Ukraine’s daring incursion into Kursk provided a much-needed morale boost and sparked renewed debate over Russian redlines and escalation. Most importantly, it demonstrated that Kyiv would continue to fight for its sovereignty and territory through any means necessary despite waning Western support. However, once it became clear that the offensive failed to achieve its primary objective of diverting Russian forces away from the Donbas, Ukraine should have withdrawn from the border region to stabilize the frontline. Instead, Kyiv appears determined to stay in Kursk in hopes that it could be used as a bargaining chip in future negotiations, whereas Russia has prioritized its offensive in the Donbas.  

Ukraine has deployed over 15,000 troops, including elite units, to the Kursk region, thereby exacerbating its manpower shortage and allowing Russia to accelerate its advance in the east. As a result, Russian troops are now less than ten kilometers away from Pokrovsk, a key logistics hub, and their offensive is intensifying in the northwest of Donetsk, towards Chasiv Yar, and in the southwest, in Vuhledar. 

The Kremlin wants to gain control of these key strategic areas before winter, and since defensive lines behind Pokrovsk aren’t as well fortified, this could pave the way for a Russian breakthrough next spring. The Kremlin has also responded to the incursion by massively attacking Ukraine’s energy infrastructure as punishment to make winter as unbearable as possible.  

Now that Russia has finally launched its counteroffensive, Ukraine will have to decide whether continuing the incursion is worth jeopardizing the defense of its eastern territories. Unfortunately, it seems as though Kyiv is placing too much political importance on Kursk. President Volodymyr Zelensky has argued in favor of bringing the war to Russia to force the population to seek peace. While many Russians may disagree with the war and dislike Vladimir Putin’s regime, they understand that the cost of defeat is too high and could, therefore, threaten the stability of the state. 

Moreover, there is a prevailing sense that Russia has finally turned the tide in the war, and only victory will restore security to its borders. Despite embarrassing the Kremlin, again, the incursion does not represent a threat to the regime, nor does it severely undermine its war effort, which is why it did not trigger a dramatic escalation. Persistent border insecurity could be used as leverage in future negotiations, but Ukraine would have to conduct multiple campaigns throughout several years for it to have an impact, and it still won’t compensate for the loss of strategic territory in the Donbas.  

Finally, while it is impressive that Ukraine has seized over 1000 square kilometers of Russian land, the territory itself is of limited strategic value and only consists of Suzha, a town of 5000 people, and small neighboring villages. If the objective is to force the Kremlin to negotiate a land swap, then Ukraine has to prove that it can hold the territory indefinitely. If after several weeks or months, Russia is still unable to fully dislodge Ukrainian troops, it may decide to use more destructive means, including the use of glide bombs, on Ukrainian-occupied territory. 

At some point, Ukraine will have to withdraw from the region; otherwise, it will incur a staggering loss of troops and resources. But as casualties mount in Kursk and Russia gains ground in Donetsk, the political cost of retreating will become higher, and Ukraine risks falling victim to the sunk cost fallacy. What started as a remarkable tactical success quickly became a strategic blunder. 

About the Author 

Kelly Alkhouli is a geopolitical analyst and director of international relations at the Center of Political and Foreign Affairs (CPFA),

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.