Pakistan was the only country to accord diplomatic recognitionto the
Taliban, apart from Saudi Arabia and the United ArabEmirates.
Several factors explain Pakistan's stance. Even if the Talibanwere
making themselves an international pariah by their treatmentof
women, they were Pashtun, whom the Pakistanis believed shouldrule
Afghanistan as the largest ethnic group. The desire to see afriendly
regime in Afghanistan that would assure "strategic depth"against
India, a longtime hope of Pakistan's strategic planners, was asecond
factor. Finally, the Taliban were willing to reciprocate for thehelp
the ISI provided by permitting use of Afghan territory bymilitant
Pakistani groups in support of the insurgency in Kashmiragainst
India.

Although the military dimension of the Kashmir dispute hadbeen
mostly dormant for nearly two decades, it flared up in 1989--justas
the Soviets were completing their departure from Afghanistan--asa
result of heavy-handed interference by New Delhi into thestate's
internal politics after the 1982 death of the legendaryKashmiri
leader, Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah. The final straw came withthe
rigging of the 1987 elections to prevent pro-Islamic elementsfrom
winning seats in the state assembly. Frustrated KashmiriMuslim
youth, who until then had been willing to vent their displeasurewith
Indian rule peacefully, turned to violent protest. TheKashmiri
intifada began. For Pakistan, the temptation to fan the flameswas
too great to resist. Drawing on the extensive experience in
orchestrating the Afghan resistance against the Soviets, theISI
began to provide active backing and training for the Kashmiri
intifada. Before long, Pakistanis and Arabs became heavily engagedin
the anti-India struggle. A nexus took shape linking theTaliban,
Al-Qaeda and other Arab terrorists, Pakistani Islamic militantsand
the ISI.

Students, Spies and Soldiers

Against this background, it is not hard to understand why, withthe
bombings of two U.S. embassies in Africa in 1998, Osama binLaden
became a cult hero among Pakistani fundamentalists--a sort ofArab
David standing up to the U.S. Goliath. Support for the Talibanand
their narrow and obscurantist brand of Islam, however, lay mainlyin
the Pashtun-populated areas of Pakistan. The Pashtuns, or Pathansas
they were formerly called, represent about 15 percent ofPakistan's
150 million people. Their strong tribal traditions, martialcharacter
and conservative religious views set them apart from Punjabisand
Sindhis, Pakistan's two largest ethnic groups. The unruly Pathanshad
posed a major security problem for the British Raj, which neverfully
succeeded in pacifying them. After independence, Pakistan'sleader,
Mohammed Ali Jinnah, withdrew the army from the tribal areas,
gambling correctly that a Muslim government would succeed inwinning
allegiance from the Pathans where the British had failed.

Meanwhile, Pakistani society itself has changed. What hashappened in
Pakistan is not so much its "Talibanization", as some haveclaimed,
as its Islamization. This development began in the late-1970swhen
President Zia sought to gain greater political legitimacy forhis
unpopular rule by making Islam a central feature of Pakistanilife.
Although Pakistan was created to provide a homeland for theMuslims
of India, its founding fathers, Mohammed Ali Jinnah and LiaquatAli
Khan, were secularists. They supported the idea of a separatestate
not for religious reasons but from fear that the Hindu majoritywould
not respect Muslim minority rights in a united India. Until Ziatook
over, Pakistani leaders paid lip service to Islam but not toomuch
more. In his Islamization policy, however, Zia substituted
traditional Quranic punishments for Western legal norms,established
a special sharia court to ensure that Pakistan's laws wereconsistent
with the Quran, cooperated with religious parties, especiallythe
Jamaat-i-Islami (which, ironically, had opposed the formationof
Pakistan), and promoted the establishment of madrassas.

In the two decades since, the madrassas have spread widely andnow
number in the thousands. The government's failure to provide
educational facilities, especially in rural areas, created avoid
that the religious schools have filled. They have produced alarge
subculture of youth who are lettered in the Quran but littleelse,
and are inculcated with religious fanaticism for jihad againstIndia,
the United States and other alleged enemies of Islam. The Talibanare
the most prominent product of the madrassas, but other graduateshave
provided the foot soldiers for several militant fundamentalistgroups
that have become a destabilizing feature of Pakistan'sinternal
scene. In recent years, for example, sectarian violencebetween
militant Sunni and Shi'a groups (the Shi'a minority constitutes 15to
20 percent of the population) has become a serious problem,
intensifying the overall sense of insecurity that has grippedthe
country.

Since the mid-1970s, Pakistan's military intelligence service,the
ISI, has also become a much more important player bothdomestically
and in national security policy. Established in the late 1940s,the
ISI at first operated much as the CIA and other externalintelligence
services do, collecting intelligence and running covertoperations
outside the home country. Zulkfikar Ali Bhutto, unhappy with thework
of the internal service, the Intelligence Bureau, gave the ISIa
mandate in the mid-1970s to undertake domestic operations as wellas
those abroad. The ISI has ever since been an activeanddestabilizing
force in Pakistan's political life, promoting the army's agendaand
opposing perceived opponents. Thus, the ISI vigorouslysupported
Nawaz Sharif against Benazir Bhutto in the 1988 and 1990elections.

As a result of the Afghan war, the ISI grew in both size andpower.
At Zia's orders, it served both as the conduit for allforeign
assistance flowing to the Afghan resistance and as the plannerand
coordinator of mujaheddin activities. Covert aid from the CIA,which
was matched dollar for dollar by Saudi Arabia, began rather
modestly--just $30 million in 1981. By 1986, however, thetotal
Afghan program had ballooned to more than $1 billion a year,all
flowing directly through the ISI's hands.

After the Soviets left Afghanistan, the ISI continued tomastermind
Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan. Since 1994, this hasmeant
working with and supporting the Taliban. The ISI has also hadthe
responsibility for orchestrating jihadi groups active in the
anti-India insurgency in Kashmir. After years of cooperationbetween
the ISI and the militants, it is not surprising that supportfor
fundamentalist views has gained ground within theintelligence
agency. It is wrong, however, to see the ISI as an independentactor
or a "rogue elephant." It takes its orders from the government,even
though at times, when the lines of authority are blurred (for
example, after Zia's death in 1988), it can gain moreindependent
leeway.

Career civilian intelligence officers and army officers ontemporary
assignment staff the ISI. The head of government appoints the
director-general, who has traditionally been a serving armygeneral.
Even though the ISI technically stands outside the military chainof
command, reporting directly to the head of government, the factthat
its chief and an important part of the staff are serving officershas
given the army leadership a decisive influence over theintelligence
agency.

The army, in its own right, has been a dominant force inPakistan's
political life since the mid-1950s and has ruled the country forhalf
of its 54 years. Unlike India, where Jawaharlal Nehru firmly
established the primacy of the civilian political leadership overthe
military and the civil service elite, the opposite occurredin
Pakistan. After the death of Jinnah in 1948 and the assassinationof
Liaquat, his successor and chief lieutenant, in 1951, Pakistanlacked
capable political leadership. Senior military officers andcivil
servants, who did not believe that the country was ready for
democracy, filled the void. In 1958, following a period ofinternal
instability, the Pakistani army took over, declaring martial lawand
sidelining the political parties. Pakistan has swung back andforth
between military and civil rule ever since. Even when civilianshave
been in charge, however, as in the 1990s, the army has hadthe
decisive say in national security issues. In times of direeconomic
straits, too, military spending has continued to account for abouta
third of the budget and six percent of gnp. The army has alsobridled
at interference in its internal affairs by the politicians. Itwas
Nawaz Sharif's attempt to put his people in charge of the armyby
firing Pervez Musharraf that triggered the October 12, 1999military
takeover. The army had accepted the forced resignation ofMusharraf's
predecessor a year earlier, but had vowed not to permit such athing
to happen again. And it didn't.

Musharraf's Choice

On September 11, 2001, Pervez Musharraf had been in power for23
months. His record was mixed. The International Monetary Fund(IMF)
gave good marks to Musharraf's Finance Minister Shaukat Aziz,a
former Citibank official, for his efforts to clean up thecountry's
finances. Debt relief was forthcoming, although not as muchas
Pakistan wanted. Development lending was extended for the firsttime
in a number of years. Corruption had tapered off, and fewalleged
that Musharraf and his colleagues were lining their pockets.Still,
the economy remained in the doldrums, suffering from lack ofdomestic
investment.

Observers also accepted Musharraf's good intentions in tryingto
decentralize government even if they questioned the practicalityof
his proposed reforms. Musharraf also seemed to be seriousabout
handing back power to elected national and provincial assembliesin
the fall of 2002 as directed by Pakistan's supreme court. At thesame
time, he made clear that he intended to stay around. In June ofthis
year he pushed aside the figurehead civilian president andappointed
himself president in his place (he was previously styled "thechief
executive"). More recently, he re-appointed himself as Army Chiefof
Staff, the real seat of power in a military regime. At the sametime,
Musharraf left the press relatively free and did not imposemartial
law.

Before the events of September 11, Musharraf had made littlechange
in Pakistan's foreign and security policies. He maintained ahardline
approach toward India, continuing Pakistan's support for the
insurgency in Kashmir. He also continued friendly ties withthe
Taliban, disregarding the global opprobrium that the Talibanearned
by their outrageous conduct.