The first position, taken by liberal hawks such as Lieberman, is intellectually honest but now politically fatal within the Democratic Party. It prevents any Democrat who takes it from enjoying the support of the party's own base. Moreover, it essentially apes the gop position on national security policy and therefore concedes the issue back to Republicans.

The second position, taken by figures such as John Kerry, is satisfying to the Democratic base but bound to create impressions with the general public of weakness on national security-the Democrats' Achilles heel. The third position, taken by figures such as Hillary Clinton, attempts to finesse this dilemma by calling for "responsible" withdrawal. Politically speaking, this may be too clever by half, satisfying neither committed opponents nor committed supporters of the war. Furthermore, just because a majority of voters now view Iraq as a mistake does not mean they are ready to surrender to the insurgents and jihadists.

Republicans will no doubt continue to do what Teddy Roosevelt did in 1900 in relation to the Philippines, when he said that the issue was no longer America's "expansion" but rather its "contraction." In other words, they will change the question from one of past failure to one of current action. Whatever Americans now think of the initial decision to go to war, are they ready to surrender in Iraq? And how would U.S. disengagement from Iraq under current circumstances represent anything other than defeat? Any Democrat calling for disengagement, however gradual, will have to answer that question, and it is an entirely legitimate one.

Of course, there is another option: they can refuse to take a clear party stand and allow particular candidates to fashion their message toward local constituencies, in the hope that existing dissatisfaction with the war will sufficiently help their party's electoral chances. This is in some ways the de facto position of the Democratic Party on foreign policy these days. Indeed the Democrats are so deeply divided on these matters that the only party statements capable of gaining general approval tend to be vague to the point of banality. Witness for example the party's spring 2006 statement on foreign policy, "Real Security", which called for a plan to "eliminate Osama bin Laden"-as if this had not occurred to the Bush Administration. Democrats may well have success this fall simply by picking up on public frustration with the war in Iraq, but as long as they give the impression of having no serious or clear alternative on national security, they will continue to be at a long-term disadvantage to Republicans on these issues.

Political pundits often draw conclusions from particular elections that do not really reflect the many reasons people vote: gas prices, hurricanes, a general sense of dissatisfaction. Changes in the number of each party's seats in the House and Senate-and change in partisan control of either house-will no doubt be interpreted as, among other things, a popular vote of confidence or no-confidence on the war in Iraq. But however the issue plays or is interpreted politically this fall, at some point Democrats will be obliged to tell the American public what they, as a party, would do differently and better in Iraq. This will be a painfully difficult challenge for Democrats, not because the war in Iraq is popular or has been well handled-it certainly has not been-but because Democrats themselves disagree bitterly over what to do next.

Moreover, the profound intra-party disagreement creates a sense of incoherence which is itself unappealing. American troops will probably still be fighting in Iraq in 2008. If circumstances do not change dramatically on the ground, then opposition to the war and calls for disengagement from within the United States will only grow stronger. Yet this will not change the fundamental paradox of the political situation: Republicans are tied to an increasingly unpopular war, but the very issue of war raises perennial Democratic weaknesses and divisions that tend to redound in favor of Republicans. In this sense, whatever the result of this fall's mid-term elections, it would be deeply unwise for Democrats to assume that the gop's political losses over Iraq are necessarily their own gains.

Colin Dueck is an assistant professor in the Department of Public and International Affairs at George Mason University and the author of Reluctant Crusaders: Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy (Princeton University Press, 2006).