Imagine U.S. sentiment if 8,000 conscripted prisoners died from 2001-2021. 

By comparison, more than 2,400 U.S. service members died during U.S. operations in Afghanistan. The twenty-year conflict, combined with economic reasons and the loss of these service members, influenced the decision to withdraw all U.S. service members from Afghanistan. Unlike U.S. policy, which is swayed by voter sentiment, Russia historically plays a long game when it comes to managing conflict and its soldiers. 

The Russian people fall back on patriotism and eventually self-unify in extended times of turmoil. The USSR lost twenty-seven million people during WWII, and it is estimated around 8.7 million of these deaths were Russian military members. The Russian people suffered greatly during WWII, but through unifying the USSR, they persevered. 

Vladimir Putin was born seven years after the siege of Leningrad, where although his mother survived, his older brother died of starvation while his father was severely injured on the frontlines. Russians, including now President Putin, self-unify through toil. Now, Russian propaganda talks about the Great Patriotic War 2.0 or the conflict between the USSR and Nazi Germany as justification for the current conflict in Ukraine to prevent European invaders into the Russian lands. 

It started with the infamous European invader Napoleon, which created a sentiment that “everybody in Europe” was out to get Russia. The same mentality exists six generations later, which leads to Russia creating buffer states like Ukraine.   

Unlike Moscow’s unpopular wars in Afghanistan and Chechnya, the Committee of Soldiers’ Mothers of Russia (CSMR) initially unified behind Putin’s special military operation in Ukraine because the Army employs many families in parts of Russia with high levels of socio-economic deprivation. 

Further into the conflict, some of the CSMR began to oppose it. Because the Kremlin doesn’t offer the minority their voice once seen during the Russian conflicts in Afghanistan and Chechnya, the CSMR takes to social media, which is controlled by the state. The CSMR's original support for Putin, combined with the silence of the minority, has created unification amongst some of the Russian people.  

Russia has a long history of national conscription. Once he turns eighteen, every male must serve in the Russian armed forces. This is a class system in which political connections and residence play a big part in determining to which service branch a conscript is assigned. If politically connected, a young service member may be fortunate enough to serve in the Russian Air Force or Navy. 

However, most Russian men will serve in the Army, where they face intense hazing and scrutiny, creating a hardened Russian Army ready for battle. Some Russian sources believe there is deliberate ethnic cleansing from Russian leadership. If soldiers are dying, it might as well be criminals and unwanted minorities. There is a big difference between Slavs and non-Slavs. Russian racism works in an unofficial tiered system. 

The Rungs of the Ladder (and Those Who can be Disposed)

The first tier is with Slavs and non-Slavs. The middle tier is Russians with Asian ancestry from the “stans” or far Siberia, and “the worst” is what they call dashiki. This bottom tier consists of Russians of the Muslim faith. It is well-known in the civil-military field that there is a high level of hazing-related deaths in the Russian Army. 

Unlike U.S. military policies that value soldier lives, Russia views Army service members as disposable. During WWII, Russia lost twenty-one times the amount of American service members. Nothing has changed since the fall of the USSR. Russia will continue to send ill-equipped soldiers into battle.  

Mass casualties have been inflicted on the Russian Army, but have we seen the best that Russia has to offer? 

No. 

Russia has thrown bodies at the Ukrainians with USSR-era upgraded equipment. Because this is what the Kremlin does, they play the long game. Russia will continue to throw bodies at the Ukrainians. 

At first, the tactic was advantageous for the U.S. and its allies; Russian soldiers were killed with advanced equipment, allowing for the analysis of the effects of modern equipment on updated Russian equipment. The problem is that U.S. adversaries were also given a front-row seat to assess how U.S. equipment can withstand aged equipment within modern warfare. 

The other issue is U.S. politicians could not stop bragging about it. Effectively using captured Western tanks for propaganda purposes within Russia, parading, “all of NATO is fighting us.” 

The Irregular Warfare Center published an article on the Internal Criticism of the Russian Military's use of special operations forces (SOF). However, who is considered Russian SOF? 

The term SOF is fluid in Russian; if you ask the Head of the Chechen Republic Ramzan Kadyrov, most of his Chechen units are SOF, too. Informal channels confirm that Spetsnaz is not considered SOF and is subpar to Army Rangers, which have more built-in support. During the USSR era, every brigade had a Spetsnaz unit, and now, there is a Russian SOCOM (RuAF SOCOM), which has seen mixed success in Ukraine. 

RuAF SOCOM provides Direct Action and Special Reconnaissance for theater commanders in Ukraine. When it comes to irregular warfare and subversion, Russia’s intelligence units suggest a lack of actual engagement against the Ukranian SOF (UKRSOF) in the early days. At the start of the conflict, UKRSOF allowed Russian advancement to create devastating effects within the Russian Forward Line of Own Troops (FLOT) essentially limiting Russian artillery capabilities. 

Although Russian soldiers and generals alike are gaining valuable warfighting experience, Russia still faces a lack of skilled military forces. To combat this, it has offered limited short-term enlistments to prior service military forces with sign-on bonuses. These skilled soldiers enable Russia to sacrifice numbers to achieve their goal of a reunified USSR. The recruitment of a skilled military force enabling the conscripted war machine is one tactic that will allow the Russian Army to persevere post-Ukraine. 

Beyond traditional military tactics, Russia employs a host of soft power tactics. The Russian diaspora was launched post-USSR as a foreign policy to protect Russian citizens abroad. The Russian Federation sought to prove itself in the international arena with national sentiment and integration movements during a period of economic instability as their new identity. When Putin became President, he made it a priority to reintegrate post-Soviet regions through the Russian diaspora. 

Putin, in discontent about Russia’s borders after the collapse of the USSR, reinstated the protection rights of Russian citizens and compatriots living abroad. The term “compatriot” is currently used in Russian foreign policy as a, “citizen living abroad, former citizens of the USSR, Russian immigrants from the Soviet Union or the Russian Federation, descendants of compatriots and foreign citizens who admire Russian culture and language.”  

Sources state that twenty-five million Russian compatriots live abroad. Ex-compatriots and Russian experts put this number closer to 100 million, closely matching the total number of Russians residing within Russia. Analysts are concerned this leads to intelligence gathering and destabilization efforts globally. 

The Russian Federation allocates 400 million rubles to support this population by providing free Russian passports and funds for cultural events. A great example of this is Estonia’s Narva region or Moldova. Russia spends money on cultural events, locations, and free access to Russian broadcasting services to foster a feeling of belonging with the area's compatriots. Moving further in this direction, Putin has aligned with  North Korea, adding North Korean service members to the Russian war machine. 

Patriotic unification under a class system operating with accurate intelligence gathering allows Russia to play the long game. The real threat is not the “degraded Russian military.” Russia can drag the war out in Ukraine. The best solution is an agreement to be made between Ukraine and Russia, where both sides are unhappy.  

Alexander Hardy is the co-founder and CEO of Valerio Solutions, a digital transformation company. He currently serves in the United States Army Reserve as a Non-Commissioned Officer in Charge (NCOIC). Alexander’s military education includes the United States Army Infantry School (now the Maneuver Center of Excellence) and the United States Army Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE). He is also an Information Systems Adjunct Professor at the University of Dayton School of Business.  

Benjamin Hazen currently serves as an Assistant Professor of Operations and Supply Chain Management at the University of Dayton. He previously served 20 years in the US Air Force in both enlisted (Satellite, Wideband, and Telemetry Systems) and commissioned officer (Aircraft Maintenance and Logistics) positions. Retiring in 2019, Ben last served as an Associate Professor of Logistics and Supply Chain Management and Deputy Director of the Center for Operational Analysis at the Air Force Institute of Technology.  

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.