Some observers fixate on weak and over-extended Iran, as if it was the latest reincarnation of Nazi Germany. They believe the United States should effectively dismember Syria in order to eradicate Tehran’s influence from Washington’s occupation zone, at least.

For instance, Max Boot of the Council of Foreign Relations complained that withdrawal would “be an incalculable windfall for Iran,” as it “would almost certainly allow Iran to gain control of eastern Syria, creating a land bridge from Tehran to Damascus and Beirut that would increase the danger to Israel.” Brodsky wrote: “Maintaining a military presence in Syria provides the United States opportunities to prevent the peaceful imposition of an Iranian post-war order on the country, and to disrupt Iran’s logistical lines, including the land corridors it uses for moving arms and personnel.” Graham argued that “you’d be giving Damascus to the Iranians without an American presence, and Russia and Iran would dominate Syria.”

However, America is not threatened by Iran. (Nor is nuclear-armed Israel, which has repeatedly demonstrated that it can take care of itself.) Tehran backs the Damascus government, but that started well before the outbreak of civil war. Ironically, an American attempt to dismember Syria will only force Assad to rely more heavily on his friends, including Iran.

Moreover, it is fanciful to presume that overstretched Kurdish forces, especially when heavily engaged against Turkish troops, are going to battle Iranians. Nor is it possible for the Kurds to hermetically seal off their territory to halt contact between Damascus and Tehran. Anyway, a “land bridge” might be convenient, but is not necessary, for Syria and Iran to cooperate: even Tehran’s radical Islamists know about airplanes.

Nor are the Kurds, with or without the United States, likely to force Moscow to do anything. The Soviet Union and Syria were allies throughout the Cold War. Reconstituting that relationship doesn’t threaten Washington, which is allied with Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gulf States. A small American presence cannot exclude Moscow from involvement in a region substantially closer to Russia than the United States.

Anyway, why should the Kurds do Washington’s bidding? They cooperated with the United States because they wanted to defeat radical forces and cement their role in a peaceful Syria. But Washington stood by when Ankara intervened in Syria against Kurdish forces in January, doing little more than whining and eventually promising the Turkish government to push Kurdish forces away from near the Syrian-Turkish border.

A Kurdish commander, Mohammed Mustafa Ali, told NBC: “We have been abandoned and betrayed. We were useful to fight against ISIS, but the Americans are now turning their backs on us.” An unnamed Kurdish official told the Guardian: “They want us to finish what’s important to them, but they won’t concern themselves with what’s important to us. Let them fight ISIS. Let us fight for ourselves.”

In contrast, at the start of the civil war Assad accepted Kurdish autonomy. Moreover, when Ankara invaded in January Damascus sent government-backed militias in support of the Kurds.

Using U.S. personnel as a tripwire to limit Iranian, Russian and Turkish activities is dangerous and reckless. In fact, the American contingent’s very weakness requires the United States to be willing to intervene to protect its troops, who are high profile participants in another country’s civil war. For instance, with Turks and Kurds at war, U.S. troops are running “presence patrols” in Manbij, despite threats by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to advance to advance there. Much could go badly wrong very quickly.

Little unifies the leaders of Iran, Russia and Turkey, who recently met in Ankara, other than a desire for Washington’s exit. Asked George Washington University’s Stephen Biddle, “Why should any of these players defer to U.S. interests when the U.S. ability to shape events on the ground is limited by a tiny commitment?”

While they cannot force out America, they can make the U.S. occupation uncomfortable. The risk of inadvertent confrontation and conflict, and the temptation for various powers to play a dangerous game of international chicken, will be strong. And for what? Every other nation involved has a greater interest in the outcome than does America. All will be willing to invest more and take greater risks.

What is the likely result of U.S. participation in Syria’s civil war? Defense Secretary Jim Mattis said “We’re going to make sure we set the conditions for a diplomatic solution.” Translation: we will keep fighting while desperately hoping that something magical saves us from a disastrous result.

The president is right about Syria. U.S. diplomat Nicholas Burns complained that the president was “someone who is not adaptive—who is not learning on the job.” In this case, at least, Trump learned more than enough from Washington’s past disastrous interventions in the Middle East. Successive administrations prodigiously wasted American lives and money for little or no gain.

Not every problem in the world, even in the Middle East, is America’s responsibility. Most problems in the world, especially in the Middle East, cannot be solved by America. Few problems in the world, especially in the Middle East, are worth the cost of America attempting to solve. Assad’s apparent use of chemical weapons doesn’t change this balance. Washington should leave Syria’s future to others.

Doug Bandow is a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute and a former Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagan. He is author of Foreign Follies: America’s New Global Empire.

Image: Reuters