Globo-Cop

Globo-Cop

Why China can't threaten the U.S. anytime soon.

 

Even the Bush administration refused to confront Russia in its war with Georgia. Future administrations are unlikely to consider war with China over Taiwan. India, with a nuclear arsenal and sizable conventional force, is likely to join the “no go” parade next. Others will eventually follow. Rather than bankrupt the American people trying to increase military outlays sufficient to overawe all of Washington’s potential adversaries, U.S. policymakers should build a smaller force capable of defending America from all-comers and intervening in only the very limited number of foreign conflicts likely to be genuinely important for U.S. security. If China turned out to be an expansionist power with globally hegemonic ambitions, Washington could back friendly states like Japan. But there would be no American armada sailing to ensure that the Filipino flag flies over the Spratly Islands.

John Bolton argues for “confronting China’s snarl” rather than allowing Beijing’s “aggressiveness to go unchecked.” However, if the PRC’s more assertive behavior is a wake-up call, it is primarily meant for China’s neighbors. The ASEAN states, Australia, Japan, and South Korea all have grown more nervous about Beijing’s intentions. They should back up their wariness with military force. After all, they have more at stake than does the U.S., which has more than fulfilled its obligation by defending the region for the last 65 years.

 

Washington has obvious differences with the PRC, and should present its position firmly when justified. But none of these disputes is important enough to trigger war. That was the case even when America’s military war far superior to China’s armed forces. The case for cooperation rather than confrontation is even more obvious today, when “China can reach out and hit the U.S. well before the U.S. can get close enough to the mainland to hit back,” observes Toshi Yoshihara of the U.S. Naval War College.

Indeed, the catastrophic consequences of Germany’s disruptive entry into Europe’s established order illustrate the importance of restraint on all sides in China. John Lee of Australia’s Centre for Independent Studies warns: "China’s overestimation of its own capabilities, and underestimation of American strengths and resolve—combined with strategic dissatisfaction and impatience—is the fast way toward disastrous miscalculation and error.”

In today’s world Washington policymakers need to focus more on defense than offense. America’s unipolar moment is ending. Better to adapt to the new reality than wreck the U.S. economy attempting to maintain an unrealistic military primacy, which benefits allied nations far more than American citizens.