Western economic institutions are having a somewhat better time of it. The end to Cold War competition did not change the economic environment significantly. Nevertheless, they too are having trouble adapting to the emergence of massive pools of privately held funds that can overwhelm what governments or existing institutions do.

Expanded Multilateralism

A second form of multilateralism would go far beyond the initial and apparently abandoned impulse of the current administration-what was termed "assertive multilateralism"-to create supranational capabilities. In the security realm, it would involve creating a standing military force responsible to the Security Council and, in some circumstances, to the secretary-general. Such a force could be dispatched quickly to help prevent conflicts or (under Chapter vii of the UN Charter) to enforce Security Council resolutions. An expanded multilateralism of this sort could also seek to establish machinery (a strengthened World Court, for example) for resolving political disputes between states that would constitute arbitration, not just mediation. Economically, this form of multilateralism would require not simply rules regulating trade but mandatory dispute settlement mechanisms and strict monetary coordination.

There are obvious difficulties with multilateralism of this sort. National sovereignty may be much battered but it is still alive and kicking. Few governments (including, notably, our own) would be prepared to cede to some supranational agency or set of agencies, run by international civil servants, the independence governments enjoy in the political, economic, or military realms. Moreover, even if there were some desire to do so, building such organizational capacity (especially in the military sphere) would be a monumental undertaking, given the expense and the forces that would oppose it.

Less unrealistic but still problematic would be a scaled-down version of such multilateralism, one that would concentrate on trying to strengthen and make more independent existing international institutions. To some extent the United States has taken or is considering taking some modest steps in this direction, both in the form of efforts to create a stand-by force responsible to the Security Council and by agreeing to follow certain WTO procedures to resolve trade disputes.

The problem with even this more modest, sub-supranational form of internationalism stems from the reality that we ourselves are not prepared (and rightly so) to give up our freedom of maneuver in those situations where we disagree and where important national interests are at stake. Given that others tend to feel the same, such multinational efforts are often no stronger than the weakest or most adamantly opposed member in possession of a veto. Again, sovereignty-not as an abstract norm but as a political reality-precludes almost any form of multilateralism that would override or take the place of domestic autonomy to a significant degree.

Multilateralism that Makes Sense

There is a third approach to multilateralism, one more informal in nature and more achievable in practice. It differs from the first in its rejection of reliance on standing, formal organizations, and differs from the second in eschewing interest in universal, supranational authorities. At its core is the idea of selected states and organizations coalescing for narrow tasks or purposes-and in most cases disbanding once the specific aim has been accomplished. Membership is available to those able and willing to participate, and this approach is thus sometimes referred to as "coalitions of the willing." Less formally it can be described as foreign policy by posse.

Examples of this approach are multiplying. The most famous cases, and in some ways the model for the idea, were Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Here, in response to a specific crisis, namely, the Iraqi invasion and occupation of Kuwait, the United States fashioned a multilateral coalition that over the course of the next seven months proved victorious on the battlefield. Like many inventions, it was born of necessity: there was no standing Gulf security organization to fall back upon, the UN lacked the capability, and it was too much for the United States alone to undertake.

The Gulf coalition was one in which tasks and roles differed according to both the desire and ability of governments to make a contribution. Some countries simply gave moral and political support by voting in one or another forum for action against Iraq. Others limited their participation to providing funds. In the military realm there was a wide disparity. The United States contributed more than a half million troops and equipment of all sorts. Some others, notably Great Britain and France, also committed sizable, balanced forces. Others, for political or military reasons or both, contributed much smaller forces and sometimes only for particular missions-say, sanctions enforcement or defense of rear areas.

The coalition that won the war disbanded as soon as it ended. But a more narrow coalition continues to work together in the war's aftermath to promote Iraqi compliance with various resolutions and to protect Iraqi citizens from their own government. The United States, Turkey, Great Britain, and France operate in and over Iraq's north to protect the Kurds. It is the United States, together with Great Britain, France, and several Gulf states, that maintain a no-fly zone over the predominantly Shi'a areas of Iraq's south. Both efforts are undertaken "pursuant to" authority judged to be implicit in Security Council resolutions in what amounts to a collective decision to act.

Other coalitions are longer standing. One set includes so-called supplier groups, i.e., those coalitions of states who agree not to provide designated technologies or capabilities to selected states in order to slow their efforts to develop certain military capacities. Right now there are supplier groups in the realm of nuclear, biological and chemical, and ballistic missile technologies. Membership of these groups obviously reflects relevance-only those who could provide such technologies are potential members-and a willingness to forgo exports. They operate much as cartels, with their effectiveness depending on the extent of their reach-that is, what it is they sanction and whether there are non-members ready and able to provide what they will not.

Ad hoc coalitions are also appearing in the economic sphere. The Mexican bailout is an interesting case. Viewing the potential failure of the Mexican economy as a major threat to U.S. and world economic health, and realizing that no existing institution or set of arrangements could provide the Mexican government the backing it required, the Clinton administration lashed together in early 1995 an ad hoc coalition that included, in addition to itself, the International Monetary Fund, the Bank for International Settlements, Canada, a consortium of Latin American governments, and several private banks. Although the private banks subsequently dropped out, the multi-billion dollar bail-out appears to have worked in allowing Mexico to weather the immediate crisis.

Diplomacy, too, increasingly turns to informal coalitions. The management of the Middle East peace process since the October 1991 Madrid Conference is coordinated by the United States (with Russia as nominal co-sponsor) that involves not only the immediate protagonists but also Egypt, the Gulf states, the European Union, and others. Similarly, diplomacy toward Bosnia-admittedly, not (yet) a shining example-is informally coordinated by a Contact Group consisting of the United States, Russia, France, Great Britain, and Germany. An earlier contact group, one that included the United States, Great Britain, France, Canada, and the then Federal Republic of Germany, was instrumental in helping to negotiate a political settlement in southern Africa in the 1980s.

An Asian example of foreign policy by posse is the informal coalition brought about by the October 1994 "Agreed Framework" between the United States and North Korea, which established the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Corporation (KEDO). The United States is in charge, with the Republic of Korea and Japan in principal supporting roles, and many other governments participating in lesser capacities. The purpose is to provide light water reactors and alternative energy (in this case, heavy fuel oil) to the North Koreans on economic terms they can afford and political terms they can accept.

What these and similar efforts have in common is that they tend to be U.S.-led groups that come together for a finite set of tasks. They are voluntary as regards membership participation in particular actions. Their charter is their own. They are often put together for a limited span of time. They tend to have little in the way of headquarters or permanent staff. They are better understood as an activity than an organization.It is not difficult to imagine other applications, including a different approach to Bosnia. Rather than trying to force policy through a divided NATO or a UN with a different set of priorities, the United States would have been wiser to build a small coalition of like-minded states that would have been in a position credibly to threaten, and carry out as need be, military actions ranging from making the designated safe-areas safe to the so-called "lift and strike" option combining arms supplies to the Bosnians and attacks on Serbian positions. Some form of ad hoc coalition may prove useful in the future if, as seems likely, the NATO/UN phase of the conflict comes to an unhappy and unsuccessful end.