If these options are unlikely to work, what are the prospects of a political agreement that provides enough incentives on both sides to take it seriously? This will only happen if pragmatic, as opposed to ideological, conservatives emerge as decisive power players in Iran's presidential elections in June. Could a leader such as former President Hashemi Rafsanjani contemplate such a deal? Could he sell it to his theocratic friends? Would the Bush Administration be willing to negotiate with such a man and such a regime? For the United States, the bottom line would have to be the end of Iran's nuclear weapons program, the end of terrorism against Israel, and cooperation in Iraq and Afghanistan. For Iran it would mean the end of U.S. economic sanctions and the acceptance of the Islamic Republic as a legitimate player in the region. It would be difficult to persuade Congress to take these steps, especially if other trends in the Middle East were positive. Likewise, the Iranian security establishment will be highly suspicious of any deal with the Great Satan. Like their brethren in the former Soviet Union and present day China, they are invariably suspicious of the United States and, by and large, have not traveled outside of their country. Their attitudes are very different than those of the Iranian bureaucrats who are well aware that Iran needs access to the world market and more engagement with the United States to solve its long-term economic problems. The security establishment benefits from confrontation with the United States, getting abundant money to pursue many programs, including the nuclear one.

So all of these signs are cause for pessimism. If, for whatever reason, a radical new approach (on the part of both Washington and Tehran) is out of the question, then the best the administration can hope for is that we prepare for the coming crisis jointly with the Europeans as allies, rather than at loggerheads. In the face of Euro-Atlantic solidarity, there is a chance that the Iranians will be prepared to fudge the program for a few more years. But ultimately, there is no way that the United States, Europe or the UN Security Council can stop a proud country of 70 million people with abundant resources from getting the ingredients for a nuclear bomb if that is what its leaders believe must happen. For this reason, it would be prudent to engage in a substantive dialogue with other allies and friends, especially the Gulf countries, about what to do if the Iranian bomb becomes a reality and a pre-emptive war with Iran is an unacceptable option. Most importantly, the United States and Europe must bite the bullet and agree with each other on a common strategy that is unambiguous as to the limits of carrots and sticks both parties are prepared to present to Iran's leaders and the international community.