Whether Ukraine’s incursion into Russian territory in August 2024 was a good idea is impossible to judge without the benefit of hindsight. Some see it as potentially triggering World War III, while others consider it necessary to prevent Russia’s domination of Europe. CIA director William Burns described the Kursk offensive as, “a significant tactical achievement” that boosted Ukrainian morale and exposed Russia’s vulnerabilities. But it can be much more than that. It can be a trigger for peace by giving Ukraine a bargaining advantage in peace negotiations.

The offensive caught Moscow off-guard, but Moscow’s response was also surprising. Russian president Vladimir Putin did not paint it as dangerously escalating the conflict, being the first invasion of Russia by foreign troops since World War II. Instead, Putin downplayed the incursion. Russia’s attacks inside Ukraine continued and in some cases intensified, but overall business went on as usual.

Is Putin biding his time, as was the case with his response to Yevgeny Prigozhin’s mutiny in 2023? Or is his measured response the result of most Russians just wanting to move on with their lives? Either way, this is an important event.

At this moment, the Kursk incursion has put Kyiv in a strong bargaining position vis-à-vis Moscow. This fact has not eluded Putin, who described the offensive as an attempt to boost Ukraine’s position in future peace talks—which nearly half of Ukrainians currently support.

There has been notable movement in the direction of peace negotiations since the offensive. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz called for renewed diplomatic efforts and a new peace conference that would include Russia. He said Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelenskyy supported this position. The same week, Putin told visiting Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi that he is open to peace talks.

Is Putin open to negotiations? Some see Russia’s conditions for talks as evidence that the answer is no. Putin outlined these conditions for the first time in June 2024 at a meeting with Russian Foreign Ministry employees in Moscow. He said that Russia would immediately cease combat operations if Ukraine abandons its intentions to join NATO and withdraw troops from the four Russia-claimed regions: Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, and Zaporizhzhya.

He emphasized that his proposal would end the conflict, not just freeze it. These conditions have been unacceptable to Zelenskyy, who long said he would not negotiate with Moscow directly until Russia’s forces leave all Ukrainian territory, including Crimea. 

Then there was Putin spokesman Dmitry Peskov’s statement that negotiations with Ukraine have lost their relevance, and former defense minister Sergei Shoigu’s insistence that there would be no talks, “until we [Russian forces] throw them [Ukrainian forces] out of our territory.”

What then explains Putin’s insistence at the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok on Sept. 5 that he never refused to negotiate?

The only time Russian and Ukrainian officials are known to have engaged in direct peace talks was in February-April 2022, weeks after the start of the war. Negotiators produced multiple drafts of a treaty that was supposed to guarantee Ukraine’s future security while fulfilling some of Putin’s demands.

Some blame former British prime minister Boris Johnson for the failure of the negotiations. The decision to abandon the deal coincided with Johnson’s visit to Kyiv, during which he reportedly convinced Zelenskyy that Putin could not be reasoned with and that the West wanted the war to continue.

According to a recent analysis by Samuel Charap and Sergey Radchenko, there was no ceasefire agreement for Johnson to sabotage, and Ukraine’s position required security guarantees that Western countries were hesitant to provide. Still, Russia and Ukraine were willing to negotiate.

If the Kursk offensive leads to a serious attempt at peace talks, it has to not be just theoretically supported but actively encouraged by Ukraine’s allies. The best time to engage in negotiations is when one is doing well, not poorly. Unfortunately, this is also the time when states are least inclined to negotiate. More victories seem just around the corner. But, in violent conflict, nothing is certain. War is always a gamble. 

To think that prior successes guarantee final victory in an activity as uncertain as war is to be under the so-called hot-hand delusion. Those displaying the hot hand typically prefer to keep playing. 

Putin’s (so-far) restrained response to the Kursk offensive provides an opening for negotiations at a time when the Russian public has grown tired of the war and would unlikely be moved to greater sacrifice. Both Putin’s and Zelensky’s pronouncements of their maximalist positions could be an outright rejection of real negotiations, or they could be a bargaining tactic. There is only one way to find out.   

About the Author

Yelena Biberman is an associate professor of political science at Skidmore College, an associate at Harvard University’s Davis Center, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council. 

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