Growing military cooperation between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Russia has led to a surge of pearl-clutching among the U.S. foreign policy establishment and its allies in the corporate news media. The signing of a new bilateral security treaty in June 2024 has produced warnings of a heightened security threat to the United States and its allies in both Europe and East Asia. Having made that diagnosis, though, such analysts have very few ideas for a cure or even a modestly beneficial treatment. 

The unifying factor in most alliances is the existence of a common enemy. In this case, the common enemy for Russia and North Korea is the United States and its military allies. U.S. leaders have pursued clumsy, tone-deaf policies toward both Moscow and Pyongyang, thereby creating a powerful incentive for them to boost their bilateral security cooperation. 

The United States is waging a proxy war against Russian forces in Ukraine and pursuing a comprehensive effort to make Russia a diplomatic and economic pariah throughout the world.  President Vladimir Putin and the rest of Russia’s elite now regard the United States as an implacable enemy determined to destroy their country as a meaningful, independent, international player.  

Under such circumstances, it is hardly surprising that the Kremlin is seeking economic and military allies anywhere it can find them, including North Korea. The overall atmosphere of intense hostility between the United States and Russia means that Russian leaders would find the DPRK to be a valuable partner.  

North Korea has an extensive and expanding capacity to produce conventional weapons, while Russia faces the danger of a growing drain on its weapon stockpiles because of the Ukraine war. In return for boosting weapons shipments to Russia, Pyongyang wants financial aid from Moscow along with assistance for the DPRK’s missile and nuclear programs. 

Just as Washington has given Russia ample incentives to pursue strategic cooperation with North Korea, it has also given Pyongyang incentives to work with Moscow. After some promising developments during Donald Trump’s administration to ease tensions with Pyongyang, U.S. policy has reverted to the norm of past decades. 

The Biden administration’s policy toward North Korea has been little more than a stale rehash of those failed stances. Washington especially clings to its pointless demand that the DPRK abandon its nuclear weapons program in exchange for vague promises of subsequent sanctions relief and progress toward a normal relationship. 

The Biden administration’s policies toward both North Korea and Russia constitute a failure of Foreign Policy 101. A cardinal rule of a smart, effective policy is to avoid driving disparate adversaries together.  In the years before the onset of Washington’s new cold war against Russia, Moscow was trying to distance itself from Kim’s regime and its behavior. The Kremlin had even signed on to U.S.-led international sanctions against Pyongyang.  For its part, the DPRK was seeking a more normal relationship with the United States.  

With Biden leaving the presidency, there is some hope for less confrontational U.S. policies toward both Russia and North Korea. However, Kamala Harris’ hawkish rhetoric during her acceptance speech at the Democratic Party’s National Convention indicates that Biden’s misguided policies toward the two countries are likely to continue if she wins the forthcoming election. Indeed, she seems hostile to the idea of even talking to Kim Jong-un. Trump’s probable course is harder to predict. His previous attempt at a rapprochement toward Pyongyang is mildly encouraging if he wins the presidency. However, the allegations that Trump was soft on Russia, if not an outright Russian agent, were nothing more than an absurd smear. His policy toward Moscow likely would be at least as hawkish as Harris’ approach.   

However, unless the next president makes major beneficial policy changes toward both North Korea and Russia, military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow will likely become even more extensive.   

Ted Galen Carpenter is a contributing editor at The National Interest, a senior fellow at the Randolph Bourne Institute, and a senior fellow at the Libertarian Institute. He also held various senior policy posts during a 37-year career at the Cato Institute. Dr. Carpenter is the author of thirteen books and more than 1,200 articles on international affairs. His latest book is Unreliable Watchdog: The News Media and U.S. Foreign Policy (2022).

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