China's size and economic potential mean that direct Chinese influence and interests will expand westward, as John Garver argues in a comprehensive article in the China Quarterly. The impact of this expansion will be enhanced because of the parallel efforts of the European Union to expand eastward into the Caucuses and Central Asia with its "Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia." This has resulted in financing for road and rail projects in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan that connect to China's Xinjiang province. Though these new projects will take many years to be completed, the geo-economic and geopolitical impact is likely to be far reaching.

Although China has also embarked on a major expansion of its maritime capabilities, most analysts believe that the primary mission of China's navy (PLAN) will continue to be focused on regional defense rather than evolving into a truly global blue-water navy. China's primary security concerns will continue to be Taiwan and preparing for a possible conflict over the island that could involve military operations against the United States. Aside from Taiwan, the South China Sea will remain the focus of Chinese concerns because of disputes over offshore islands, such as the Spratly Islands, which contain important energy resources. China's maritime vulnerabilities are another reason it has launched a massive infrastructure program to open its west to Central, South and Southeast Asia.

U.S.-Indian-Chinese Relations

Although India and China's growing Middle East roles reflect different historical circumstances and different conceptions of national priorities, there is presently an important convergence between their interests and those of the U.S. when it comes to energy security. Historically, the Western powers argued that dependency on Middle Eastern sources required a regional military presence to secure energy supplies, especially in times of war. This was the motivation, in part, behind the Franco-British attack on Egypt in 1956 (to secure continued access for oil through the Suez Canal) as well as creation of the U.S.-led coalition to evict Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in 1991.

Will India and China follow in the footsteps of the Western powers and seek military means to shore up their energy needs? Or will they continue to rely on America's undisputed control of the world's oceans and the presence of the U.S. Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Fleets in the Persian Gulf, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean and the eastern Pacific to guarantee the uninterrupted flow of oil and natural gas to world markets?

Any disruption of the Gulf's energy would lead to an immediate and painful impact upon all their economies. So India and China, even though they disapproved of the U.S. decision to invade Iraq, both stand to lose if the United States fails in Iraq and insurgency and violence spread to Saudi Arabia, Iran and the smaller Gulf states. But it is not clear whether the current mechanisms for assuring energy security, namely American military hegemony, will forever be acceptable to India and China. There are Chinese strategists who are worried about the U.S. ability to stop the flow of oil to China in an event of a crisis and there are Indian strategists who worry that China, at some point, will be able to project power into the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea, especially if China's military ties with Pakistan grow. And some Americans are asking whether the huge price the United States pays to be the world's policeman is worth it, especially if its Asian economic competitors are getting a "free ride."

It has been argued that the mutual interest between China, India and the United States in containing the spread of radical Islam or preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction to unstable regimes has created a strong overlap of strategic interests that should work in favor of developing a trilateral cooperative security agenda in the Middle East, the region where so many of the threats come from.

Yet there are geopolitical realities that do not fit so easily into a pattern of mutual cooperation. For starters, India and China, though now on friendly terms, are inevitable competitors within Asia. They have unresolved territorial disputes along the Indo-Chinese border (over which they fought a war in 1962). India has expressed concern about China's activities in Southeast Asia, particularly Myanmar. China's continuing strategic ties to Pakistan--which go back to the Cold War, including China's cooperation with Pakistan's nuclear and military programs--also figure into India's strategic calculus. More recently, China's assistance to Pakistan in constructing the new port at Gwadar raises a number of questions, including the long-term possibility that China could operate a fleet out of the port. Gwadar is located in Baluchistan in western Pakistan, less than a hundred miles from the Iranian border and similarly close to the Strait of Hormuz.

Some Chinese strategists, on the other hand, see U.S.-Indian ties and strategic cooperation as a potential challenge to Chinese interests in Asia. These concerns could lead to enhanced competition between India and China in both nuclear and maritime forces. India and China could once more emerge as adversaries given their overlapping interests in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, the Indian Ocean and the subcontinent itself. This could be especially troubling if their respective relations with Pakistan and Iran are competitive or even confrontational. The emerging strategic equation will become more complicated as the other great Asian power, Japan, shows signs of adopting a more assertive foreign policy and a willingness to challenge China on key security issues, including the question of Taiwan. In 2005 the Japanese government, in a break with the past, issued a joint statement with the United States declaring that Taiwan is a joint security concern.

Two issues on the U.S.-Indian agenda have implications for the Middle East, especially in relation to Iran. The Bush Administration's decision to revoke decades of restricted policies on U.S.-Indian nuclear technology cooperation have been justified in the broader context of U.S. interests in Asia. Critics argue the nuclear deal is further proof of the administration's radical new approach to proliferation, which is not to see proliferation per se as the problem but rather proliferation to certain hostile countries, such as Iran and North Korea. This philosophy is very different from the original principles underlined in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which required that the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China to take steps to draw down and eventually eliminate their own nuclear forces. There is no evidence this is happening, and countries such as Iran argue the U.S. stance on proliferation is hypocritical and that the deal with India demonstrates the "double standard."

A second issue concerns India's strategic interests in Iran. India has good reasons to nurture a close relationship with the Islamic Republic. A friendly Iran provides a westward buffer in the event that the political situation in Pakistan deteriorates and, in the extreme case, if Pakistan succumbs to control by radical Sunni theocrats. Alternatively, good relations with Iran can help India and Pakistan overcome their antagonisms, especially in the area of energy cooperation. Both India and Pakistan need more natural gas, of which Iran has the world's second-largest reserves. The proposed natural gas pipeline from Iran to India via Pakistan has been in the advanced planning stages for a number of years, but an array of technical, economic and political problems have delayed consummation of the agreement. Not the least of these problems has been the strong opposition of successive U.S. governments to projects that enhance Iran's energy development. Although the United States has no direct veto power over such pipeline deals, its opposition is a major barrier and has a deterrent effect on the various financial institutions that would have to commit great sums of money up front to initiate the project. U.S. opposition to the pipeline runs directly counter to Indian interests; absent a rapprochement of U.S.-Iranian relations, it is likely to remain a source of friction between India and the United States.

Managing the Trilateral Relationship

How does increasing strategic cooperation between India and the United States effect U.S. policy in the Gulf and relations with China? In the immediate future there is little India can do, or would probably wish to do, to help in Iraq. However, Indian policy towards Iran will have immediate resonance in Washington, which could be negative if India parts company with the United States on tough measures to contain Iran's nuclear program. For the future, as India emerges as a great power in its own right, it will have a greater influence over those regions, such as the Gulf, where it has vital interests. A decade from now it is not likely that any Indian government will sit idly by if thousands of its citizens are threatened in the Gulf, as happened in 1990. Given the growing bilateral military-to-military ties between India and the Gulf states, it is not unrealistic to envisage a time when India's role in the Gulf takes an overtone of a "presence", or possibly even that of "policeman." There is nothing predetermined about such an Indian role, but it would be wise for American decision-makers to include such possibilities into their own calculations about future American strategies. India will not act in the Gulf at America's behest, but all logic suggests India and America have many mutual interests in the region.