The Harris administration will likely maintain the Biden administration’s approach to North Korea because of the significant and long-lasting effects of recent shifts in the international security landscape marked by the deepening of Russo-North Korea cooperation. The Biden administration has had little luck with its diplomatic efforts and outreach toward North Korea since the start of Biden’s term. The failed Hanoi Summit in 2019 prompted North Korea to seek an alternative option that would keep South Korea and the United States out of the picture—an unfortunate consequence of counterproductive summits.

In the meantime, North Korea has put the nail in the coffin regarding a possible revival of talks with the United States. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine offered a timely opportunity for Pyongyang to boost its economy through bilateral arms trade with Moscow. This diverts North Korea’s reliance on nuclear diplomacy, which entails putting on a demanding and financially costly diplomatic show with Seoul or Washington that comes with, from Pyongyang’s perspective, empty promises of sanctions-lifting.

A second Trump term is also unlikely to turn the tide. In response to Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump’s claim that Kim Jong-un misses him, Pyongyang shut down further speculations about a possible resuscitation of summitry with Trump.

As the doors to diplomacy with North Korea closed, another diplomatic door opened for the Biden administration.

With Fumio Kishida and Yoon Suk-yeol seeking a break from their predecessors’ security policy after entering office in 2021 and 2022, respectively, North Korea catalyzed the strategic rapprochement between Japan and South Korea. It provided a convenient justification for persuading their domestic constituents of the need for a hawkish and, more importantly, joint action.

The series of shuttle diplomacy between Seoul and Tokyo eventually cleared the path for the trilateral U.S.-Japan-South Korea summit in Camp David in August 2023. Questions of its longevity and strength have been partly quelled by the recent announcement to institutionalize the trilateral framework by establishing a secretariat shortly. The institutionalization of the U.S.-led trilateralism in Northeast Asia will ensure that it survives the possible transition from Biden to Harris.

However, it remains unclear what role this trilateral institution could play when it comes to diplomacy with North Korea. The trilateral framework remains a threat management mechanism centered on joint efforts of defense and deterrence. Change of leadership and administration in Japan in September and South Korea in 2027 could potentially derail or dilute the current aspirations for consolidating trilateral cooperation efforts.

There are two possible diplomatic directions the secretariat could take in diplomacy. First, it could pursue reviving multilateral diplomacy with North Korea, such as the Six-Party Talks. A longer-term but less feasible approach is to further institutionalize into a formal alliance institution capable of diplomatic representation similar to NATO.

Until either approach seems feasible, diplomacy with North Korea will remain a singular effort by each country rather than a concerted one. Democratic presidential nominee Kamala Harris underscored during her acceptance speech that she will not “cozy up” to Kim Jong-un. However, as long as Russia-North Korea persists and deepens, she would have to think out of the box and consider “what can be, unburdened by what has been” when it comes to U.S.-North Korea relations and diplomacy.

Minseon Ku is a postdoctoral fellow with the Diplomacy Project at the Global Research Institute, William & Mary.

Image: Creative Commons.