Summary and Key Points: Retired U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Amos Fox argues that "smart bombs" are not as effective at limiting collateral damage as widely believed.

-Writing for the Royal United Services Institute, Fox discusses the "precision paradox," where precision strikes, despite their accuracy, may not achieve their objectives, necessitating additional strikes and possibly ground operations. This can lead to more collateral damage than if conventional weapons were used initially.

-Fox contends that smart bombs cannot replace the effectiveness of ground forces and challenges the U.S. foreign policy that relies on precision strikes to minimize boots on the ground.

The Precision Paradox: Are Smart Bombs Really Effective?

Are “smart bombs” truly effective in limiting collateral damage?

Retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel Amos Fox doesn’t think so. Writing for the Royal United Services Institute, Fox emphasized the “precision paradox,” or “the incongruence between precision strike theory and the fervent enthusiasm of precision ideologues.” Said another way, Fox believes that, despite how zealous the support for precision weaponry is, (in large part due to the system’s professed ability to limit collateral damage) precision weapons still cause collateral damage—sometimes making the damage worse.

“America loves smart bombs,” Business Insider wrote. “Ever since World War II, precision warfare has appealed to what America sees as its strengths: High technology, efficiency and the ability to strike down its enemies with a minimum of harm to innocents.” Indeed, the entire U.S. foreign policy scheme is built upon the premise that the United States can intervene effectively abroad, with minimum inputs, without boots on the ground, thanks to long-range strike options.

But Fox thinks the entire precision strike premise is a myth.

Precision Paradox?

Fox is not convinced in the effectiveness of precision strikes, nor in the idea that smart bombs can be substituted for deployed troops on the ground.

“Accurate strikes are not equivalent to effective strikes,” Fox wrote. Because even if a smart bomb strike lands precisely where the strike is supposed to land, yet, if the strike fails to achieve the mission’s objective (killing a terrorist or disrupting industry), then more strikes will be necessary. So, when the first strike fails, “then precision-based warfighting requires additional strikes and, likely, a subsequent use of land force activities to offset the shortcomings of precision strikes,” Fox wrote, meaning the repeated strikes may result in higher collateral damage than if conventional weapons were used in the initial strike.

“If precision strikes are often accurate, but ineffective, and additional strikes or land operations are required to create the effect intended with the initial precision strikes, then precision strategies do not decrease civilian casualties and collateral damage in conflict zones.”

Basically, Fox is saying that if you kill one civilian during a precision strike, but need five strikes to meet your objective, then a conventional strike that kills two civilians, but meets the objective on the first attempt, is ultimately the better option. Hence, the precision paradox.

“Accurate strikes do not inherently mean effective,” Fox told Business Insider. “Therefore, more strikes are required when a strike does not effectively accomplish its intended purpose. Thus, in the aggregate, if a [precision guided munition] isn’t 100 percent effective, it can often result in similar outcomes to ballistic artillery, or other non-precision munition employment.”

Fox does not believe, however, that improvements to smart bomb technology will solve the problem; smart bombs are already exceedingly accurate. The problem is with intelligence and the decisionmaking that goes into the deployment of a smart bomb. Fox argues instead, as John Mearsheimer has also said, that a land force is typically necessary to achieve a desired result against an existing land force. So, smart bombs ultimately do not serve as a viable replacement for boots on the ground.

Fox’s theory, which he calls “an inconvenient truth about war,” would complicate the American foreign policy scheme, which calls for and accepts intervention abroad with minimal engagement under the theory that desired results can be achieved without boots on the ground.  

About the Author: Harrison Kass 

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

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