Today, many military systems look a lot like consumer electronics. In fact, many consumer products, like drones (a market dominated by China’s DJI at the moment) are being routinely repurposed as munitions and as armed ISR platforms. Even high-end military systems like missiles and torpedoes are essentially very complex sensing and processing platforms that happen to include propulsion systems and explosive payloads. Manufacturing these systems can be done with the same kind of tooling and cost reduction in scale that is routinely achieved in consumer electronics.

The United States and NATO could benefit from encouraging Taiwan to become a center for the manufacturing of such weapons systems. Today, advanced munitions are reliant on a highly bureaucratic, antiquated manufacturing and contracting system. As a result, a Tomahawk missile costs $1.5-2M today,  the United States only has about 4,000 of them, and the supply is likely to shrink to less than 1000 units as part of an ongoing modernization program.  Similarly, a modern torpedo costs as much as several million dollars. Lightweight Mark 54 systems are cheaper but still in the million dollar per unit range, a Harpoon anti-ship missile costs $1.5M, and Patriot anti-aircraft missile unit costs are in the $4m range.  Even systems that are intended for much wider deployment are quite expensive:  Javelin missiles go for about $80,000, with a $100,000 launcher.  A shoulder-launched Stinger anti-aircraft missile is now priced at about $400,000. 

These munitions are being hand-built like Ferraris, not churned out in volume like iPhones. In short, the industry is in a low-volume, high-price, sole-sourced trap.

These are, as a result, expensive munitions that can be expended profligately, and the numbers of them that are being manufactured – low hundreds per year of the Tomahawks, for instance – are not nearly adequate to support a distributed deterrence model. The Taiwanese alone need thousands of each of high-end munitions (and much more) in order to have a credible deterrent against China. It is essential to the security of the United States to ensure that the Taiwanese have an unambiguous ability to sink a thousand-ship invasion flotilla, with capacity to spare to attack infrastructure and other targets:  In addition to a ~800-ship navy, China has hundreds of civilian amphibious transport ships available for sea lift, and hundreds of maritime militia ships; this count does not include the many thousands of merchant ships either owned or flagged in China.

An obvious solution would be for the United States, in conjunction with the companies that supply arms to the U.S. military, to license the Taiwanese to manufacture these kinds of munitions in quantity. Simple commercial contract vehicles, like those commonly used for consumer electronics, would serve to create dramatically improved incentives for cost reduction compared to what currently dominates the defense contracting world. By offering take/pay contracts for large volumes of these munitions and launch systems, the United States could harness the enormous skill and power of the Taiwanese manufacturing ecosystem to rapidly drop the cost of these systems:  Imagine doubling or tripling the spend on Tomahawks, but getting 10 or 20x the number of munitions.  This is the kind of volume and price ramp that the Taiwanese electronics ecosystem routinely achieves for consumer goods, and they do it in time for the Christmas shopping season, again and again. By moving to commercial contract vehicles and enlisting the help of Taiwan’s mighty electronics industry, the United States can help the Taiwanese to defend themselves.

Furthermore, as the volumes go up and the costs come down, these manufacturing lines and suppliers can be duplicated here in the United States, in a transfer of manufacturing capability and expertise. Reducing the costs of these munitions will create a situation where the United States can afford to enable distributed deterrence by our allies across the globe.

One objection that many will raise:  What happens if China does successfully invade Taiwan, and Taiwan is a manufacturing center for these munitions? One response:  All of these munitions have been around for decades and have been expanded around the world. While the most recent upgrades may hold some mystery, the older generations have surely all been reverse engineered. In addition, the plants where these munitions will be manufactured can be set up so that, in the event of an invasion, they can be rapidly and comprehensively destroyed. And lastly, the key recent upgrades are embodied in specific subsystems, chips, and software - providing the chips and the finished subsystems is not necessarily the same as providing the means to replicate them at scale. Key technologies that are encapsulated in isolated subsystems - and especially in chips made in the US - could be held back and only manufactured in the United States, for the most advanced platforms. And given the extensive nature of Chinese espionage here in the US, it’s time to think less about keeping secrets and more about delivering capabilities.

Right now, the CCP would be reasonable in viewing a fight in the Taiwan straits as one in which they would likely lose only ships and planes that they put into play. This is much like Putin’s situation before the Ukraine invasion; the Russian army units put into Ukraine were at risk, but assets within Russia were safe from attack. Enabling the Taiwanese to attack Chinese assets far afield and deep within China fundamentally changes this calculus.

Victory in the Taiwan straits is a matter of maintaining the status quo, while in parallel driving a rapid reduction in Western dependence on key and strategic goods production in China.  As Hal Brands points out, China has engaged in the fastest buildup of military capability in modern history over the past few years, and our current deterrence strategies are failing.  Distributed deterrence is less about what we will do to deter an invasion, and more about enabling deterrence for our allies, who are under direct and existential threat.

The Chinese leadership explicitly declared their intent to have the capability to invade and integrate Taiwan by 2027; given their record in Hainan, the South China Sea, Tibet, and Hong Kong, we should take them at their word.  The most straightforward path for deterring China from an invasion is to furnish the Taiwanese with the capabilities and technology required to defend themselves, and to punish Chinese aggression. A commitment to sail to Taiwan’s aid, while valuable, is insufficient.

Michael Hochberg earned his Ph.D. in Applied Physics from Caltech, and currently runs Periplous LLC, a strategy consulting company.  He founded four companies, representing an exit value over a billion dollars in aggregate, spent some time as a tenured professor, and started the world’s first silicon photonics foundry service.  He co-authored a widely used textbook on silicon photonics, and has published work in Science, Nature, National Review, The Hill, American Spectator, RealClearDefense, Fast Company, etc.

This article was first published by RealClearDefense.

Image: U.S. Department of Defense.