History and realist theory suggest that such talk of sustained international cooperation is unrealistic and that it is only a matter of time before one or more of these major actors (most likely China or an increasingly united and alienated Europe) challenges American primacy. But this is by no means inevitable. Countries tend to challenge the status quo when they see it as being inconsistent with their national aspirations and vulnerable to challenge. The objective for U.S. foreign policy should be to persuade others to work with the United States--and to persuade them that it is neither wise to work against the United States, given its strength, nor necessary to work against it, given its intentions.

The current administration has it half right on this point. The president's 2002 National Security Strategy stressed the importance of maintaining a U.S. power advantage that would discourage challengers, to prevent "an enemy--whether a state or non-state actor--to impose its will on the United States, our allies, or our friends. . . . Our forces will be strong enough to dissuade potential adversaries from pursuing a military build-up in hopes of surpassing, or equaling, the power of the United States."

There are limits to this approach, however. The United States is not in a position to prevent the rise of other powers. The rise and decline of states has a great deal to do with demographics, culture, natural resources, educational systems, economic policy, political stability, individual opportunity and legal frameworks--all matters largely beyond the control of outsiders. Put another way, there is not a lot the United States could do to prevent the rise of either China or Russia or India or Europe--any more than Europe was able to prevent the rise of the United States in the 19th and 20th centuries. Any effort on the part of the United States to frustrate the rise of another country would guarantee that government's animosity and all but ensure its working against U.S. efforts around the world.

Nor should the United States want to discourage the emergence of strong countries; to the contrary, the United States needs other countries to be strong if it is to have the partners it requires to meet the challenges posed by globalization. The issue for American foreign policy should not be whether China becomes strong, but rather how China uses its growing strength. The same point applies to Russia, India, Japan, Europe, Brazil, South Korea and South Africa.

It is not enough, though, to discourage major power competition or conflict. U.S. foreign policy needs to encourage cooperation. Even if other countries choose not to challenge the United States directly, they could elect to sit on their hands; for the immediate future, non-cooperation is likely to be a more frequent and bigger problem for U.S. foreign policy than direct opposition. The costly and damaging consequences of non-cooperation are visible in postwar Iraq: For more than two years, few governments proved willing to commit troops or resources to assist that country's new leaders and its people to recover from decades of tyranny and the more recent war and subsequent disorder. Over time, this kind of passive resistance to U.S. policies abroad, on the part of other major powers, will drain the resources of the United States or lead to less effective international action against contemporary challenges, or both. Everyone will be worse off.

As a result, the goal of U.S. foreign policy should not simply be to maintain a world defined by U.S. military superiority. Rather, the priority for American foreign policy should be to integrate other states into American-sponsored or American-supported efforts to deal with the challenges of globalization. This can only be achieved through consent, not coercion.

This will not always be easy, particularly given the level of anti-Americanism that currently exists. It would be wrong, however, to view today's sentiments as representing what might be described as a strategic choice by governments to counter the efforts of the United States throughout the world. Although some anti-Americanism can be attributed to natural resentment of a stronger country, the bulk of anti-American sentiment stems from disagreement over particular U.S. policies, especially the war against Iraq, the Palestinian issue and the perception in many quarters of uncritical U.S. support for Israel, and U.S. rejection of multiple international arrangements. The style and tone of American foreign policy during the first term of George W. Bush's presidency has also had an impact. But much of today's anti-Americanism need not be either structural or permanent; the good news is that there are signs that it is abating in some places. Anti-Americanism should be taken seriously, though: It makes it more difficult for the United States to find useful and at times necessary partners. Even worse, over time the perception that Americans do not have a decent respect for the opinions of mankind could bring to power individuals and governments who view the United States as a threat that needs to be countered.

Some will see a risk that integration might prove too successful: Following an extended period of international calm, a much stronger China or Europe might then turn on the United States. There are analysts who take such a risk seriously; John Mearsheimer predicts, in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, "A wealthy China would not be a status quo power but an aggressive state determined to achieve regional hegemony." Here again, though, the strategy of integration offers reassurance. At its core is the ambition to give other powers a substantial stake in the maintenance of order--in effect, to co-opt them and make them pillars of international society--so that they will come to see it is in their self-interest to continue working with the United States and damaging to their interests to fall out with the United States. We are far more likely to face a disruptive major power down the road if we do not pursue the idea of integration.

The more serious questions relate to the United States itself. The first is whether one can anticipate sufficient domestic support for integration. The short answer is "yes." In particular, the burden-sharing that is at the core of integration should be well received, especially if the United States embarks on other wars of choice that prove costly. The American people have shown no signs of resisting the price tag for homeland security or the struggle with terrorism. This is unlikely to change; history suggests support will be there for any future wars of necessity. One area where integration is being resisted (at least by some) is in the economic realm. Here, various forms of transitional economic adjustment assistance, along with education and training, will be required to assist workers who have lost jobs because of foreign competition or technological change in order to prepare them for new ones.

The second question is whether there will be sufficient capacity to carry out a foreign policy premised on integration. Integration requires U.S. leadership, which in turn requires U.S. strength. The United States will need considerable economic and military resources to meet the significant challenges of this era and to discourage a renewed great power challenge. The United States enjoys considerable primacy, but how long this primacy will continue is in doubt given the emergence of enormous fiscal and current account deficits, a strained military that may well be too small, an energy policy that leaves the United States overly dependent on costly imported oil and an educational system that over time seems likely to diminish U.S. competitiveness. Doctrines and foreign policy more generally do not operate in a vacuum; integration or any other American approach to the world will only succeed if carried out by a country that is both able and willing to devote the requisite resources to the many tasks at hand.

1. See, for example, Norman Podhoretz, "World War IV: How It Started, What It Means, and Why We Have to Win", Commentary (September 2004).

2. Henry Kissinger, A World Restored: The Politics of Conservatism in a Revolutionary Age (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1964).

* * *

WANT MORE TNI? Click here to order a print subscription to The National Interest and get free electronic access to the current issue and TNI's archives. International readers can also click here to get an electronic-only subscription.