While this map is unacceptable to the Palestinians, it is also unbearable to the Israeli Right, as it mandates the removal of many existing settlements and settlement outposts. Indeed, the fate of the Gaza settlements--which were left beyond the fence after Israel's 1994 withdrawal, and have now been dismantled--hints at the possible future of West Bank settlements that remain on the barrier's "other side."

A possible clue to Sharon's intentions is a map presented discreetly by Israeli officials to the Bush Administration in early 2004, when Sharon sought American guarantees in return for his promised disengagement. The White House told Sharon that withdrawing from Gaza alone was not enough and demanded a similar move in the West Bank. It aimed to calm the Palestinians, who feared that "Gaza first" would also be "Gaza last." The Israelis returned with two options: first, a token evacuation of four settlements, and second, a more daring removal of 17 settlements, creating a large, contiguous Palestinian area throughout the northern West Bank, from Ramallah to Jenin. In the course of negotiations, the smaller option was favored. The other 13 settlements remain in place, isolated Jewish spots between Palestinian population centers. Some of them are home to the most extreme settlers. It is reasonable, then, to predict that given the right circumstances they will be next in line for evacuation.

In a speech drafted for the Likud central committee meeting in late September (but not delivered, due to a mysterious sabotage of the microphone), Sharon discussed a further West Bank withdrawal. "Everybody knows the truth", he wrote. "When the time comes, not everything will remain in our hands. We have a dream, which is right and just, but there is also a tough, demanding reality."

Justifying his policy, Sharon cited the demographic imperative, namely, of consolidating Israel's Jewish majority over a smaller territory. This argument has been part of the Israeli Left's arsenal for many years, and Sharon was a late convert to its logic. In the past, he rejected "the demographic problem" as groundless leftist propaganda. Nevertheless, he realizes that the Israeli political center favors demography over territory, as the higher Palestinian birth rate is quickly eroding the previous Jewish majority between the Jordan River and the Mediterranean.

Recognizing the need for withdrawal is not enough, however. The ease of the Gaza withdrawal incited an internal debate in Israel over the right strategy for drawing Gaza's eastern border: by agreement with the Palestinians or unilaterally. Sharon's one-sided actions, the fence construction and the Gaza withdrawal, were born of necessity rather than long-term thinking. But their implementation and public popularity prompted talk about a "unilateral strategy" as the favored national policy.

Recalling the collapse of peace talks at Camp David, the proponents of unilateralism argue that nothing could satisfy the Palestinians' craving for more territory and refugee return. They also mistrust the Palestinians and view their commitments as empty words. Therefore, they say, instead of being held hostage to a Palestinian veto, Israel should determine its territorial interests--based on demographic and security concerns--and use its considerable power to "draw the line" by itself. Final-status talks appear to many Israelis, including Sharon, a fairy tale. Nobody foresees an easy solution to problems like the fate of Jerusalem's holy places and the 1948 Palestinian refugees. The unilateralists would rather leave these intractable issues open than risk another debacle like Camp David. Some of them even go as far as proposing an Israeli unilateral recognition of a Palestinian state as the culmination of disengagement.

Their opponents, from both political ends, criticize unilateralism as naive and dangerous, arguing that its temporary relief is only a recipe for the next war. Right-wingers like Netanyahu assert that Israel must demand a quid pro quo for its withdrawals, that "running under fire" amounts to rewarding the terrorists, exposing weakness and prompting the next intifada. The Left, led by Yossi Beilin, is trying to rally support for its Geneva Accord, a model final-status agreement that Beilin negotiated with a group of Palestinian officials in 2003. The Geneva camp believes that peace is possible and preferable to dictated solutions, which only perpetuate the conflict. More recently, new Labor leader Peretz positioned himself firmly in the Left's camp, recommending a resumption of final-status talks and possibly a lease of the settlement blocs from a future Palestinian state.

Sharon has publicly rejected unilateralism, declaring repeatedly, "There will be no second disengagement." His actions and his open mistrust of "the Arabs", however, indicate the opposite, and few Israelis take his denials seriously. They remember that before his about-face in late 2003 Sharon had firmly rejected the idea of unilateral withdrawal. Clearly, Sharon sees no reason to support "Disengagement Two" at present and favors clinging to the "roadmap" and waiting for the Palestinians to reciprocate the Gaza withdrawal. Nevertheless, it is also clear that he may change his mind if he believes the national interest mandates another unilateral move.

TO THE Israeli Right, this means forgoing the dream of Greater Israel and creating an identity crisis. Sharon's suggestion that "Zionism is not lost" with the removal of settlements and his call to funnel the settler energy into other important areas--the Galilee, the Negev and Jerusalem--fell on deaf ears. The Right is still licking its wounds, wondering if its long-held elitist policy was folly.

At the same time, the Palestinians and the Israeli Left believe that Sharon has never changed; that he remains the regional bully, aiming to crush the Palestinians' national ambitions with a combination of Israeli force and American backing; that his disengagement was only a trick to strengthen Israel's hold on the West Bank, while getting rid of the burdensome Gaza and winning international acclaim. They view Sharon's arrogance toward Abu Mazen and the PA as a proof of their suspicions. After all, he refused to deal with the "no partner" Arafat and then all but dismissed his successor. According to this view, Arafat was unwilling to compromise, and Abbas, despite his stated commitment to peace, is simply unable to get his act together and confront the rejectionists.

The Palestinians' main concern is that Israel aims to disconnect Gaza from the West Bank, thus rendering the dream of a unitary Palestinian state obsolete. Indeed, there are clear indications that Israel is behaving differently toward the two parts of the PA. After all, Israel waived its territorial claims to Gaza while it demands at least a chunk of West Bank territory. From the Israeli standpoint, the threat to cut the PA in two serves as a negotiation bargaining chip. Some Israeli officials believe that a viable state in the West Bank and Gaza, with all their differences and their lack of decent space and infrastructure, is simply impossible. Therefore, they promote a "regional settlement" in which Egypt will regain responsibility for Gaza, and Jordan for the West Bank. The neighboring states obviously reject these ideas, and Sharon has kept quiet about them.

With their characteristic ambiguity, Sharon's policies remain open to interpretation from all sides, and he appears to like it this way. It allows him freedom of action and places his adversaries and interlocutors in a constant dilemma. Having reached that point after the Gaza withdrawal, Sharon will now turn his energies to winning a third term in office. Before making any serious move on the Palestinian front, he must renew his public mandate. And that will be no stroll in the park for him.

Aluf Benn is diplomatic editor of the Israeli daily Ha'aretz and a contributing editor to The National Interest.

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