Etc.

Sixth, a key member state could undergo a foreign-policy metamorphosis that undermines the alliance. The United States, a newcomer to world politics, turned its back on Europe following World War I, sealing the fate of the Versailles settlement. The Carter administration abandoned Taiwan in the late 1970s, shifting U.S. diplomatic recognition from the Republic of China to the People’s Republic of China. We still struggle with the fallout of that turnabout today. Most recently U.S. president Donald Trump made dismissive noises about distancing America from longstanding commitments to NATO, Japan, and South Korea.

Sometimes unsettled domestic politics can debilitate or even gut alliance commitments.

Seventh, sometimes an alliance fades away rather than burns out. Or maybe it never fully gels. One thinks of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization and the Central Treaty Organization, meant to be NATO equivalents and implements of containment in Southeast Asia and the Middle East. A confluence of events—enmity between would-be alliance partners, disparate views of the common interest, and on and on—could render an alliance stillborn. Even if it existed in name for a time, the accord might become moot because partners did not see challenges and solutions the same way.

Eighth, one or more allies might no longer be able to contribute meaningfully to the cause. For example, demographic decline might result in material decay over time, not just depriving an ally of manpower but enfeebling its economy, its capacity for technological innovation, and other foundations of military might. That ally would become a dependent on largesse from the strong. Inability to share the burden could generate stresses within fellow allies, whose governments and societies might well resent freeriding on their own finite resources—resources that could go to other pressing priorities at home. Ultimately a breach could befall the alliance when the robust abandoned the hangers-on. This is a real possibility as demographic decline takes hold in U.S. allies in Europe, not to mention Japan and South Korea.

It’s hard to uphold commitments without the wherewithal to uphold them. And it’s hard to expect others to provide for your security when you provide little in return.

And lastly, never underestimate an adversary’s efforts to prevent, degrade, or break alliances. Let’s call in the Sun Tzu/Clausewitz tag team once again. It’s commonplace within professional military education to insist that our opponent gets a vote in the success of our strategy and will doubtless cast its vote No. But the opposite is true as well. We will vote No on the success of the opponent’s strategy. When alliances of disparate opponents face off, chances for mischief-making are legion. So says Sun Tzu and his injunction to shatter hostile alliances.

Never neglect interaction between competitors bent on thwarting each other.

For his part, Clausewitz might opine that each contestant can manipulate the cost/benefit calculations that animate its opponent to wage war. It can try to dishearten the opponent, convincing the leadership that its hope is forlorn. Or it can try to persuade hostile leaders that if a triumph is either entirely beyond their means or beyond the means they are prepared to spend on the enterprise, they should stand down by cost/benefit logic. Alliances will go back and forth until . . .

Fuggedaboutit.

About the Author: Dr. James Holmes, U.S. Naval War College  

Dr. James Holmes is J. C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College and a Nonresident Fellow at the University of Georgia School of Public and International Affairs. The views voiced here are his alone.