Biden Ukraine ATACMS Missile Policy is Too Little, Too Late: The Biden administration has loosened some restrictions on how Ukraine can use U.S.-supplied missiles in its ongoing war with Russia. But this move is too little, too late.

Over the weekend, the White House decided to ease restrictions on the use of Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS) weapons to hit targets inside Russia. This move was reportedly in response to North Korea sending 10,000 troops to fight in Russia’s Kursk region, where Ukraine remains entrenched following a daring military incursion. France and Britain have also reportedly approved the Ukrainian use of SCALP and Storm Shadow missiles to carry out similar strikes on Russian territory. This move essentially broadens a policy adopted last May, when the U.S. first approved limited strikes on targets inside Russia to support the defense of the Ukrainian city of Kharkiv.

On its face, this is a positive move. The Biden administration’s ongoing fears of escalation have persistently forced Ukraine to fight for a draw rather than for a win. Since the war started in 2022, the strongly held White House assumption has been that there is a threshold of support – which, once crossed, will create an escalatory spiral that could lead to nuclear conflict with Russia. This dynamic was evident in the earliest days of the war, when Biden blocked the transfer of Mig-29 fighters from Poland to Ukraine because it might lead to more direct conflict with NATO, and “that’s called World War Three.” So the policy became to supply Kyiv with some advanced weapons, but not too many, and with restrictions on their use. This meant Ukraine would not lose the war but could not retake most of its lost territory either.

For Ukraine, the latest policy change might mean the ability to improve its position ahead of negotiations under the next U.S. administration, and being able to prove to President-elect Trump that it can in fact change the facts on the ground in its favor. This is important, given growing Republican opposition for continued support for Ukraine.

Russia, of course, has condemned the move and accused the outgoing administration of “adding fuel to the fire.” Last September, President Vladimir Putin warned that loosening restrictions on ATACMS would “change the very nature of the conflict” and would mean that the United States and NATO countries “are at war with Russia.” On Tuesday, Putin upped the ante by formalizing a new defense doctrine that allows for a nuclear response to any conventional attack on Russia by any nation supported by a nuclear power.

However, the Kremlin has made such red line claims before, and the feared massive escalation has not materialized. This may be because the Biden administration’s baby-step approach has resulted in no dramatic shifts on the battlefront. Indeed, the most intriguing move of late – Ukraine’s push into Russia near Kursk – was done without White House knowledge or approval.

Alarmist headlines notwithstanding, the new policy will stabilize more than escalate the conflict. Ukraine has been slowly losing ground in recent weeks, a bad look for President Zelenskyy with an incoming American administration focused on changing the game. Being able to use Western-supplied missiles more creatively may slow or reverse Russian gains. But the idea that the new Biden policy will deter North Korea is fanciful; the pugnacious Kim Jong-un may well take this as a public affront and increase aid to Russia to prove he cannot be deterred.

There is also the legitimate question now being asked in Republican circles: whether this shift in policy was intended to hand the new Trump administration a fresh crisis right off the bat. With two months left in office for the current administration, this decision could well have been deferred to the next national security policy team. 

Then again, it’s safe to assume that the new ATACM guidelines will not lead to an escalatory spiral. Even the Russians have noted that this could just be a ploy to “reduce the degree of freedom for Trump,” so it is not in their interest to overreact and thereby support the argument that Western aid to Ukraine should continue.

Naturally, President Trump is free to put restrictions on the use of ATACMS or any other weapons back in place once he takes office, or he could use it as a bargaining chip in future negotiations. Yet, it is a mistake to think that the Trump posture will automatically be to abandon Ukraine. In his first term, Trump authorized the sale of Javelin missiles to Ukraine, which the Obama administration had blocked. Ukraine used these anti-tank weapons to blunt Russia’s 2022 offensive and save its capital, Kyiv, from being overrun. Trump, therefore, already can claim a measure of success in having defended Ukraine from Russian aggression. 

The Biden administration’s approach to Ukraine has been to manage a stalemate, to oversee an endless conflict with mounting casualties and suffering on both sides. The new ATACMS policy fits completely within that framework – it does something, but not enough. President-elect Trump has pledged to help end the conflict, and President Zelenskyy believes the conflict “will end faster with the policy of this team that will now lead the White House.” If the war cannot be settled on the battlefield, it will have to be dealt with at the negotiating table. Peace, in other words, will come not with missiles but through the art of the deal.

About the Author

James S. Robbins is a Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs at the American Foreign Policy Council and Dean of Academics at the Institute of World Politics.

Image Credit: Creative Commons.