generous assistance with debt relief and reconstruction.

BEFORE September 11, U.S. policymakers would have been hard-pressed to justify significant military action against Iraq without a major provocation. In the wake of September 11, it should be clear that America can no longer afford to ignore the danger posed by the regime of Saddam Hussein, and that is true regardless of Iraq's association, or lack thereof, with the events of September 11. But if Washington is to use force against Iraq, it should do so not just to punish, degrade capabilities, or deter. Rather, it should aim for regime change. Were such an effort to fail, it would still result in the diminution of Iraq's military capabilities and likely have the effect of deterring future aggression. Even that lesser outcome would help bolster a faltering containment regime.

The approach outlined here involves daunting risks and challenges. But, again, the risks of further delaying a serious effort at regime change are even greater, particularly because the passage of time increases the possibility that Baghdad might acquire more advanced biological arms or nuclear weapons. Therefore, the Bush Administration should focus now on forging a serious, long-term strategy for regime change in Iraq, despite the formidable risks and challenges involved. For if ridding Iraq of the regime of Saddam Hussein will be difficult, experience has shown that living with it will be even more so..

1 For more on the shortcomings of containment, see Ofra Bengio's analysis just above.

2 In December 1991, in a speech to senior military officers, Saddam mocked reports of a coup in Iraq appearing in the foreign press at the time by sarcastically asking his commanders: "They are talking every day about an expected military coup in Iraq ... [and] how to help the coupists.... We need people among you to prepare for a military coup, in which I will take part, so that the West may feel pleased. Nothing remains except that we, you and I, arrange a military coup. Let us write down the names of those who wish to join us in staging such a coup." INA, December 14, 1991, in FBIS-NE.5-91-241, December 16, 1991, p. 36.

3 The 1991 uprising erupted spontaneously amid the confusion and tumult of post-war southern Iraq. According to one account, the uprising started when soldiers returning from the front turned their guns on portraits of Saddam in downtown Basra, thereby breaking the barrier of fear that had heretofore paralyzed opponents of the regime, and prompting a mixed mob of soldiers and civilians to storm the offices of the Ba'ath party and the intelligence services there. The unrest spread quickly through much of the south. The Kurds in northern Iraq--watching developments in the south and sensing a perhaps unique opportunity to shake off central government control--joined the uprising, implementing a plan they had prepared for just such an eventuality. However, operational coordination during the uprising between the Shi'a in the south and the Kurds in the north was practically nonexistent.

4 A1-Hayat, June 18, 1999, p. 2.

Michael Eisenstadt is a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy