The Anatomy of Complicity

Dimitri Simes has given a vivid commentary in these pages on American complicity in Russia's crisis (Winter 1998/99). My dosing thoughts aim at some structuring of the problem for continuing debate.

The first culprit is, of course, the dogma of monetarism, its associated postulates and especially its oversights. It is clearly inadequate and often wrong for Russian conditions. Although its adherents frequently say the right things, they actually pay too little attention to the social, cultural, legal and institutional setting required for economic reform, and to the gaps between reality and pretense in various aspects of reform. Their healthy opposition to etatism slides into an unhealthy neglect of the need for a viable state in Russia, and, indeed, in most societies in need of major economic and political reform.

The second culprit is a cynical Washington habit of prettifying policies and glossing over their risks, failures and negative side effects. Much of Washington's action and rhetoric on Russia has been aimed at preserving the image of a foreign policy success, even as the image became more tarnished. The debacle of the past several months has elicited major "course corrections" from Secretary Albright, Deputy Secretary Talbott and others about Russia policy. But one combs through them line by line without finding any hint of an admission that past policies may have been flawed. Perhaps complete candor on a complex policy cannot be expected of any administration. But the lack of candor has serious costs. It magnifies the impact of failure when it occurs and multiplies the difficulties of recovery. Systematic misrepresentation of what our policies, our recommendations, our political support were producing has also contributed much to expunging popular respect and admiration for America among the Russian people, a tragic loss of a major political asset.

Finally, we must face the semi five issue of cronyism. The emergence of crony politico-capitalism in Russia has been accompanied and facilitated by inadequately transparent relationships among actors in Moscow, Washington, Wall Street and Cambridge, among other places. Some of this has been at least minimally illuminated - for example, the dubious activities of Harvard's Institute for International Development. George Soros' remarkable revelations about his lobbying for Russian bailout money during the summer of 1998 shed a bit of light on another aspect of this general phenomenon. How can one distinguish between suspicious dealings that ought to be stopped and the efforts of public and influential private figures legitimately but discreetly trying to influence sensitive matters? Why do I sense that when Chubais boasted last summer that "we conned" (my kinuli) the IMF into the latest pledge of credits, "we" did not refer just to Russians? If this is merely chumminess among a few top Russians and Americans who share belief in the monetarist dogma, it is bad enough. The larger concern is, as it were, "environmental." Our foreign policy, security and business dealings with Russia involve the gravest of stakes, enormous sums of money, and interaction among guileful, aggrandizing and, in some cases, ruthless players. These dealings have gone so deeply into a thicket of insider relationships that some bush hogging is called for. Without more transparency, there is too much room for the wasteful, the dangerous and the sinister.

Not all of America's relationship to Russia's crisis is complicit in its causes. Although to a far less extent than the Russian population, we too have been victimized by its results. A lot of U.S. taxpayer dollars now rest in overseas accounts, rather than being at work fueling Russia's recovery, as supposedly intended.

We have also been doing constructive work in service of American and Russian interests through such programs as Nunn-Lugar and efforts to safeguard nuclear materials. So far, congressional funding of these programs has not suffered from the deepening Russian crisis; but this is not guaranteed for the future. Correcting failures, protecting successes and keeping open opportunities for our policy toward Russia require a thorough stock-taking. Now is the time for it.

Fritz W. Ermarth retired from the CIA in October 1998 after a career that included chairmanship of the National Intelligence Council and two tours on the National Security Council staff. This article was reviewed by CIA's Publications Review Board to prevent disclosure of classified information and cleared; clearance does not constitute endorsement of assertions or judgments in the article.