A future Harris administration would do well to maintain the current Biden approach toward North Korea, at least initially. Two key reasons justify this restraint. 

First, much like her Democratic and Republican predecessors, Kamala Harris would find her options for dealing with Pyongyang limited. Despite the temptation to adopt a tougher stance to satisfy domestic audiences, as Trump did, there is a consensus that keeping the door open for dialogue tends to yield, at least, less problematic results. 

Maintaining engagement with North Korea is crucial, even if no immediate strategic gains are apparent. A hawkish approach would only bolster China’s image efforts as a peace mediator on the Korean Peninsula, while heavy-handed diplomacy would deepen the historical grievances and ideological prejudices entrenched within the North Korean elite. Traditionally, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) regime views Washington’s denuclearization proposals as a ploy to undermine its survival. 

In this context, continuing the Biden administration’s balanced approach, striking a middle ground between “Obama’s arm’s length” and “Trump’s grand bargain” diplomacy, without abandoning the long-standing commitment to denuclearization, appears to be the most prudent course for Harris, at least initially. 

The precondition for this approach is clear: no significant changes must occur in the East Asian geopolitical landscape that would alter the current regional balance of power. 

Second, Harris must strengthen the trilateral framework with Japan and South Korea, referred to by China as the iron triangle. This agreement, established in August 2023, may be one of the best legacies of Biden’s East Asia diplomacy. However, this arrangement must go beyond merely enhancing institutional mechanisms for diplomatic, intelligence, and military cooperation as agreed upon at Camp David. 

The success of any American strategy to deal with North Korea and China depends on the quality of bilateral relations between Seoul and Tokyo. A genuine and effective South Korea-Japan strategic partnership could indeed be a paradigm shift in dealing with Kim Jong-un. While the advances under the Spirit of Camp David are commendable, the volatile domestic political climates and historical mutual suspicion between these two allies warrant caution. 

A critical step is ensuring a more predictable and stable South Korean foreign policy. South Korea has a history of shifting foreign policy between administrations, moving freely from a soft Sunshine Policy to a tougher stance on Pyongyang without hesitation. Additionally, South Korean presidents also have displayed varying degrees of sympathy and commitment toward the United States’ East Asian policies in the last decade. The trilateral framework must aim to guarantee a more consistent South Korean approach while keeping a close watch on radical nationalists within Japan. 

While the temptations to establish a narcissistic Harris Doctrine will be strong, Kamala would be wise to maintain the delicate balance of the current Biden approach. Proceeding cautiously, like stepping on solid stones while crossing the geopolitical river, is advisable, at least at the outset. By continuing to prioritize engagement over escalation, while simultaneously strengthening the trilateral partnership with Japan and South Korea, a new Democratic administration can craft a nuanced policy that avoids the pitfalls of aggression while preparing for future North Korean moves. 

However, by no means this must be an option for inertia. The evolving global significance of North Korea, driven by its ties with Russia amidst the war in Ukraine, means that Harris would need to adapt, not rigidly adhere to, her diplomatic strategy. Careful calibration of both traditional alliances and emerging threats will be crucial to keeping peace on the Korean Peninsula principally in the current turbulent times.

About the Author: 

Moises de Souza is an Assistant Professor in Asia Pacific Studies and Course Leader for the International Relations Programme at the School of Psychology and Humanities at the University of Central Lancashire (UK). He also serves as Chair of the Northern England Policy Centre for the Asia Pacific (NEPCAP). 

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