The Hamas Attack and the Failure to Understand “Intelligence Failures”
The most basic distinction concerning knowledge of foreign threats is between tactical knowledge of plans and intentions for a specific attack and strategic knowledge of a foreign danger that could materialize in any of several forms of attack.
It is only big, sudden, shocking events that break through the firewall of public ignorance. The general perception of what constitutes an “intelligence failure” is not a gap in knowledge and understanding that most affect a government’s ability to protect its citizens, but instead, something that happens to surprise politicians and the public—who in turn assume that intelligence and security services must have been just as surprised.
Paul R. Pillar retired in 2005 from a twenty-eight-year career in the U.S. intelligence community, in which his last position was as the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. Earlier he served in a variety of analytical and managerial positions, including as chief of analytic units at the CIA covering portions of the Near East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. His most recent book is Beyond the Water’s Edge: How Partisanship Corrupts U.S. Foreign Policy. He is also a contributing editor for this publication.
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