North Korean soldiers appear about to join Russia’s campaign to conquer Ukraine. Soldiers are one of the few things the DPRK has no shortage of, and it decided to use them to make money, secure Russian support, and gain combat experience. 

It is a return to Pyongyang’s Cold War habit of covertly sending troops to support allies, as it did for the Arab states against Israel. What does this troop deployment imply for U.S. interests? 

Russia and Europe 

Some in Washington want to read this as a sign of Russian weakness and desperation, but this is wishful thinking. The DPRK’s small force represents only a fraction of Russia’s massive army, which proved able to regenerate itself. These few thousand soldiers do not fundamentally alter the battlefield situation. The deployment should be read in another light.  

Enlisting allies in American wars is a longstanding U.S. practice to increase available troops, reduce the burden on the American people, and give a military operation a layer of international legitimacy. Few would describe British or Australian participation in the Iraq War as a sign of American desperation or weakness. 

Russia is no different. For the Kremlin, the North Korean force is a low-cost addition and a symbolic win domestically and abroad. 

Some also see the North Koreans in Russia as a major threat to European security. However, their presence will have a limited impact on Europe overall. The North Koreans are merely a Russian auxiliary force. They will have no independent role. Still, it is a clear warning for NATO and like-minded partners. Moscow’s next war will likely mean further requests for North Korean reinforcements. 

North Korea 

Does the deployment imply worse things to come on the Korean Peninsula? As with North Korea, its actions can be plausibly read as either aggressive or defensive.  

In a defensive interpretation, North Korea is in the process of scrapping any hope of reunification and bolstering its border defenses. It is also growing its nuclear arsenal quickly to keep South Korea (ROK), the United States, and even China away. In that background, Russia is the last buoy for a small North Korea surrounded by larger hostile neighbors. Sending troops will bolster this battered ally and bring real combat veterans into the Korean People’s Army. Large amounts of North Korean ammunition went to Russia, limiting its ability to attack South Korea in the short to medium term. 

Conversely, some experts believe that Kim Jong-un is contemplating military action. They would likely read the troop deployment as a prelude to aggression. Pyongyang wants trained soldiers prepared for war and wants to ensure full Russian support to defy the ROK-U.S. alliance. 

Both hypotheses are plausible, and it is too early for definitive conclusions. Still, the defensive interpretation appears more consistent with North Korean behavior, at least for now.  

That said, there are worrisome implications for the long-term inter-Korean balance. North Korea will likely get in return for its support cash, raw materials, and military, including nuclear, technologies. In the long run, it may secure access to new weapons from Moscow to modernize its armed forces, which rely heavily on outdated Soviet-era gear. 

The Korean People’s Army will also gain actual combat experience in high-intensity modern warfare, something that its southern neighbor lacks. 

Militaries promote personnel with combat experience. In Russia, serving in Syria was often a career booster for officers, and many who fought there are now at the helm. Similarly, we can expect that the North Koreans currently learning war in Russia will be the officers in charge of the DPRK’s military ten or twenty years down the road and, thus, yield tremendous political weight. 

However, it is still too early to predict the impact on the DPRK’s force structure. If the North Koreans suffered heavy casualties, it could lead to a deeper rethinking and more profound reforms. However, if North Korean soldiers enjoy easy victories, there will be less impetus for reforms.

Note that they are coming at a time when Ukrainian lines are already crumbling. 

Kim Jong-un may gain increased confidence in his soldiers from the adventure. In any case, Pyongyang’s planners will certainly learn that integrating all types of firing and reconnaissance systems with ground troops for swift blows is critical—something the Russians struggled with initially. The DPRK will also witness first-hand the importance of air control, as Russia has been bombing Ukrainian positions at will for months to great effect. 

Pyongyang will undoubtedly be eager to find ways to rejuvenate its decaying air defense system and its antiquated, near-impotent air force. 

What is China’s place in the story? 

Washington has asked China to pressure North Korea into withdrawing its troops. Although China-North Korea relations are already abysmal, Beijing has little stake in North Korea’s Ukrainian adventure. Beijing is deeply committed to Russia’s military effort by supporting its economy and providing critical components for its defense industry. China has a vested interest in bolstering Moscow, its most powerful ally, to weaken and distract the United States. 

Hence, it has no reason to disrupt Vladimir Putin’s efforts to employ North Korean troops.  

Indeed, in all likelihood, the Chinese knew beforehand. Even if their intelligence had missed it before it became public, the Russians probably warned them. The Kremlin cannot afford to antagonize China, its key partner on the world stage. 

Also, Putin knows better than to meddle in what Xi Jinping considers its Asian sphere of influence without first asking permission.  

The other way around, however, talking of a new China-DPRK-Russia “Axis of Evil” is premature. 

First, the North Korean deployment does not guarantee Russian commitment to its security. Ukraine War or not, the relationship will remain one-sided. Moscow would not sacrifice its troops or risk a war in Asia to save Kim Jong-un if he were to get into serious trouble. 

Second, China wants Russia to erode the U.S. position, but not at any cost to itself. It will enable Moscow’s military effort but certainly not fight Russia’s wars on its behalf. 

Finally, Beijing is well aware of North Korea’s attempts to diversify its partnerships with the ultimate goal of balancing China’s growing power. Xi Jinping is merely tolerating the DPRK’s actions. 

This deployment of North Korean troops will not revolutionize the Ukrainian battlefield, Russia’s strategy, or the European security landscape. It also has little to do directly with China. However, it may reshape North Korea’s military posture and internal power dynamics over the long run, and that is probably where the attention should be. 

Dylan Motin holds a Ph.D. in political science. He is currently a Non-resident Kelly Fellow at the Pacific Forum. He is also a non-resident fellow at the European Centre for North Korean Studies and a non-resident research fellow at the ROK Forum for Nuclear Strategy. He is the author of Bandwagoning in International Relations: China, Russia, and Their Neighbors (Vernon Press, 2024). 

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