Although Musharraf has a secular outlook and is not anIslamic
extremist, his government before the September 11 terroristattacks
failed to rein in the major religious parties, theJamaat-i-Islami,
the Jamiat-e-Ulema Pakistan, and the Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam (which,in
particular, supported the Taliban). For example, theMusharraf
government backed off from moderating Pakistan's harshanti-blasphemy
laws in the face of objections by the religious parties. Itappeared,
therefore, that Musharraf was content with the status quo--butthat
status quo begs a short description.

Despite official patronage from Zia and the ISI, thereligious
parties have never been able to attract mass support and haverarely
gained more than five percent of the vote. The clout of the
fundamentalists has come from their militancy, their ability tobring
mobs into the streets and their willingness to exert pressure onthe
administration of the day, whether that of Benazir Bhutto,Nawaz
Sharif or Pervez Musharraf. It was as if Pakistani regimes had madea
Faustian bargain with the fundamentalist parties, affordingthem
political space and legitimacy in return for their service asa
vehicle to promote Pakistan's national interests, via the ISI,first
in Afghanistan and more recently in Kashmir.

On September 11, the day the terrorists struck, Lt. Gen.Mahmood
Ahmed, the since-replaced Director General of ISI, was inWashingon
on a routine liaison visit. The next day, Deputy Secretary ofState
Richard Armitage called him in to deliver what amounted to an
ultimatum. In moving against bin Laden and other terroristsin
Afghanistan, the United States wanted to know where Pakistanstood.
Would it be willing to provide intelligence cooperation, allowU.S.
overflights and offer logistical support? Armitage did not saywhat
the United States would do for Pakistan in return. Secretary ofState
Colin Powell followed up with a phone call to Musharraf saying,in
effect, that Pakistan had to choose between joining the fightagainst
terrorism and international isolation. Unlike the Carter andReagan
Administrations of 1980 and 1981, the Bush Administrationplayed
hardball with Islamabad.

The decision was not easy for Musharraf and his seniorcolleagues.
They realized that public opinion in the country was opposedto
cooperating with the United States. Even if active backing forthe
Taliban and bin Laden was limited to the religious parties andtheir
supporters, the average Pakistani did not like the idea ofbecoming
involved in a conflict with neighboring Afghanistan anddeeply
distrusted Washington. Pakistanis believed their supposed U.S.ally
had betrayed them not only by refusing to help in the 1965war
against India, but, even worse, by cutting off the militaryand
economic aid on which Pakistan depended. More recently, in1990
Pakistanis felt that after Washington no longer needed Pakistanto
afflict the Soviets in Afghanistan, the United States discardedthem
"like a piece of used Kleenex", imposing nuclear sanctionsand
suspending aid, to boot.

But paradoxically, despite this disenchantment and the absenceof
military or significant economic help since 1990, the UnitedStates
still casts a long shadow over Islamabad. Only partly injest,
Pakistanis say that their country is ruled by the three A's:Allah,
the Army and America. Among the English-speakingelite--senior
military officers, civil servants, rural landlords (theso-called
feudals) and the business community--the American connectionruns
strong. They may bemoan U.S. policy, but they send their childrento
the United States for education and seek political, securityand
business links with America. Many in the elite have relatives inthe
400,000 strong Pakistani-American community. Pervez Musharraf'sown
brother is an American citizen, a doctor in Chicago.

The average non-English speaking Pakistani tends to holdstronger
anti-American views, reflecting the harder line of theUrdu-language
press. The man in the street in Karachi, Lahore, Islamabad,and
especially in Peshawar and Quetta, sees the United States as notjust
anti-Pakistani (and of late pro-Indian) but as genuinely
anti-Islamic. This opinion echoes widespread, long-standinganger
over U.S. policy toward Israel and the Palestinians and, more
recently, over policies such as the continued bombing andsanctioning
of Iraq. The virulent criticism of America by the Taliban andbin
Laden has resonated well in Pakistan.

More important than the lack of immediate public supportfor
cooperating with the United States was concern about the reactionof
the religious parties. Musharraf knew that they would quicklyand
vociferously take to the streets to vent their opposition toa
positive response to the Americans. Although the Presidentwas
reasonably sure that the security forces could contain trouble inthe
short-run, he had to be concerned about what might happen werethe
U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan to becomeparticularly
bloody and protracted. If the fundamentalists succeeded eventuallyin
staging massive anti-American and anti-government demonstrationsin
major cities throughout the country, especially in thePunjab,
Musharraf's position would be in danger.

In the past, the Pakistani army has stepped in to prevent acollapse
of state authority in the face of the mob. After disturbancesrocked
the country in 1969 and again in 1977, the army deposedPresident
Ayub Khan, himself a former army commander, and Zulfikar AliBhutto,
to impose martial law. The soldiers and officer corps comeprimarily
from the Punjab, Pakistan's most populous province (as a refugeefrom
India, Musharraf is an exception). Never comfortable with the ideaof
firing on fellow Punjabis, the army leadership would probablyreplace
Musharraf with a general possessing stronger Islamic credentialsif
the fundamentalists appeared to be winning the battle of thestreets.
The danger in Pakistan is thus not of an Iranian-style revolutionin
which the army disintegrates, but of the army bending tostreet
power. Musharraf's recent shake-up of the military high commandto
replace officers who were unhappy with the policy of supportingthe
United States surely went forward with this threat in mind.

Another important factor in Pakistani decisions has been theattitude
of its longtime adversary, India. In January 1980, India stood onthe
opposite side of the Cold War fence from the United Statesand
Pakistan. Its statement whitewashed Soviet aggression during theUN
General Assembly's special session on Afghanistan. But in2001,
against the background of improving bilateral ties withWashington
and bitter opposition to the Taliban, India promptly offeredfull
support to the United States. Musharraf knew immediately that
Pakistan would find itself isolated if it refused to cooperatewith
the Americans; indeed, it would perhaps even find itselflumped
together with the Taliban as part of an American target set.

Although the Bush Administration did not bargain forPakistan's
support--as the Carter and ReaganAdministrations did in1980-81--the
Musharraf government was doubtless aware that Washington wouldreward
Pakistani cooperation. Lifting several layers of sanctions on
Pakistan and India was already under consideration beforeSeptember
11, so this was likely to be the first reward--as indeed itwas.
Pakistan can now acquire spare parts for its aging militaryequipment
and has already begun to receive badly needed economic help. Inthe
1980s, the United States and its friends poured in assistanceto
bolster Pakistan. While circumstances differed on September11,
Musharraf had good reason to expect a generous response toPakistan's
pleas for debt relief and financial help if it joined the
anti-terrorist cause.

Musharraf justified his positive response to the United Statesin a
national television address on September 19. He first spelledout
what help the United States had requested, but indicated that hedid
not know what U.S. plans were. Stressing that the decisionwas
difficult, he argued that cooperating with the Americans wasin
Pakistan's interest, while refusing to do so presented gravedangers
to the country. Refusal to cooperate, he declared, could even
threaten Pakistan's sovereignty, its economy, its securityassets
(nuclear weapons) and its Kashmir policy. Making clear that hehad
India in mind, he undiplomatically told New Delhi to lay off.

Predictably, the religious parties took to the streets to opposethe
decision after mid-day prayers two days later on September 21.The
demonstrations were boisterous but largely limited to Peshawarand
Quetta, where Afghani and Pakistani Pashtuns form the majority ofthe
population, and to Pashtun areas of Karachi. The police containedthe
disorders and the rest of the country remained relativelyquiet.
Although public opinion opposed Musharraf's decision, he receivedthe
backing of the Muslim League and the Pakistan Peoples' Party,the
major mainstream political parties. They provided that backingpartly
because of the sheer horror of the terror attacks, and becauseabout
250 Pakistanis or Pakistani-Americans di