Non-proliferation risks could also be reduced by implementing the nuclear deal in a country-neutral manner--not as a special exception to the rules for India alone. Although the administration has been slow to indicate how specifically it would seek to adjust U.S. law and NSG guidelines, it has suggested that one option would be to leave the general rules in place but waive their application in the special case of India because of its qualifications as "a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology." A problem with that option is that it would accentuate concerns that the United States is acting selectively on the basis of foreign policy considerations rather than on the basis of objective factors related to non-proliferation performance. Moreover, in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, where changing the guidelines requires a consensus, some countries--notably China--might well resist a country-specific approach and press for permitting nuclear cooperation with other non-parties to the NPT with whom they are friendly--notably, Pakistan.

To avoid the pitfalls of making a country-specific exception without opening the door to nuclear cooperation in cases where it is clearly not yet merited, the administration should propose modifications of U.S. law and the NSG guidelines that would permit nuclear cooperation (except in sensitive parts of the fuel cycle) with any state not party to the NPT that meets certain standards of responsible nuclear behavior. To avoid creating an incentive for countries to withdraw from the NPT, the modified rules should apply only to countries that were outside the NPT as of a specified date, which should be chosen to exclude North Korea and include only India, Pakistan and Israel. For such non-NPT states to be eligible to receive U.S. nuclear exports under a revised U.S. law, the president should be required to certify that the state fulfill several criteria of responsible nuclear behavior.

First, the state must provide public assurances that it will not test nuclear weapons or produce fissile materials for nuclear weapons. Second, it must show that it has placed its civil nuclear facilities under IAEA safeguards, including all nuclear reactors and R & D facilities related to electricity generation. Third, the state must play an active and constructive role in helping address acute nuclear proliferation challenges posed by states of proliferation concern. Fourth, it must establish and rigorously implement a national export-control system that meets the highest international standards, including stringent rules and procedures banning unauthorized contacts and cooperation by personnel with nuclear expertise. Fifth, it must work actively on its own and in cooperation with other countries to stop illicit nuclear transactions and eliminate illicit nuclear commercial networks, including fully sharing the results of any investigations of illicit nuclear activities. Sixth, the state must also apply physical protection, control and accountancy measures that meet the highest international standards to any nuclear weapons and to all sensitive nuclear materials and installations, both military and civilian, on its territory.

These criteria could be written into U.S. law. They could also be adopted by the NSG as criteria for deciding, by consensus, whether a particular non-party to the NPT should be eligible for nuclear transfers from NSG member states. While such an approach would be country neutral, it would enable both the U.S. government and NSG members to distinguish among the non-parties to the NPT in terms of whether--and how soon--they would be eligible for nuclear cooperation.

STAUNCH SUPPORTERS of the NPT can be expected to argue that these criteria do not go far enough--and that only NPT adherence should make a country eligible for nuclear cooperation. But it is unrealistic to expect India or the other non-parties ever to join the NPT, given their longstanding positions. Continuing to insist on adherence as a condition for nuclear cooperation could forfeit the contribution to non-proliferation that steps short of NPT adherence could make.

Those who strongly support the July 18 joint statement can be expected to argue that the criteria are too demanding and could result in India's walking away from the nuclear deal. But even the most demanding criterion--ending fissile-material production--is a step India supports in principle and says it is willing to take when its minimum deterrence needs are satisfied. If India is prepared to stop production now, it could readily meet the remaining criteria. If not, the door would be open for India to walk through at a time of its own choosing. This would be a major change from the status quo that has prevailed for decades, in which the door to nuclear cooperation for India and the other non-parties has been locked as a matter of law and policy.

In its ardent desire to transform U.S.-Indian relations, the Bush Administration has given too little weight to the damaging implications of its actions for the non-proliferation regime. The remedy should not be to reject the deal struck in July but to require that it be pursued in a way that enables the United States to advance its strategic goals with India as well as its non-proliferation interests--not to serve one at the expense of the other.

Robert J. Einhorn, currently a senior advisor at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, was assistant secretary of state for non-proliferation from 1999to 2001.