If the end of the American era is to come in the foreseeable future,
it will therefore have to result largely from internal causes.
Kupchan makes the point repeatedly that our global role has depended
upon having a major adversary, and that in the absence of one the
United States will no longer feel compelled to play the role of
global guardian. Nor does he think that terrorism can serve as the
functional equivalent of a great power foe. At best, Kupchan argues,
terrorism introduces an unpredictable element into policy, "at times
provoking America to lash out, at other times inducing it to retreat
behind protective barriers." "[I]n the long run terrorism . . .
promises to reinforce the unilateral and isolationist trends that
were already picking up steam before September 11." It is from the
study of American history that Kupchan sees the need of a major
adversary to sustain our global role. Since the end of the Cold War,
he writes, America's past has been catching up with its present.
There is something to be said for this view.

We did need a major adversary to draw us into the role we now play,
and prior to September 11, 2001 a growing aversion to bearing the
costs of hegemony in the absence of a major adversary was indeed
apparent. Still, that aversion did not lead the nation to abandon its
pretensions to an order-giving role. Having once gained the
commanding position we came to occupy, we were reluctant to give it
up. Kupchan himself calls attention to the new commitments taken on
by the United States during the 1990s, though he thinks this was an
aberration rather than a reliable indication of the future. He
attributes U.S. action to a hangover from the Cold War, an
unprecedented economic boom and the "illusion" that war can be waged
primarily from the air with minimum loss of American lives. These
considerations surely contributed to the persistence of American
hegemony in the 1990s. In the end, however, they must be seen as
subordinate to the simple rule that global powers do not relinquish
their position voluntarily. The United States is proving to be no
exception to this rule.

Although the long-term effects terrorism will have on American policy
necessarily remain speculative, it seems odd to insist that they must
reinforce both unilateralism and isolationism. The case for believing
that they must reinforce unilateralism is reasonably clear and
follows from the administration's conception of the threat and
particularly the strategy for combating it. As spelled out in the
administration's National Security Strategy, the threat terrorists
and rogue states pose arises from the marriage of radicalism and
technology. The result is a security environment more complex and
dangerous than that of an earlier era. In the Cold War, the United
States faced a risk-averse adversary; traditional concepts of
deterrence worked. Against terrorists and rogue states, however, the
former constraints are no longer effective. For them, weapons of mass
destruction have been transformed from weapons of last resort to
weapons of choice. It is in these changed circumstances that a
strategy of pre-emption is both necessary and justified. The concept
of imminent threat, says the administration, must be adapted to the
capabilities and objectives of today's adversaries.

A strategy that encompasses the notion of pre-emptive war is almost
bound to be unilateral. At the same time, it may be anything but
isolationist. That Kupchan does not give this prospect its due is the
result of his reading of the American position today. He has
constructed his case around the proposition of an American power that
is in decline. If it were indeed true that a multipolar world is
already on the cusp, the prospects he holds out--whether of an
increasing isolationism or of a more discriminating brand of
internationalism--might follow. But if instead American hegemony
continues to reign without serious challenge, a third prospect must
be given serious consideration: that of empire in everything but name.

Although nothing lasts forever, the only safe bet is that the
international system will remain unipolar for a long time. It may
well be that American power will go without serious challenge until
the middle of this century. In these circumstances, what constraints
should the holders of such power observe? The answer given by the
Bush Administration seems simple enough. This government alone, it
declares, will determine when and for what purposes force should be
employed, and it will do so according to its own distinctive
standards of judgment. That the decision is unilateral does not
necessarily mean that action will also be unilateral. Other states
may join in, whatever their reasons for becoming part of the
"coalitions of the willing." It may be that a given action will bear
the imprimatur of the UN Security Council, or not. Should it do so,
the American government would be particularly gratified.
Nevertheless, the source and legitimacy of the action will remain
independent of the United Nations.

This has been the position of the Bush Administration in the case of
Iraq. Should it become the position of future administrations as
well, the United States will set itself against world opinion and its
own best traditions. What the world apparently fears most is neither
terrorists nor tyrants but the untrammeled power of the United
States. If this nation is to lead, it will first have to reassure the
world about the uses and purposes of its power. How this can be done
is the great question, and here, one can do no better than to follow
Kupchan. Wrong though he is in his estimate of the end of
unipolarity, he is right in his prescription of the ideas that should
inform American foreign policy today--the exercise of strategic
restraint and the reaching of decisions through a consensus of the
great powers. Reassurance would come through the observance of
processes that depend upon some measure of compromise and consent
rather than simply the fiat of the world's greatest power.

On the other hand, the failure to provide reassurance might lead to
an outcome not too different from Kupchan's isolationism. What gives
the prospect of isolationism some plausibility is the possibility of
a pendulum effect should the Bush Administration overreach in the
Middle East. Too great a swing in terms of an over-commitment that
goes badly could prompt an exaggerated swing in the opposite
direction.

Then, too, isolationism could be the result of an America that is
increasingly disliked by the world, with all that this implies in
terms of political opposition, criticism, obstructionism and general
disaffection. For a nation as desirous as ever to be liked, how long
would the United States be willing to go on playing an unpopular
role, one that would perhaps have to depend more and more on naked
power? Prospects not to be dismissed, they should give pause to an
administration hell-bent on having its way.