The most obvious challenge comes from the presence of Al Gamaa al-Islamiyya within the Islamist bloc. The GI is on the U.S. list of foreign terrorist organizations and, at the same time, part of the new Egyptian parliament. While a case can be made that the main, Egyptian-based branch of the GI has renounced terrorism, its presence on the list poses a problem for U.S. efforts to cooperate with Egypt. If the GI is part of the Islamist bloc, and if the Islamist bloc is formally or informally part of the government, then is Egypt a terrorist state?

Putting aside anti–United States terrorism, Egypt continues to have a Salafi terrorism problem of its own. In the mid-2000s, a Salafi group calling itself Tawhid wal Jihad (Monotheism and Holy War) emerged in the Sinai. The group targeted Egypt’s relationship with Israel by bombing the town of Taba in 2004, where Israeli vacationers cross into the Sinai; it targeted Egypt’s tourism sector with both the bombing in Taba and bombings in the Sinai resort towns of Sharm el-Sheikh and Dahab in 2005 and 2006, respectively; and it targeted Egyptian secular nationalism, as the bombings coincided with the Egyptian public holidays of the October War anniversary in 2004, Revolution Day in 2005 and celebration of the ancient Egyptian Spring Festival in 2006. In theory, these groups might be less hostile to the government with Salafis in power. In practice, the opposite might be true. The Islamist bloc, some jihadis contend, has sullied itself by entering politics. Moreover, many of the attacks from the Sinai are on Western targets as well as the Egyptian state, and the Sinai terrorists might hope the Salafi government would be supportive, or at least not hostile.

The Salafi front has demanded the dismantling of Egypt’s national-security agency and may also encourage a purge of the Egyptian military. This is understandable—these institutions brutalized the Islamists for decades, and they are undemocratic to the core. Should they do so, however, they will also gut Egypt’s counterterrorism capacity. Jihadis in the Sinai might take advantage of any potential security vacuum to strike at Israel.

ISRAEL ALSO worries about Salafi influence in Egypt, and for the Jewish state the concerns are more immediate given the two nations’ shared border and history of conflict. Looking at Salafi rhetoric, at least, Israel has reason to worry. Individual Salafi preachers are often vitriolic in their condemnations, and an Al Nour statement declared, “The party strongly objects [to] normalization and dialogue attempts and establishing relations with an entity which wants to wipe off our identity, occupies our lands, imposes a siege on our brothers and strongly supports our hangers.”

The good news is that concerns of the Salafis pushing Egypt to abrogate the 1979 peace treaty with Israel seem exaggerated, at least for now. Indeed, so far, the Salafis—like the Muslim Brotherhood—appear to seek to calm international audiences, even to the point of reassuring Israel. In an interview with Israeli Army Radio, no less, an Al Nour Party spokesman promised that the party would respect the peace treaty with Israel and existing agreements.

But focusing on the peace treaty misses much of the role that Egypt played under Mubarak with regard to Israel’s security. During those years, Egypt policed its border, and if Israel suspected a terrorist plot, Israeli intelligence and Egyptian intelligence would work together to fight it. Egypt’s intelligence and military may still control counterterrorism policy after elections, but even if they do, they will be more politically sensitive than in the past. Directly aiding anti-Israel terrorists at present is not high on the Salafi agenda, but Salafis could push the regime to turn a blind eye to anti-Israel violence emanating from the Sinai. They may not openly cooperate with terrorists, but they would not want to collaborate with Israel either. Depending on the course of events in the region and the stances of other parties, they may also find supporting anti-Israel forces a way to undermine their rivals within Egypt.

Terrorists based in Gaza have found it difficult to attack Israel due to the security barrier along Gaza’s border with Israel. If they could easily go from Gaza into the Sinai, they would have a far easier avenue of attack. Israel also has relied on Egypt to limit the goods entering Gaza as part of the economic pressure it puts on Hamas. It is one thing to ignore Israel but another to cooperate with Israel against Hamas. While Hamas is linked to the Muslim Brotherhood, and Salafis in Gaza are often critical of Hamas, it would be difficult for Salafis to completely ignore Hamas’s needs should a crisis occur. In the end, they view the Palestinians as the good guys.

Beyond counterterrorism, Mubarak was a valued partner in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. It is moribund now, but should it start again the United States would want Arab states to provide political backing for concessions on the part of the Palestinians. Mubarak repeatedly stood by secular Palestinian leaders as they negotiated with Israel and tried to broker deals involving Israel and Hamas. The Salafis, on the other hand, probably would criticize any concessions to Israel.

In August 2011, eight Israelis died at the hands of terrorists coming from the Sinai. The Israeli military, in hot pursuit, entered the Sinai and accidentally killed six members of the Egyptian security forces along with several terrorists. The killing of Egyptian security forces enraged Egyptians and led protesters to storm the Israeli embassy. Israeli leaders and the Egyptian military were able to calm tensions, but for several days the United States feared the situation would permanently damage relations between the two countries.

Replay this cross-border attack in, say, 2014, and imagine a Brotherhood government with strong Salafi influence. How would the Brotherhood respond if Israeli forces shot Egyptians in hot pursuit? It is easy to imagine the situation quickly escalating, with the Salafi movement using any attempt by the Brotherhood to calm passions as proof that it would sell out its fellow Muslims.

CONTAINING IRAN is perhaps President Obama’s top regional agenda item. Fears of an Islamist arc that would go from Tehran through Baghdad and reach Cairo (or even Tripoli and Tunis) are greatly overblown. But the GI’s Building and Development Party, for one, includes in its platform the formation of an “Islamic axis” with Iran and Turkey as a first step in reviving the caliphate. Salafis would hesitate to endorse, or be seen as endorsing, a U.S.-led campaign against Iran given the unpopularity of the United States. This would be particularly true for any military action in the region.

Yet the majority of Salafis have little sympathy for Iran’s Islamic Republic. Many see Shia Muslims as apostates and thus, in a way, even worse than Christians or Jews. When Ismail Haniya, head of Gaza’s Hamas-run government, visited Egypt in February 2012, he was lambasted in a statement by the Salafi Call: “We refuse that Haniya leads the prayer in Egypt’s largest Sunni mosque after he shook hands with the Shiites,” referring to a recent visit to Iran. Also, Salafis, like most Egyptians, have a strong sense of national pride and want their country, not Iran, to play a leading role in the Arab world.

THE UNITED States, on paper at least, champions not just democracy in Egypt but liberal democracy—meaning not only elections but also the full panoply of minority rights, political protections and other assurances that an elected majority is not abusive.

Salafis will push to make a conservative interpretation of Islamic law the only law of the land, and during the process to draft a new constitution, they were not afraid to say so. Building and Development Party MP Hani Nour Eddin said his party “won’t give up the application of the Sharia.” At a conference last fall hosted by the Asala Party, Sheikh Shehab al-Din Ahmed rejected Egypt’s long-held civilian law, saying, “The application of the French law in Egypt spread evils and corrupted the country morally, politically and economically, so there’s no other substitute for applying the Sharia.” This absolutism may apply elsewhere. Egyptians saw how Al Nour always put its own female candidates (legally required on every electoral list) in the bottom position and did not show their images in campaign materials. Before he was barred as a presidential candidate, Salafi preacher Hazem Saleh Abu Ismail campaigned on forcing all Muslim women to wear the veil.

Salafis also reject the notion of non-Muslims being of equal status in Egyptian politics and society—including Egypt’s Coptic Christians, who represent roughly 10 percent of the population. When the parliament held a moment of silence to commemorate the death of Coptic Pope Shenouda III, several Salafi MPs left the room and others refused to stand.

For many Salafis, democracy is only tolerable as long as it can help build an Islamic state, so domestic policies are sure to be at the top of the Islamist bloc’s agenda. Indeed, like politicians everywhere, the Salafis may be willing to make compromises on some foreign-policy issues—the main focus of U.S. concerns—to concentrate on what matters most to their constituents.