After Donald Trump’s now historic call with the President of Taiwan, it seems relations between Beijing and Taipei are now back as one the most important international issues of the day.

And so it should be.

With China and Taiwan seeing a spike in tensions after years of relative calm—with the Asia-Pacific region already swimming in its own sea of troubles thanks to tensions in the South and East China Seas—there is once again the danger of a crisis that could bring Washington and Beijing to blows. And as both nations are armed with nuclear weapons, the stakes could not get any higher.

But what would happen if Taipei and Beijing actually ended up in some sort of conflict? What would be the military systems and strategies used? What weapons in China's arsenal would Taiwan fear the most? What would Beijing fear? And most importantly: who would win?

We have explored this issue in depth and have packaged together in this one post articles by Michal Thim and J. Michael Cole, written back in 2014, that should help answer these important questions. Let the debate begin. 

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It has become conventional wisdom when referring to the current state of ties between Taipei and Beijing to offer something similar to the following: “cross-Strait Relations have significantly improved under the administration of President Ma Ying-jeou.” While such a, statement is not totally unjustified, security-minded observers would opine that the Taiwan Strait remains highly militarized, and that Ma’s rapprochement has not stopped Beijing from deploying more—and increasingly sophisticated—weapons pointed at Taiwan. And no mid-level-official-branded-high-level meeting is going to change that.

In many ways, Taiwan shares similar challenges currently faced by U.S. forces in the Western Pacific. Therefore, do platforms that you can see on a recent list by Kyle Mizokami, “Five Chinese Weapons of War America Should Fear”, apply to Taiwan as well? Not necessarily. The DF-21D, the world’s first anti-ship ballistic missile or ASBM, is specifically designed to counter U.S. Navy carrier groups. The PLA and its air and naval branches will have other means at its disposal to deal with the Taiwanese navy in a more symmetrical manner. The J-20, China’s first 5th generation fighter—which is still in development—could hypothetically be deployed against Taiwan but it is more likely that Chinese planners would leave J-20s to deal with U.S. F-22s and U.S./Japanese F-35s, should they come to Taipei’s defense. On the other side, offensive cyber operations and new Chinese landing ships are of course very relevant to Taiwan. Bearing all that in mind, the purpose of this piece is to present major combat platforms that would either play a significant part in a full-scale attack on Taiwan or those against which Taipei does not have an adequate counterpart.

So what weapons are at Beijing’s disposal for a possible Taiwan contingency? Now without further ado, the four Chinese weapons of war Taiwan should fear:

Missiles:

The number of missiles pointed at Taiwan has become embedded in the consciousness of the Taiwanese population.  In fact, it is fairly likely that if you happen to be involved in a conversation with a street vendor in one of the plentiful night markets, they could very well know an approximation of the number of short- and mid-range ballistic missiles that have been deployed across the Taiwan Strait. Numbers by experts vary, but most estimates place the number of short and mid-range ballistic missiles at around 1,600 or more.

The PLA is also acquiring various types of Land Attack Cruise Missiles (LACM) and Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCM), which can be launched from various platforms and domains (land, sea and air). This gives China greater ability to attack key infrastructure and military targets from different angles with the added advantage of launching saturation strikes that would stretch Taiwan’s limited missile defense capability beyond its limits.

Advanced Air-Defense Systems:

The Russian S-300—which China has purchased and refined in the HQ family of systems—are generally considered among the best one can get for securing a nation’s air space. However, barring a suicidal attack inside Chinese territory, why should Taiwanese pilots be afraid of this sophisticated air-defense system? Well, the tyranny of Taiwan’s geography could erase any differences between offensive and defensive systems. The situation may get even worse with the much rumored purchase of the more advanced S-400 with a range of 400km.Virtually all of Taiwan would be within the range of the S-400, although Taiwanese bases on the east coast enjoy some protection thanks to Taiwan’s mountain ranges. Therefore, defensive systems could turn offensive as any plane taking off from air bases in western Taiwan would become a target once reaching altitude of approximately 20,000 feet, forcing Taiwanese pilots to either fly low or expose themselves to deadly fire.

Submarines:

Submarines have to make it on the list, partly because Taiwan only has two combat capable submarines and the acquisition of new boats is nowhere on the horizon. Yet that is not the only reason why Taiwan should be concerned. The Chinese ‘silent service’ could play a role in missions such as a maritime blockade of Taiwan, as well as conducting operations against Taiwanese surface vessels under full-out war conditions.

Type 052D:

Taiwan’s navy is generally no underdog, yet its major disadvantage is that it has to cope with a growing and highly capable Chinese navy. The PLAN has benefited greatly from a rapid modernization program. One of the newest PLAN acquisitions is the Type 052D guided-missile destroyer. Similar to submarines, the Type 052D would play a role in any blockade scenario, as well as any full-scale attack. Missions would include destruction of Taiwanese surface combatants and offensive anti-air operations against Taiwan’s air force, complementing the threat posed by advances in Chinese air-defense systems.

Needless to say, there are other items in China’s arsenal that could challenge Taiwan’s defences and cause serious headaches in a wartime scenario. The modernization of China’s armed forces has been impressive both in terms of quantity and quality. That being said, Taiwan need not despair, as its geographic setting would pose significant challenges for any PLA military operation that would attempt in seizing the island. Ultimately, the PLA would have to cross the treacherous Taiwan Strait and therein lies Taipei’s advantage. To successfully stage an amphibious invasion in the age of high-precision strike has become more difficult, not easier than 70 years ago.

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The initial response to an article titled “Five Taiwanese Weapons of War that China Should Fear” would be to ask why such weapons would be necessary in the first place. After all, relations between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait since 2008 have been, at some level at least, the best they’ve been since the conclusion of the Chinese civil war in 1949. Over that period, many agreements have been signed between Taipei and Beijing; millions of Chinese tourists flock to Taiwan every year; and interactions between Chinese and Taiwanese politicians—including the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party—have reach levels that would have been unthinkable just a few years ago. Why, then, should Taiwan seek to develop or acquire weapons that would strike fear in Beijing?

The answer to that question lies in the extent to which rapprochement can continue, and the prospects that an end to this trend could result in a decision by China to resort to martial measures to resolve the “Taiwan question” once and for all. Recent developments in Taiwan, chief among them the Sunflower Movement’s 21-day occupation of the Legislative Yuan in March and April this year, have highlighted the formidable ideological divide that exists between the two societies and the deep fears that are felt by Taiwanese even as their country normalizes relations with China. To be succinct: the majority of Taiwanese are all for economic exchanges with China, and most understand the futility of ignoring the elephant in the room; but parallel to that realization is the deeply ingrained aversion to seeing a reversal of Taiwan’s liberal democracy and way of life. Ongoing events in Hong Kong, tensions that were in part exacerbated by Beijing’s release of its white paper on “one country, two systems,” have further awakened Taiwanese society to the huge costs that are to be paid in sovereignty transactions with China.

How Beijing responds when it realizes that normalization will not go on forever or in the direction hoped for by the Chinese Communist Party is anyone’s guess, but current trends under President Xi Jinping, whose leadership style is perhaps best described as daring and impatient, signify that the military option—which was never taken off the table—remains possible, especially if the civilian and military leadership in Beijing believes that this could be accomplished quickly and, just as important, at minimal cost to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Taiwan’s answer to that possible future is to convince Beijing that a quick, “clean” and relatively cost-free war would be anything but (they rarely are anyway, but hubris tends to cloud otherwise perceptive minds). The nature of our five weapons stems from one simple truth: The time has long passed when the Taiwanese military could hope to meet the PLA on symmetrical terms and defeat it in a conventional way. In fact, the definition of military victory itself must be altered to reflect reality. For the PLA, victory is, in its maximalist form, the annihilation of the Taiwanese armed forces; in a less extreme form, it is the subjugation of the island through coercion or limited kinetic action. Conversely for Taiwan’s military, victory is neither the total destruction of the PLA nor occupation of China, two objectives that are as infeasible as they are unpractical. Instead, victory for Taiwan lies in deterrence—the promise of pain; and failing that, the imposition of substantial costs to the PLA for an attempted invasion. The five weapons, to which we shall turn in a second, must also be practical. In other words, their acquisition or indigenous development must be within the realm of the possible but at the same time must not threaten the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait to such an extent as to provoke preemptive action by Beijing. For example: Nothing would strike fear in China more than a Taiwanese nuclear program and the means to deliver one or several nuclear-tipped warheads against Chinese military installations, industrial centers, or cities. And yet, nuclear weapons do not make the list, as they would be impractical. Given the scope of Chinese intelligence activity in Taiwan, such a program could not remain covert long enough to ensure its completion and would be considered casus belli among the Chinese leadership, inviting aggression rather than deterring it. Another example would be the procurement of many more PAC-3 air-defense systems, but the aggregate costs would be prohibitive, and furthermore no amount of air-defense batteries would be sufficient to counter the 1,500-plus ballistic missiles currently aimed at the island (not all 1,500 missiles can be launched at once, as volleys are limited by the amount of launchers, but nevertheless, China could with relative ease overwhelm Taiwan’s air defense capabilities should it choose to do so).