The North Korean government under Kim Jong-un continues to move in a direction that alarms its potential adversaries: South Korea, the United States, and Japan. Pyongyang’s latest actions douse already dim hopes for reconciliation and solidify a status quo of seemingly permanent tension on the Korean Peninsula. But despite speculation to the contrary, Pyongyang’s recent activity does not indicate that Kim has decided to go to war against South Korea.

Pyongyang’s drive to develop and deploy various types of advanced missiles, of which the cruise missile tests of the past few days are the latest reminder, understandably causing worry about the DPRK’s intentions. But this is explainable as attempted deterrence rather than preparation to launch an elective war. The DPRK government is responding to the relative weakness of its conventional forces, a steady stream of U.S. nuclear threats, continued U.S. and ROK efforts to negate the DPRK’s second-strike capability through anti-missile defense, and the South Korean government’s interest in “decapitation” of the DPRK leadership.

The North Korean government’s recently enhanced partnership with Russia helps Putin sustain his aggression in Ukraine, boosts DPRK military capability, and strengthens the global anti-U.S. coalition that also includes China and Iran. But it does not necessarily increase the chances of the DPRK launching its own war in the near future. On the contrary, Pyongyang’s shipment of missiles and ammunition to Russia suggests the opposite.

Perhaps the most jarring of recent DPRK actions is its renunciation of the decades-old goal of reunifying both halves of the Korean Peninsula under a single Korean Workers’ Party government. In his January 15 speech to the North Korean legislature, Kim said he would henceforth consider South Koreans enemies rather than “compatriots.” Pyongyang has dismantled the organizations that previously managed cooperation with the ROK.

A possible interpretation is this policy change clears the way for a DPRK decision to make war against a people redefined as antagonists rather than cousins. Equally plausibly, however, it could be a manifestation of an official view that conquest of the South is not feasible and the DPRK should instead focus on self-preservation. Viewed in that light, renouncing reunification would seem to make a bolt-from-the-blue North Korean attack less rather than more likely. 

Even carrying out a small-scale, unprovoked lethal attack would be perilous for Kim. One problem is that since 2010, when South Korea suffered fatalities from the sinking of the ROK Navy ship Cheonan and the shelling of ROK-held Yeonpyeong island, South Korean governments have said they will retaliate militarily against North Korean attacks. Instead of gaining political leverage, Kim could expect to lose some of his combat capability and lose face if his punch proved weaker than the South Korean counter-punch.

Another problem is that Kim cannot be sure that a small, one-off DPRK attack would not initiate a chain of escalation that Kim could not control, leading to a general war that would threaten the existence of the Kim regime and the North Korean state. 

An oft-discussed scenario is the DPRK opportunistically attacking South Korea while the United States is distracted by another conflict elsewhere. The wars in Ukraine and Gaza will likely continue for most of 2024, and some high-ranking U.S. military officers have warned of the possibility of a war in the Taiwan Strait as soon as 2025. Even with the U.S. preoccupied, however, there would be little for the DPRK to gain by attacking. South Korea’s conventional forces are more than a match for the North Korean military, and the U.S. nuclear arsenal would continue to provide backup.

Those who warn of an impending unprovoked North Korean attack must explain what benefit Kim could hope to gain by taking on militarily superior adversaries. While purposefully spewing belligerent rhetoric, the Kims have not stayed in power for this long by acting suicidal.

About the Author 

Denny Roy is a Senior Fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu, specializing in Asia-Pacific strategic and security issues. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago. He is the author of Return of the Dragon: Rising China and Regional Security (Columbia University Press, 2013), The Pacific War and its Political Legacies (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2009), Taiwan: A Political History (Cornell University Press, 2003), and China’s Foreign Relations (Macmillan and Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), co-author of The Politics of Human Rights in Asia (Pluto Press, 2000), and editor of The New Security Agenda in the Asia-Pacific Region (Macmillan, 1997). He has also written many articles for scholarly journals such as International Security, Survival, Asian Survey, Security Dialogue, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Armed Forces & Society, and Issues & Studies.

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