5) Before launching a school and establishing a curriculum, carefully consider the goals. One goal in Iraq was to expose detainees to American democratic values. Without any experience of democracy (making choices, seeing that one’s actions matter, free elections), the democratic process could only be an abstract principle to a captive adolescent, even if he valued these ideas.

Many possibilities for the migrant children’s curriculum will rightly be considered. For example, is the goal to ensure that the immigrant children don’t lose time, and will be able to re-enter their old schools upon returning home? Or, is the expectation that many will stay, and that their school experience will support their future integration into U.S. society? Given the uncertainty, should the goal be a hybrid system? Can one at best aim for a “get to know the United States and spend some time constructively while you wait for your future to be determined approach?” This will require non-partisan, judicious thinking on the part of policy makers. In Austria during the Bosnian war, large numbers of refugee children required schooling. Their parents were insistent that as soon as the crisis was over, they would be going home. The Austrian authorities, however, had come to the opposite (and ultimately correct) judgment that in light of the magnitude of the crisis in their home country, these refugees would almost certainly be staying permanently in Austria. Consequently, a program was set up to integrate the refugee children into the Austrian public schools as efficaciously as possible—a wise and successful move, as it turned out. Today, the Muslim Bosnians consistently score highest on pro-Europe and pro-Austria attitudes and have done well in employment and economic standing.

To their credit, the military leadership in Iraq thought hard about what kind of a school they intended to run. Should it be an American or an Iraqi enterprise? Should there be a visible military aspect or should the school be an explicitly civilian setting? Two decisions, reached early on, specified (A) only Iraqis or Iraqi- Americans could teach; (B) no one in uniform was permitted in a teaching role. These were well reasoned decisions, perhaps optimal. But they precluded any chance of American soldiers building relationships with detainees, who were often of a similar age, based on common interests of sports, music and the ubiquitous, popular with all, Tom and Jerry cartoons. Military doctrine discouraged fraternizing, and language barriers were tough. Efforts by U.S. soldiers with a knack for language and a willingness to learn some Arabic were received very positively by the detainees, who also enjoyed trying out their English. This may have been a missed opportunity.

In the case of the immigrant detainees, it seems worth considering a heightened role for Hispanic American educators, youth workers and even National Guard members. But whatever the planners decide, they constantly need to monitor their decisions to avoid unintended consequences, and huge gaps between intention and execution.

6) Manage public scrutiny without interfering with or distorting day to day operations. This is how it worked at Camp Victory in the post-Abu-Ghraib era: Two weeks after the school opened, the world was invited in to see the fledgling enterprise. For nine of the following fourteen days, diverse opinion-shapers arrived in droves: the Western and Arab print press, Anderson Cooper, Martha Raddatz, U.S. congressional delegations, Iraqi politicians, the inspector general of the Army, the International Red Cross, and high-ranking officers from the Multi-National Force Iraq. Even Iraqi soccer stars came “to boost detainee morale.” Calculated to impress, these visits were choreographed to showcase the school as a symbol of America’s hope for Iraq and its benign treatment of Iraqi youths. Meanwhile, the war on the ground was bloody and the adult detainees at Camp Bucca were barely under control, which made the school an especially encouraging, heartwarming “must see” for any official visitor to the war zone.

These visits, however, cost dearly. No new school can withstand such scrutiny without dedicating substantial resources to the planning and choreography of visits. The military staff knew more about welcoming higher-ups than fine-tuning a curriculum, so it was no contest what got their attention. Day-to-day military administrators—already few in number by usual school standards—prepared meticulously for these high-stakes occasions, working out routes through the school and talking points timed to the minute. In reflection of international law in regard to detainees, these visits highlighted “care and custody” more than teaching and learning. Details had to be exact: staff went to great lengths to replace the old Iraqi flag featuring Saddam’s handwriting, lest some newspaper print a picture of this obsolete symbol hanging on the library wall. After almost every VIP visit, a new rule would come down—for instance, no more soccer on VIP visitor days lest the players track mud into the classrooms. It is possible to plan for Melania Trump to see a classroom and conclude that “these children love to study.” But the public and the press will be watching closely, alert for even subtle violations, which in turn will keep the administrators on edge and focused on appearances more than substance. Public scrutiny does play a critical role in preventing abuse, but in an adversarial political climate, no one's agenda is pure. And representatives of the administration are on the defensive, more concerned about avoiding bad publicity than about objectively getting things right. One solution might be to devote resources to a competent professional separate staff to communicate with the public and generate ideas, and to require the press to agree on pool reports to cut down the intrusions.

However this ultimately plays out, it is essential on the grounds of ethics, the law, our national interest, our image in the Americas, and our self respect as a nation, that the matter be handled efficaciously, fairly and humanely. There is no upside to getting it wrong, and every reason to exercise flexibility, common sense and good will.

Kathe Jervis is a longtime teacher and educational researcher, and a current staff associate at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University.

Cheryl Benard is a former program director with the RAND Corporation. In 2007 they assisted in setting up a school for young Iraqi detainees on a U.S. military facility in Baghdad.

Image: Immigrant children now housed in a tent encampment under the new "zero tolerance" policy by the Trump administration are shown walking in single file at the facility near the Mexican border in Tornillo, Texas, U.S. June 19, 2018. REUTERS/Mike Blake