* Set a date for US bases to close.

Actually the last suggestion isn't quite positive-sum per se either. It assumes a zero-sum fear of U.S. bases in the region, but tries to reduce the Russia fears by putting a terminus on the situation. Perhaps something similar is true of the first proposal. Nevertheless, taken together, the result would be to create space for more positive-sum thinking and action to emerge.

I wonder, would it be more than the carrying capacity could hold in Washington at this time, if one were to go on to speculate about some more explicitly positive-sum activities? That is, initiatives where the United States and Russia are truly supporting one another's influence in the region, going beyond the preliminaries of reducing the old negative-sum mutual suspicions? Perhaps it would be too much and people would turn sour in the belly upon hearing of such things. Or perhaps not. After all, the national interests of the United States require it. For policy analysts, it would be a kind of betrayal  of our professional responsibility, if we were to subordinate our analysis of American interests to our personal or social-milieu interests in keeping a distance from Russia. So maybe we should create some space in our minds to think about these things, whether or not we feel ready for it.

The following are some speculations on potential initiatives for advancing the broad American interests in the region and building up a positive-sum relationship:

* Subsidize some Russian bases and troops to stay in the region, or new ones to be set up where the local regime consents. America needs the Russians for border security, drug interdiction, and other stabilizing functions; and maybe also for regional intelligence with a modicum of objectivity, independent of the local regimes.

* In return, Russia could drop any further mention of a need for the United States to eventually get out.  An U.S. presence would give an assurance for ultimate sovereign independence from Russia; but this would no longer be equated with Russia's absence or with protection against Russian influence.

It's bad for America, not just for Russia and for Tajikistan, that Russian bases are closing and troops leaving from the Tajik border area. Even if one takes the view - as most commentators, who enjoy the tit-for-tat, do - that America has been promoting this turn of events, it's not too late to realize it's a blunder and turn around and do the right thing. How much better off we would be today, if we had realized we were mostly wrong in our enmity to British power in all areas overseas half a century earlier, instead of waiting to wise up only in the Falklands war. The harsh realities after 9-11 ought to impel us to wise up faster about our positive interest in Russian power and influence in some regions.

* Quietly encourage the Georgians (moving our discussion temporarily across the Caspian for this point) and Russians to make the following deal: Georgia stops demanding withdrawal of Russian bases; in return Russians start supporting restoration of Georgian territorial integrity in Abkhazia and Ossetia and stop making noises against U.S./NATO presence in Georgia. In other words, the United States and Russia both stay there, instead of each trying to push the other out.

This would build on the momentum of the recent role of Igor Ivanov in getting Abashidze peacefully out of Ajaria. It would fulfill the hopes of Georgians for Russia to play a similar role in the other, deeper crises of Georgian territorial integrity. At the same time, it would build on the reality that Georgia did much to provoke those crises: Georgian nationalism has been far from healthy in its handling of ethnic matters since 1991. Russian mediation will continue to be needed for reassurance of the ethnic Abkhaz and Ossets if they are to consent freely and peacefully to reunification with Georgia despite their actual preference to join Russia.

* American support for rights of ethnic Russians in Central Asia. US democratization subsidies to Russian-language media and ethnic Russian-led civic organizations and parties. This would free them from the charge of being advance agents of Russian imperialist reconquest; if only by turning them into "US agents", so to speak.

* American public protests and pressure against discrimination against "ethnic Russians" in Central Asia in matters of employment in government positions, in this region, the label "Russian" is put also on Ukrainians, Jews, and most other post-Soviets, along with Germans and all other Europeans living there.) This would earn us tremendous credit with Russians, not just regionally but in

Moscow. It would show that we mean our "human rights" rhetoric for real, with at least a modicum of objectivity, even when it's to the benefit of Russia not just against it. And that would be a darned good thing for the reputation of human rights in Russia, where the democratic cause has suffered by being connected too often with the weakening and humiliation of the nation, and "human rights" has too often come to seem like a code word for hostile activism.

* A regular practice of Washington-Moscow consultations on policy in the region, aimed at joint policy and a united front when speaking to the local regimes. Phone calls to Moscow before Rumsfeld or Powell heads off to Central Asia. In return, some consultation, mutatis mutandis, prior to Central Asia visits by Lavrov or Ivanov, although - realistically speaking - their visits are somewhat more routine.

* A U.S.-Russia "working group" on the region, akin to - or merged with - the one set up on Afghanistan and terrorism in 1999. The group would prepare joint initiatives for positive sums; and meanwhile keep track of activities of both sides in the region, and make sure there is the advance consultation on those activities that's needed for avoiding suspicion on either side of what the other is doing there.

More points could be added, to be sure. I've limited myself here to some basic ones that could be initiated in Washington that it would be hard to imagine Russians refusing. That's an atypically high standard of realism, restricting what can be considered perhaps too tightly. With a bit more idealism or at least a balanced view on Russian intentions, one could ask Russia to couple these points with some others which, while also to mutual benefit, would be most specially and obviously to the American benefit; e.g., help in getting oil pipelines through, getting security on the line, and stabilizing the countries along the route -- presumably still from Baku to Ceyhan, although some other route or routes may be found more optimal once the zero-sum geopolitics are really put aside.

There are also higher levels of cooperation and integration that are worthy but go beyond the cautious limits I have set for the proposals above. Ian Bremmer and Nikolas Gvosdev have written persuasively of the logic of shared bases under joint institutional auspices.

Even without these additional points, however, the ones laid out above would add up to a pretty hefty positive sum. One that enhances substantially the ability of both countries to realize their vital interests -- promotion of stability and modernization in the region and winning the war on terror.

It's the kind of thing our policy analysis community might want to be  bringing into its field for contemplation. After all, we're supposed to be in the business of helping our government think things through and see the way to realizing our society's true interests. Isn't that what policy analysts are for?

Ira Straus is U.S. coordinator of the Committee on Eastern Europe and Russia in NATO.