Key Point: Modern Japan still labors under the shadow of Imperial Japan, which so traumatized the Japanese people that the military and military action has long remained unpopular. Though well-equipped and well-trained, Japan’s armed forces don’t operate abroad very often, and when they do, it’s for noncombat tasks such as disaster relief.

Japan is scheduled to come out with revisions to its National Defense Program Guideline— which guides its future defense spending—by the end of this year.

But the new defense policy faces a different environment than its predecessors. China’s military strength is surging, North Korea has nuclear weapons and missiles within range of Japan, while the Japan Self-Defense Forces face a recruiting crisis as Japan’s aging population shrinks the pool of potential soldiers.

Japan must also grapple with how to defend Japanese islands, such as the Senkakus, which China claims as its own. China now has stronger anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities that could allow Beijing to seize and hold these islands. “While previous Japanese counter-amphibious doctrine called for a static defense of beachheads with heavy armored units, the ever-increasing range and sophistication of Chinese cruise and ballistic missiles means that breaking through an initial invasion force, and landing large numbers of armored vehicles or marines to reinforce its islands, has become a daunting proposition,” wrote Asian security expert Ben Rimland in a June article for the Project 2049 Institute.

“Attacking the invading ships and land units beyond the envelope of PLAN and PLAAF [Chinese navy and air force] cruise missiles and SAMs [anti-aircraft missiles], then, has become imperative,” Rimland warned. In addition, the advent of North Korean mobile ballistic missiles, minutes away from hitting Japanese cities, means Japan’s air force will need a capability to quickly hit missile launchers before they can move.

One solution is to enhance the strike capabilities of the Japan Air Self-Defense Force, or JASDF. “The overall picture is one of a force that will likely add a new mission to its portfolio-strike—and will work to strengthen execution of its traditional missions: maritime interdiction and defensive counter-air,” Rimland wrote.

That means embracing stand-off weapons that can be launched beyond the reach of Chinese defenses. For maritime interdiction of Chinese ships, Japan wants the U.S. Long Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) and is close to deploying the indigenous ASM-3 anti-ship missile. To strike land targets without coming into range of long-range Chinese anti-aircraft missiles like the HQ-9 or the Russian-made S-400, Japan also wants the U.S. Joint Air-Surface Stand-Off Missile Extended Range (JASSM-ER) and the Joint Strike Missile (JSM). To launch the JASSM-ER and JSM, Japan is looking at upgrading its F-15J fighters to an equivalent of the American F-15E Strike Eagle.

But Rimland sees defensive counter-air—the protection of Japanese skies from enemy aircraft—continuing as the main mission of the JASDF. China, which claims various Japanese islands such as the Senkakus as its own, has been rapidly upgrading its air-warfare capabilities, including development of the J-20 stealth fighter. Chinese aircraft have violated Japanese and South Korean airspace.

Modern Japan still labors under the shadow of Imperial Japan, which so traumatized the Japanese people that the military and military action has long remained unpopular. Though well-equipped and well-trained, Japan’s armed forces don’t operate abroad very often, and when they do, it’s for noncombat tasks such as disaster relief.

Previous defense guidelines prohibited the JASDF from ground attack capability, including precision-strike munitions and aerial refueling. “Though Japan has since developed both precision air-to-ground attack and mid-air refueling capabilities, the lack of dedicated suppression of enemy air defense weapons, such as anti-radiation air-to-ground missiles or runway cratering munitions, indicates that the focus remains on destroying enemy planes in flight (defensive counter-air), rather than striking their supporting infrastructure on the ground (offensive counter-air),” Rimland wrote.

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“The key is that the SDF was never, and indeed still is not, permitted to have such an overmatch that it can be qualified as ‘war potential,’” Rimland tells the National Interest.

Yet, while Japan once held a technological edge, new Chinese weapons such as the J-20 stealth fighter and advanced air-to-air missiles, as well as improved Chinese pilot training, means Japan’s control of its skies is no longer assured. So Japan must search for other solutions, such as partnering with Britain to develop a next-generation air-to-air missile based on the MBDA Meteor, or buying American E-2D Advanced Hawkeye radar aircraft to enhance detection and battle-command capabilities.

Concerned that China could knock out its airbases, Japan is also considering whether to buy American vertical and/or short takeoff and landing (V/STOL) F-35B stealth fighters to supplement its planned purchase of forty-two F-35A conventional fighters. “Combining the ability to operate from unimproved air fields with a stealthy design, and the long-ranged punch of the improved Meteor missile, an F-35B purchase would be a considerable modernization of the JASDF’s DCA [defensive counter-air] capability,” Rimland noted.

Rimland remains dubious that Japan’s proposed next-generation fighter, the domestically-produced F-3, will see the light of day. But he does believe that more than new aircraft are needed to enhance Japan’s air power. He advocates much closer integration of the JSDAF into U.S. battle command and targeting systems. “Tying together the various air operations and intelligence nodes will undoubtedly encounter resistance from the SDF’s stovepiped bureaucracies, but the payoff will be a leaner and smoother intelligence process,” Rimland wrote. “Enhancing cross-domain targeting also remains critical. The various branches of the SDF, despite recent improvements, are notorious for protecting their bureaucratic turf and stymieing efforts to work jointly. But with the JASDF set to procure ultra-long–range missiles, coordinating targeting information between JASDF fighters and JMSDF [Japanese Navy) ships will become critical.”

Michael Peck is a contributing writer for the National Interest. He can be found on Twitter and Facebook.

This article is being republished due to reader interest.

Image: Reuters.