When one looks for the worst tank to have ever existed, there are, surprisingly, a vast many options to choose from. We all think of the tank as the armored beast that crushes any who challenge it. In fact, there have been at least as many awful tanks as there have been great ones. 

It’s just that the tank has some great public relations. 

The one tank that sticks in my craw is the Imperial Japanese Army’s Type 95 Ha-Go Main Battle Tank (MBT), which was used by Japan in World War II. According to my colleague, Maya Carlin, “By the time this MBT was deployed against American armor in the Pacific during the Second World War, it proved to be an outdated platform. The slow tank could only reach speeds of 28 miles per hour, and its 37mm gun lacked the power needed to strike targets accurately.”

In the 1930s, the Japanese military wanted to get a new tank. It needed something that was mobile and had firepower to augment infantry and cavalry units. The Type 95 Ha-Go was the apotheosis of that movement. Japanese military leaders believed that the simple design of the tank would serve their desire to expand the Japanese Empire. Indeed, by the end of WWII, the Type 95 MBT would be one of the most produced armored vehicles in the world. 

The Formation of the Type 95

Tomio Hara (1895-1990) is viewed as the “father of Japanese tanks” from WWII. He is credited with not only developing the Type 95 but also the “bell-crank” or “Hara” suspension system that all Japanese MBTs used for the duration of the conflict. The Type 95’s general specifications were 4.38 meters long, 2.06 meters wide, and 2.13 meters tall. These tiny tanks were armed with a 37mm main gun on a rotating turret with an additional 6.5mm machine gun. The armor was 12mm thick (just enough supposedly to counter 7.7mm armor-piercing rounds.

The Type 95 was mass-produced by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries around 1936. Subcontractors included Nigata Tekko Sho, Dowa Jido Sho, Sagamu Arsenal, Ikegai Automobile Manufacturing Company, and Ihesil Automobile. Mass production went into high gear after 1938 (around when Japan began its wars of conquest). Between 1939 and 1943, 2,269 units were built. 

Troops using and relying on the Ha-Go for protection soon learned a hard lesson: that Tomio Hara’s much-ballyhooed suspension system for Japan’s tanks was not so great. For instance, troops fighting in Japan’s early wars in Manchuria, China, were among the first to encounter the system’s legendary suspension pitching woes. Indeed, the unique geography of Manchuria proved to be the reason behind the discovery that the Type 95 was prone to severe pitching.

And by “unique geography,” I mean the flatlands of Kaoliang Fields in Manchuria! 

An Awful Track Record in Combat

Later, in combat with British and Commonwealth forces, the Type 95’s 37mm gun failed to penetrate the armor of the British Matilda infantry tanks that were often deployed against them. Similarly, when the Americans entered the war, the armor on the Type 95 Ha-Go proved inferior to the weapons that U.S. Army tanks, like the M3 Stuart, were packing in the war. These tanks were also slower than their American rival. 

According to one report, the Type 95’s weaknesses were not as badly felt against the Americans in the Philippines because the unique combat environment of the country mitigated those weaknesses. In the Philippines, there were few roads and heavy bush, meaning that most tank battles took place at extremely close ranges. 

Beyond the Philippines, though, that was another matter.

What’s more, the Japanese lacked the logistical supply chain to keep large, armored forces operating at the tempo they needed to operate effectively. In a sense, the Japanese were never going to be able to match Western armor capacities on land. The Type 95 proved that stark reality ad nauseam for the Japanese when fighting the Americans. 

Japan, as well as Italy, produced some of the worst tanks in WWII. The Type 95, though, is in a league of its own. It was mass-produced, meaning that the Japanese were forced to rely on it—despite the fact that very early on it was discovered that these systems were insufficient to achieve victory.

About the Author 

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is available for purchase wherever books are sold. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image Credit: Creative Commons.