As the Royal Ulster Constabulary and regular British Army forces struggled to reduce violence, loyalist paramilitary groups, such as the Ulster Defense Association and the Ulster Volunteer Force, began a campaign of tit-for-tat killings with Catholic Republicans. British security services tended to ignore the extrajudicial activities of Loyalist Paramilitary groups, who killed approximately 1,000 Catholic civilians between 1969 and 1994. Furthermore, reports are widespread that the British security services colluded with loyalist paramilitary groups throughout the conflict for the purpose of human intelligence gathering and targeted killings.

Much as the crimes of the AUC complicated the negotiating position of the Colombian government, those of the loyalist paramilitaries made the idea of broad prosecution and imprisonment of IRA militants unpalatable to Catholic Republicans at the negotiation table. The Patten Commission that followed the 1998 Good Friday Agreement stated how the Royal Ulster Constabulary had “failed at protecting human rights for Northern Ireland's citizens for years,” and resulted in its dissolution in favor of a new Police Service of Northern Ireland in 2001. The separate, but related, Stevens Commission faced extreme obstruction from both security and government officials, and concluded that collusion with loyalist paramilitaries was prevalent in the Royal Ulster Constabulary and British Army. To this day, families face legal hurdles in seeking justice for slain family members, militia violence on both sides continues, and the tensions between Catholic and Protestant communities still exist. The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union has rekindled these tensions and threatens the very existence of the Good Friday Agreement.

The Use of Domestic Militias: A Warning

The police and other uniformed security officials at all levels of government serve a difficult and unique function within the United States. Officers must enforce laws and maintain order, but do so in a way that respects the humanity of citizens and recognizes how police legitimacy rests upon how they perform their tasks. However, the police are the only ones allowed to perform these law enforcement functions. Just as the concept of a Capitol Hill Autonomous Zone (CHAZ) with local “police” volunteers sets a dangerous precedent of lawlessness, so does allowing armed militias to perform security functions alongside police officers. Once the state cedes its monopoly of legitimate violence to others, the population starts to doubt the state’s legitimacy to enforce its rules at all. Subcontracting that enforcement to others carries a moral hazard and tends to exacerbate grievances. What follows is rarely good for the state.

Major Alex Deep is an Army Special Forces officer currently serving in the United States Special Operations Command. He previously commanded units within 3rd Special Forces Group, deploying multiple times to Afghanistan and Syria. In addition, Alex holds a Master of Arts degree in Strategic Studies and International Economics from Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, taught International Relations and the Politics of the Middle East at West Point, and is a non-resident fellow at West Point’s Modern War Institute.