Because one not involved in the action writes this critique from a distance, it may be too harsh and unfair. Final judgments on the extent, locus, and nature of failure in 9/11 must rest on careful study with complete access to the record of the last decade in counter-terrorism. Our intelligence and law-enforcement leaders claim to have successfully thwarted or interdicted a significant number of terrorist attacks in this period. That record of success must be examined to bring a balanced conclusion on the meaning of 9/11. Even more important, that record should give important lessons on how to design and run an effective I&W system for counter-terrorism.

We need to look back at this tragic experience through the lens of strategic-operational-tactical warning combined with threat, value, vulnerability, and response option assessment to find the true reasons for failure. And if that lens does not presently exist in robust form, it must be promptly created, polished, and applied to the present and future threat of terrorist attack. The place for this lens is probably in the new Department of Homeland Security. But the logic and the impact of the function it performs must reach out to all the nation's elements of intelligence, defense, and public safety.

Fritz W. Ermarth is Director of National Security Programs at the Nixon Center. He is also a part-time Senior Analyst in the Strategies Group of Science Applications International Corporation. He served several tours on the NSC staff, served as Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (1988-93,) and retired from the CIA in 1998. The judgments in this article are the author's own and should not be attributed to any of his past or present affiliations.