ASSOCIATING interdependence with democracy, peace and prosperity is nothing new. Before World War I, the close interdependence of states was thought of as heralding an era of peace among nations, and democracy and prosperity within them. In his widely read book, The Great Illusion, Norman Angell summed up the texts of generations of classical and neoclassical economists and drew from them the dramatic conclusion that wars would no longer be fought because they would not pay. World War I instead produced the great disillusion, which reduced political optimism to a level that remained low almost until the end of the Cold War--"almost", because beginning in the 1970s a new optimism, strikingly similar to the old, began to resurface. Interdependence was again associated with peace, and increasingly with democracy, which began to spread wonderfully to Latin America, to Asia and, with the Soviet Union's collapse, to Eastern Europe. In 1989 Francis Fukuyama foresaw in these pages a time when all states would be lib eral democracies, and more recently Michael Doyle projected that this would happen sometime between 2050 and 2100.¹

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, in their 1977 book Power and Interdependence, strengthened the notion that interdependence promotes peace by arguing that simple interdependence had become complex interdependence, binding the economic and hence the political interests of states ever more tightly together. Now we hear from many sides that interdependence has reached yet another height, transcending states and establishing a Borderless World, the title and theme of Kenichi Ohmae's 1990 book. People, firms and markets matter more; states matter less. Each tightening of the economic screw raises the benefits of economic exchange and makes war among the more advanced states increasingly costly. The simple and plausible propositions are that as the benefits of peace rise, so do the costs of war; when states perceive wars to be immensely costly, they will be disinclined to fight them. Still, war is not abolished, because even the strongest economic forces cannot conquer fear or eliminate concern for national honor. G enerally, however, economic interests dominate and markets begin to supplant politics at home and abroad. That economics depresses politics and limits its significance is taken to be a happy thought.

The State of the State

GLOBALIZATION is the fad of the 1990s, and globalization is made in America. Thomas Friedman's The Lexus and the Olive Tree (1999) is perhaps the most exultant celebration of the American way, of market capitalism and liberal democracy. Free markets, transparency and flexibility are the watchwords. The "electronic herd" moves vast amounts of capital in and out of countries according to their political and economic merits. Capital moves almost instantaneously into countries with stable governments, progressive economies, open accounting and honest dealing, and out of countries lacking those qualities. States can defy the "herd", but they will pay a price, usually a steep one, as did Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia and South Korea in the late 1990s. Some countries may defy the herd inadvertently (the countries just mentioned); others out of ideological conviction (Cuba and North Korea); some because they can afford to (oil-rich countries); others because history has simply passed them by (many African countries) .

Countries wishing to attract capital and to gain the benefits of today's and tomorrow's technology must don the "golden straitjacket", a package of policies including balanced budgets, economic deregulation, openness to investment and trade, and a stable currency. The herd decides which countries to reward and which to punish, and nothing can be done about its decisions. The herd has no telephone number. When it decides to withdraw capital from a country, there is no one to complain to or petition for relief. Decisions of the herd are not made; they happen, and they happen because many individual investors make simultaneous decisions on similar grounds to invest or to withdraw their funds. Globalization is a process shaped by markets, not by governments.

Globalization means homogenization. Prices, products, wages, wealth, rates of interest and profit tend to converge the world over. Like any powerful movement for change, globalization encounters resistance--in America from religious fundamentalists, labor unions and their allies; abroad from anti-Americanists; everywhere from cultural traditionalists. The "end of the Cold War and the collapse of communism have discredited all models other than liberal democracy. The statement is by democratic theorist Larry Diamond, and Friedman repeats it with approval. There is but one best way, and America has found it. As Friedman puts it, "It's a post-industrial world, and America today is good at everything that is post-industrial." The herd does not care about forms of government as such, but it values and rewards "stability, predictability, transparency, and the ability to transfer and protect its private property. The message to all governments is clear: conform or suffer.

There is much in what Friedman says, and he says it very well. But how much? And, specifically, what is the effect of closer interdependence on the conduct of the internal and external affairs of nations?

First, we should ask how far globalization has proceeded. In fact, much of the world has been left out of the process: most of Africa and Latin America, Russia, all of the Middle East (except Israel), and large parts of Asia. Moreover, for many countries the degree of participation in the global economy varies by region. Northern Italy, for example, is in; southern Italy is out. Globalization is not truly global, but is mainly limited to northern latitudes. Linda Weiss points out that, as of 1991, 81 percent of the world stock of foreign direct investment was located in high-wage northern countries: the United States, followed by the United Kingdom, Germany and Canada. She adds that the concentration of investment in these countries has increased by 12 percent since 1967.² Obviously, the world is not one.

Second, we should compare the interdependence of nations today with interdependence earlier. The rapid growth of international trade and investment from the mid-1850s into the 1910s preceded a prolonged period of war, internal revolution and national insularity. During the years of post-World War II recovery protectionist policies lingered as the United States opened its borders to trade while taking a relaxed attitude toward counties that protected their markets. One might say that from 1914 into the 1960s an interdependence deficit developed, which helps to explain the steady growth of interdependence thereafter. Among the richest twenty-four industrial economies (the OECD countries), exports grew at about twice the rate of GDP after 1960. In 1960 exports accounted for 9.5 percent of their national GDPs; in 1900 that figure was 20.5 percent.³ Finding that the level of interdependence in 1999 approximately equals that of 1910 is hardly surprising. What is true of trade also holds for capital flows, again as a percentage of GDP.

Third, money markets may be the only economic sector that has become truly global. Finance capital moves freely across the frontiers of OECD countries and quite freely elsewhere. Still, with the movement of financial assets as with commodities, the present remains like the past. Despite today's ease of communication, financial markets in 1900 were at least as integrated as they are now.

Yet many globalizers underestimate the extent to which the new resembles the old. In any competitive system the winners are imitated by the losers. In political as in economic development, latecomers imitate the practices and adopt the institutions of the countries that have shown the way. Occasionally, someone finds a way to outflank, to invent a new way or to ingeniously modify an old way to gain an advantage; and then the process of imitation begins anew. That competitors begin to look like one another if the competition is close and continuous is a familiar story. But the apostles of globalization argue that the process has now sped up immensely. In the old political era, the strong vanquished the weak; in the new economic era, says Friedman, quoting Klaus Schwab, "the fast eat the slow." No longer is it "do what the strong party says or risk physical punishment", but "do what the electronic herd requires or remain impoverished." In a competitive system, a few do exceptionally well, some get along, and m any bring up the rear.

If states must conform to the ways of the more successful among them or pay a stiff price for not doing so, we then have to ask what becomes of the state itself. The message of globalizers is that economic and technological forces impose on states a near uniformity of political and economic forms and functions. A glance at just the past seventy-five years, however, reveals that a variety of political and economic systems have produced impressive results and have been admired in their day for doing so.

In the 1930s and again in the 1950s, the Soviet Union's economic growth rates were among the world's highest, so impressive in the 1950s that America feared being overtaken and passed by. In the 1970s, West European welfare states with managed and directed economies were highly regarded. In the late 1970s through the 1980s, the Japanese brand of neomercantilism was thought to be the wave of the future, and Western Europe and the United States worried about being able to keep up. Imitate or perish was the counsel of some; pry the Japanese economy open and make it compete on our grounds was the message of others. America did not do much of either, yet in the 1990s its economy, too, has flourished.

Yet it is odd--and intellectually reckless--to conclude from a decade's experience that the one best model has at last appeared. True globalization, if it were realized, would mean a near uniformity of conditions across countries. But even in the 1990s, one finds little evidence of this. The advanced countries of the world have enjoyed or suffered distinct fates. Major West European countries were plagued by high and persistent unemployment; many Northeast and Southeast Asian countries experienced economic stagnation or collapse, while China continued to do quite well; and we know about the United States.

Globalizers, to be sure, do not claim that globalization is complete, only that the process is irreversible. Some evidence supports the conclusion, some does not. Looking at the big picture, one notices that nations whose economies have faltered or failed have been more fully controlled, directed and supported by the state than has the American economy. Soviet-style economies failed miserably, in China only the free-market sector flourishes, the once much-favored Swedish model has proved wanting, and the economies of the European Union suffer from high unemployment and low growth. One can easily add more examples. From these it is tempting to leap to the conclusion that America has indeed found, or stumbled onto, the one best way.

Obviously, Thomas Friedman thinks so. Tip O'Neill, when he was a congressman from Massachusetts, declared that all politics are local. Wrong, Friedman now says, all politics have become global. "The electronic herd", he writes, "turns the whole world into a parliamentary system, in which every government lives under the fear of a no-confidence vote from the herd."

BUT IT IS hard to believe that economic processes direct or determine a nation's policies, that spontaneous individual decisions about where to place resources reward or punish a national economy so strongly that a government either does what pleases the "herd" or its economy fails to prosper or even risks collapse. We all recall recent cases, some of them mentioned above, that seem to support Friedman's thesis. Mentioning them both makes a point and raises doubts.

or one thing, even if all politics has become global, economies remain local to a surprising extent. Countries with large economies continue to do most of their business at home. Sectors of the American economy that are scarcely involved in international trade--such as government, construction, non profit organizations, utilities, and wholesale and retail trade--employ 82 percent of Americans.⁴ As Paul Krugman observes, "The United States is still almost 90 percent an economy that produces goods and services for its own use." For the world's three largest economies--the United States, Japan, and the European Union taken as a unit-exports account for 12 percent or less of GDP.⁵ The world, then, is less interdependent than is usually supposed. Moreover, developed countries, oil imports aside, do the bulk of their external business with one another, which means that their dependence on imported commodities that they could not easily produce themselves is further reduced.

Reinforcing the parochial pattern of productivity, the famous footloose corporations also turn out to be firmly anchored in their home bases. A study of the world's one hundred largest corporations concludes that not one of them could be called truly "global" or "footloose." Another study found exactly one multinational corporation that seemed to be leaving its home base: Britain's chemical company, ICI. On all the important counts--location of assets, site of research and development, ownership, management--the importance of a corporation's home base is marked. And the technological prowess of corporations corresponds closely to that of the countries in which they are located.

Again, within advanced countries at similar levels of development that are closely interrelated, one would expect uniformities of form and function to be most fully displayed. Indeed, GDP per work hour among seven of the most prosperous countries nearly came into alignment between the 1950s and the 1980.⁶ Yet, while countries at a high level of development do tend to converge in productivity, that is something of a tautology Stephen Woolcock, looking at forms of corporate governance within the European Union, finds a "spectrum of approaches" and expects it to persist for the foreseeable future.⁷ Since the 1950s, for example, the economies of Germany and France have grown more closely together as each became the principal trading partner of the other. But a study of the two countries concludes that France has copied German policies yet has been unwilling or unable to copy German institutions.⁸

THE MOST telling refutation of the belief that state power has sharply declined is to be found in the state's capacity for transformation. Because technological innovation is rapid, and because economic conditions at home and abroad change often, states that adapt easily to such changes enjoy considerable advantages. International politics remains inter-national. National systems display a great deal of resilience. Those that adapt well grow and prosper; others just manage to get along. In this spirit, Ezra Taft Benson, when he was President Eisenhower's secretary of agriculture, gave this kindly advice to America's small farmers: "Get big or get out."

Success in competitive systems requires the units of the system to adopt ways they would often prefer to avoid. The United States looked to be heavy-footed in the 1980s when Japan's economy was booming. It seemed that the Ministry of International Trade and Industry was manned by geniuses who guided Japan's economy effortlessly to its impressive accomplishments. Now it is the United States that appears light-footed.

Students of American government point out that one of the advantages of a federal system is that the separate states can act as laboratories for socioeconomic experimentation. When some states succeed, others imitate them. The same thought applies to nations.

States adapt, but they also protect themselves. Different nations, with distinct institutions and traditions, protect themselves in different ways. Japan fosters industries, defends them, and manages its trade. The United States uses its political, economic and military leverage to manipulate international events to promote its interests. Thus, as David E. Spiro elaborately shows, international markets and institutions did not recycle petrodollars after 1974; the United States did. Despite many statements to the contrary, the United States worked effectively through different administrations and under different cabinet secretaries to undermine markets and thwart international institutions. Its leverage enabled it to manipulate the oil crisis to serve its own interests.⁹

Many of the interdependence boosters of the 1970s expected the state to wither and fade away. Charles Kindleberger, for example, wrote in 1969 that "the nation-state is just about through as an economic unit." Globalizers of the 1990s believe that this time it really is happening. The state has lost its "monopoly over internal sovereignty", Wolfgang H. Reinecke writes, and as "an externally sovereign actor" it "will become a thing of the past."¹⁰ But even as this is being asserted it is striking that, internally, the range of governmental functions and the extent of state control over societies and economies has seldom been fuller than it is now. After World War II, West European governments spent about 25 percent of their nations' products; now the figure is about 50 percent. In many parts of the world the concern has been not over the diminished internal powers of the state but over their increase. And although state control has lessened somewhat recently, does anyone really believe that economically ad vanced states have returned to a 1930s level--let alone to a nineteenth-century level--of governmental regulation?

States perform essential political, social and economic functions, and no other organization rivals them in these respects. They foster the institutions that make internal peace and prosperity possible. In the state of nature, as Kant put it, there is "no mine and thine." States turn possession into property and thus make saving, production and prosperity possible. The sovereign state with fixed borders has proved to be the best organization for keeping peace internally and fostering the conditions for economic well-being.

We do not have to wonder what happens to society and the economy when a state begins to fade away, for we have all too many examples. A few obvious ones are China in the 1920s and 1930s and again during the Cultural Revolution, many African states since their independence, and currently post-Soviet Russia. The less competent a state, the more likely it is to dissolve into component parts or be unable to adapt to transnational developments. Challenges at home and abroad test the mettle of states. In modern times, enough states have always passed the test to keep the international system functioning as a system of states. The challenges vary but states endure. They have proved to be hardy survivors.

The State in International Politics

ECONOMIC globalization would mean that the world economy, or at least the globalized portion of it, would be not merely interdependent but integrated. The difference between an interdependent and an integrated world is a qualitative one and not a mere matter of proportionately more trade and greater and more rapid flows of capital. With integration, the world would look like one big state. Economic markets and interests, however, cannot perform the functions of government. Integration requires or presumes a government to protect, direct and control.

Interdependence, in contrast, is "the mere mutualism" of states, as Emile Durkheim put it. Interdependence is not only looser than is usually thought but is also politically less consequential. Interdependence did not produce the world-shaking events of 1989-91. A political event, the failure of one of the world's two great powers, did that. Had the configuration of international politics not fundamentally changed, neither the unification of Germany nor the war against Saddam Hussein would have been possible. The most important events in international politics are explained by differences in the capabilities of states, not by economic forces operating across states or transcending them. Interdependence theorists, and globalizers even more so, argue that the international economic interests of states work against their going to war. True, they do; yet if one asks whether economic interests or nuclear weapons inhibit war more strongly, the answer obviously is nuclear weapons.

Europe's great powers prior to World War I were tightly bound together economically. They nevertheless fought a long and bloody war. The United States and the Soviet Union were not even loosely connected economically. They nevertheless sustained an uneasy peace for four and a half decades. The most important causes of peace, as of war, are found in international-political conditions, including the weaponry available to states. Events following the Cold War dramatically demonstrate the political weakness of economic forces. The integration (not just the interdependence) of the parts of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, with all of their entangling economic interests, did not prevent their disintegration. Governments and people sacrifice welfare and even security in pursuit of national, ethnic and religious ends.

National politics, not international markets, account for many international economic developments. Many students of politics and economics believe that economic blocs are becoming more common. But economic interests and market forces do not create blocs; governments do. Without governmental decisions the Coal and Steel Community, the European Economic Community, and the European Union would not have emerged. American governments forged NAFTA, and it was Japan that fashioned an East and Southeast Asian producing and trading area. Governments intervene much more in international economic matters today than they did in the earlier era of interdependence. Before World War I, foreign ministry officials were famed for their lack of knowledge of, or interest in, economic affairs. Because governments have become much more active in economic affairs at home and abroad, interdependence has become less of an autonomous force in international politics.

The many commentators who exaggerate the closeness of interdependence, and even more so the extent of globalization, think of individual states rather than of the international political system as a whole. Many small states import and export large shares of their gross national products. But states with large GNPs do not. When most of the great powers were smaller, they depended heavily on one another both economically and militarily. Great Britain and Germany before World War I were each other's second-best customers for both exports and imports, and their trade accounted for a huge proportion of their GNPs--52 and 38 percent, respectively. After World War II, the world's two great powers were barely dependent on others, while a number of other states depended heavily on them. The terms of political, economic and military competition are set by the larger units of the international political system. Through centuries of multipolarity, with five or so great powers of comparable size competing with one anothe r, the international system was highly interdependent. Under bipolarity and unipolarity the degree of interdependence has declined markedly.

States are differentiated from one another not by function but primarily by capability. For two reasons inequalities across states have greater political impact than inequalities across income groups within states. First, the inequalities of states are larger and have been growing more rapidly. Rich countries have become richer while poor countries have remained poor. Second, in a system without central governance, the influence of the units of greater capability is disproportionately large because there are no effective laws and institutions to direct and constrain them. They are able to work the system to their advantage, as the petrodollar example cited above shows.

In the international system as it exists today, the United States is truly blessed. Precisely because the United States depends relatively little on others, it has a wide range of policy choices and the ability both to bring pressure on others and to assist them. The "herd" with its capital may flee from countries when it collectively decides that they are politically and economically unworthy, but some countries abroad, like some firms at home, are so important that they cannot be allowed to fail. National governments and international agencies then come to the rescue. The United States is the country that most often has the ability and the will to step in. The agency that most often acts is the IMF, and most countries think of the IMF as the enforcement arm of the U.S. Treasury. Thomas Friedman believes that when the "herd" makes its decisions, there is no appeal, but often there is one, and it is for a bailout organized by the United States.

The international economy, like national economies, operates within a set of rules and institutions that have to be made and sustained. Britain to a large extent provided this service prior to World War I; no one did between the wars, and the United States has done so since.

The Unhidden Fist

IF, ECONOMICALLY, the United States is the world's most important country, militarily it is the decisive one. Thomas Friedman puts the point simply: the world is sustained by "the presence of American power and America's willingness to use that power against those who would threaten the system of globalization. ... The hidden hand of the market will never work without a hidden fist." But the fist is in full view.

On its military forces, the United States outspends the next seven biggest spenders combined. When force is required to keep or to restore the peace, either the United States leads the way or the peace is not kept. The Cold War militarized international politics. Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, and among some other countries as well, came to be defined largely in a single dimension: the military one.

Oddly, the end of the Cold War has elevated the importance of the military component in American foreign policy. Thus, William J. Perry and Ashton B. Carter, former secretary and assistant secretary of defense, have recently offered the concept of "preventive defense" as a guide to American policy. Preventive defense is conducted by American defense officials engaging in "security and military dialogue with regional states"; it calls for "a more robust defense to defense program."¹¹ Indeed, in many of the successor states of the Soviet Union, and in some other parts of the world as well, our defense personnel carry out what American policy there is.

The United States continues to spend, too, at a Cold War pace. In real terms, America's 1995 military budget approximately equaled the 1980 budget, and in 1980 the Cold War was at its height. The fact that most other countries have reduced their budgets more than the United States has heightened its military dominance. Some say that the world is not really unipolar because the United States often needs, or at least seeks, the help of others. The truth, however, remains: the stronger have many more ways of coping with adversities than the weak have, and the latter depend on the former much more than the other way around. The United States is the only country that can organize and lead a military coalition, as it did in Iraq and in the Balkans. Some states have little choice but to participate, partly because of the pressure the strong can bring to bear on the weak and partly because of the needs of the latter. West European countries and Japan are more dependent on Middle Eastern oil than is the United States , and Western Europe is more affected by what happens in Eastern Europe than is the United States.

As expected, the beneficiaries resent their benefactor, which leads to talk of righting the imbalance of power. Yet when the imbalance between one and the rest is great, catching up is difficult. French leaders especially bemoan the absence of multipolarity and call for greater European strength, but one cannot usefully will the end without willing the means. The uneven distribution of capabilities continues to be the key to understanding international politics.

America continues to garrison much of the world and to look for ways of keeping troops in foreign countries rather than withdrawing them, as one might have expected it to do at the Cold War's end.¹² The 1992 draft of the Pentagon's Defense Planning Guidance advocated "discouraging the advanced industrialized nations from ... even aspiring to a larger global or regional role." The United States may at times seek help from others, but not too much help, lest it lose its leading position in one part of the world or another. The document, when it was leaked, provoked criticism. In response, emphasis was placed on its being only a draft, but its tenets continue to guide American policy.

Discontent in the Caboose

IN A SYSTEM of balanced states, the domination by one or some of them has in the past been prevented by the reaction of others acting as counterweights. The states of Europe held each other in balance through the first three hundred years of the modern state system. In the following fifty years, the United States and the Soviet Union checked each other, each protecting its sphere and attempting to manage affairs within it. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been alone in the world; no state or combination of states provides an effective counterweight.

What are the implications for international politics? The more interdependent the system, the more a surrogate for government is needed. Some Americans believe that the United States provides this service and that, because of its moderation, other states will continue to appreciate, or at least to accept, its managerial role. Benign hegemony is, however, something of a contradiction in terms. "One reads about the world's desire for American leadership only in the United States", a British diplomat has remarked. "Everywhere else one reads about American arrogance and unilateralism."

American leaders seem to believe that America's pre-eminent position will last indefinitely. The United States would then remain the dominant power without rivals rising to challenge it, a position without precedent in modern history. When Americans speak of preserving the balance in East Asia through our military presence, the Chinese understandably take this to mean that we intend to maintain the strategic hegemony we now enjoy in the absence of a balance of power. When China makes steady though modest efforts to improve the quality of its inferior forces, we see a future threat to our and others' interests. Whatever worries the United States has in East Asia and whatever threats it feels, Japan experiences them earlier, feels them more severely, and reacts to them. China then worries as Japan improves its airlift and sealift capabilities and as the United States bolsters its forces in Korea. The actions and reactions of China, Japan and Korea, with or without American participation, are creating a new balance of power in East Asia, which is becoming part of the new balance of power in the world.

In the Cold War, the United States won a decisive victory. Victory in war, however, often breeds lasting enmities. Magnanimity in victory is rare. Winners of wars, facing few impediments to the exercise of their wills, often act in ways that create future enemies. Thus Germany, by taking Alsace and most of Lorraine from France in 1871, earned its lasting enmity; and the Allies' harsh treatment of Germany after World War I produced a similar effect. In contrast, Bismarck persuaded the Kaiser not to march his armies along the road to Vienna after the great victory at Koniggratz in 1866. In the Treaty of Prague, Prussia took no Austrian territory. Thus Austria, having become Austria-Hungary, was available as an alliance partner for Germany in 1879.

Rather than learning from history, the United States repeats past errors by expanding NATO eastward and extending its influence over what used to be the province of the vanquished. This alienates Russia and nudges it toward China instead of drawing it toward Europe and America. Despite much talk about the "globalization" of international politics, American political leaders to a dismaying extent think of East or West rather than of their interaction.

McGeorge Bundy once described the United States as "the locomotive at the head of mankind, and the rest of the world the caboose." America's pulling power is at a peak that cannot be sustained, for two main reasons. First, America is a country of 276 million people in a world of 6 billion, representing less than 5 percent of the world's total population. The country's physical capabilities and political will cannot sustain present international burdens indefinitely. Second, other countries may not enjoy being placed at the back of the train. Both friends and foes will react as countries always have to the threatened or real predominance of one among them: they will work to right the balance. The present condition of international politics is unnatural. Both the predominance of America and, one may hope, the militarization of international affairs will diminish with time.

Many globalizers believe that the world is increasingly ruled by markets. Looking at the state of states leads one to a different conclusion. The main difference between international politics now and earlier is not found in the increased interdependence of states but in their growing inequality. With the end of bipolarity, the distribution of capabilities among states has become extremely lopsided. Rather than elevating economic forces and depressing political ones, the inequalities of international politics enhance the political role of one country. Politics as usual prevails over economics.

1 Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and Socialism (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997), pp. 480-1.

2 Weiss, The Myth of the Powerless State: Governing the Economy in a Global Era (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1998), P. 186.

3 Robert Wade, "Globalization and its Limits: Reports of the Death of the National Economy are Grossly Exaggerated", in National Diversity and Global Capitalism, ed. Suzanne Berger and Ronald Dore (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 62. Cf. Weiss, Myth, Table 6-1.

4 Robert Z. Lawrence, "Workers and Economists II: Resist the Binge", Foreign Affairs (March/April 1994).

5 Weiss, Myth, p. 176.

6 Robert Boyer, "The Convergence Hypothesis Revisited: Globalization but Still the Century of Nations", in National Diversity, p. 37.

7 Woolcock, "Competition among Forms of Corporate Governance in the European Community: The Case of Britain", in National Diversity, p. 196.

8 Andrea Boltho, "Has France Converged on Germany?", in National Diversity, chap. 3......

9 Spiro, The Hidden Hand of American Hegemony: Petrodollar Recycling and International Markets (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), especially chap. 6.

10 Reinecke, "Global Public Policy", Foreign Affairs (November/December 1997), p. 137.

11 Perry and Carter, Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999), pp. 9,11.

12 Hans Binnendijk, for example, has urged Americans to develop a case for leaving American troops in South Korea even if the North should no longer be a threat. See Strategic Assessment 1996: Instruments of U.S. Power (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996), p. 2.

Kenneth N. Waltz, former Ford Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, is a research associate of the Institute of War and Peace Studies and adjunct professor at Columbia University. An earlier version of this essay was published in the December issue of PS: Political Science & Politics.