Seoul’s Retaliation Doctrine Undergoes Stress Tests: Republic of Korea (ROK) President Yoon Suk-yeol entered office in 2022 declaring that tolerance of North Korean “provocations” did not buy lasting peace, but rather only emboldened Pyongyang to take additional aggressive actions. Accordingly, he said his government’s policy would be to, “punish and retaliate against any provocation by North Korea,” and to, “make North Korea realize that its provocations will always be met with a severe price.”

Since the beginning of Yoon’s presidency, however, the potential risk of an assured retaliation posture has increased. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has announced that it will mass produce tactical nuclear warheads designed for use against South Korea. It has diversified and expanded its nuclear arsenal and approved the automatic launching of nuclear weapons in the event of a loss of communication with the top leadership. 

The Kim regime has also seemingly psychologically prepared its people for war with their southern cousins by renouncing a long-held aspiration to reunify with South Korea and by declaring the ROK an enemy country. 

Two incidents this year are testing Seoul’s retaliation policy.

The first is the trash balloon attack, a creative if nasty gray-zone tactic. Arguably the ROK is the original provocateur in this case. A South Korean non-government organization started sending anti-Kim regime leaflets into North Korea via balloons beginning in May. DPRK officials especially hate these leaflets, either because they fear the content might undermine the regime’s legitimacy, or because they feel compelled to demonstrate loyalty by strongly reacting to disrespect toward their leader, or both.

The North Koreans retaliated by sending thousands of balloon loads of trash southward starting in late May. Yoon, whose public approval rating has been in the twenties this year, faced increasing political pressure to do something. In June, South Korea’s national security director Chang Ho-jin said his government would retaliate for the trash balloons with measures that would be “unbearable” for the DPRK.  

The ROK reactivated the giant loudspeakers that blare music and propaganda into North Korea and also announced the resumption of military activities near the border, officially ending a 2018 agreement with the DPRK that had already become a dead letter.

This failed, however, to stop the trash balloons. From South Korea’s point of view, the DPRK was getting away with a months-long provocation.

Enter the drone incident. 

In October, the DPRK government announced that a drone from South Korea had dropped leaflets over Pyongyang on three occasions that month. The regime went to its default response, which was to threaten war. A DPRK Ministry of Defense spokesperson said the drone intrusion was a “declaration of war” and that North Korean artillery units were “on standby to open fire.”

Kim’s highly-ranked sister Kim Yo-jong said, “The moment that a drone of the ROK is discovered in the sky over our capital city once again will certainly lead to a horrible disaster.” The DPRK government’s Korea Central News Agency said if it happens again, “an immediate retaliatory attack will be launched.”

Some uncertainty still surrounds the incident. Some analysts believe Pyongyang faked the drone intrusion. 

That is possible, although there are other, less convoluted ways to stoke anti-ROK sentiment, and it is hard to understand why the government would make up a story that included the failure of the DPRK armed forces to prevent an enemy aircraft from reaching Pyongyang.

All things considered, however, it seems likely that Yoon ordered the drone mission as Seoul’s retaliation for the trash balloon attacks. There is a precedent for Yoon sending a drone into North Korea; he did it in response to a DPRK drone intrusion in December 2022. In the latest case, the ROK government first denied involvement, but later was more evasive, saying accusations from Pyongyang do not “merit a response.” The crashed drone publicized in North Korean media resembles a type of drone in service with the ROK military.

It appears that Seoul has not only retaliated for the trash balloons but has engaged in escalation to de-escalate. South Korea’s retaliation was more aggressive, delivering leaflets from a drone, which of course, could also carry lethal ordnance, rather than by balloon. It was more targeted, dropping its payload directly on the streets of the capital city rather than wherever the wind might blow. 

Further, that payload had the potential to politically damage the regime, whereas the North Korean balloons were merely a nuisance. Furthermore, Seoul’s retaliation might have worked. The immediate DPRK response was to send more balloons into the South, but instead of trash, the balloons carried anti-Yoon leaflets. That represents a de-escalation.  

Pyongyang opted not to send a drone, and anti-Yoon leaflets are relatively harmless since South Koreans are free to criticize their president.

A second challenge to Seoul’s retaliation policy is the DPRK sending troops to Russia, presumably to support Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. The DPRK has already been supplying Russia with ammunition and missiles that Russian forces have fired against Ukrainian soldiers and civilians. However, the introduction of DPRK troops harms South Korea’s security in several new ways.

According to South Korean intelligence, Russia is paying the North Korean troops $2,000 per month. We can expect the DPRK government will confiscate that money and use it to pursue regime goals. The DPRK troops who survived the Ukraine war will gain combat training and experience, making the North Korean armed forces more dangerous to the ROK.  

A pertinent historical note: before the Korean War of 1950 to 1953, North Korean leader Kim Il-sung considered the availability of battle-hardened North Korean soldiers who had fought against the Japanese in China crucial to the success of his planned attempt to conquer South Korea.

Providing combat troops likely buys North Korea more of what it wants from Russia, including technical assistance in developing more lethal missiles, some of which may target the ROK. Pyongyang dispatching men to die for Russia deepens the bilateral partnership, increasing the possibility that Moscow would accept a request from Pyongyang to support a future North Korean military action against South Korea in some substantial way.

Seoul is treating this as a major provocation and committing itself to a response. Yoon said, “The Republic of Korea will never sit idle over this.” His vice-foreign minister Kim Hong-kyun summoned Russia’s ambassador to South Korea and demanded the “immediate withdrawal” of North Korean soldiers from Russia, adding that their presence that, “gravely threatens South Korea” and warning that the ROK will, “respond with all measures available.”

An obvious, and appropriate, response would be for South Korean to directly arm Ukraine.  Some analysts argue a supply of ROK-made weapons systems could substantially improve Ukraine’s fortunes. The ROK government policy prohibits transferring weapons to countries at war. Up to now, South Korea has provided Ukraine with non-lethal equipment, while sending armaments to replenish the arsenals of countries sending their weapons and munitions to Ukraine. Yoon is considering making an exception to the policy, “depending on North Korea’s military activities.” It is reasonable that he waits until the role North Koreans will play in the war becomes more clear. 

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman Maria Zakharova warned that Russia, “will react very harshly [to] the entry of the Republic of Korea into the Ukrainian conflict,”—a threat, but also evidence that South Korea has leverage because of the possibility it might become an arms supplier to Ukraine.

Yoon is demonstrating that the DPRK’s enhanced nuclear arsenal and more aggressive nuclear doctrine have not intimidated Seoul into supinely accepting threatening North Korean actions.  Undoubtedly, the U.S. nuclear umbrella is crucial. Its continued credibility effectually cancels out the DPRK’s nuclear weapons advantage over the ROK.

South Koreans have long worried about the United States dragging their country into an unwanted conflict, but there is a reciprocal and equally old worry on the U.S. side. Some Americans will reflexively feel anxiety that South Korean responses to hostile DPRK actions might trigger a new conflict on the Peninsula. To be sure, an excessive ROK reaction would be bad. But so is routine non-reaction.  

Not only the ROK’s well-being but also the U.S. strategic agenda in Northeast Asia is best served by Seoul cultivating an expectation in Pyongyang that menacing North Korean moves will invite a well-calibrated counter-punch.

About the Author: Denny Roy

Denny Roy is a Senior Fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu specializing in Asia-Pacific strategic and security issues.  He holds a PhD in political science from the University of Chicago and is the author of four books and many journal and op-ed articles.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.