In short, the United States and its interests not only face a sequence of significant challenges-terrorism, Russian militarism, Chinese nationalism and European unification-but also wildly varying magnitudes of danger from its potential major rivals, as well as from lesser states and non-state actors. All of these trends-exacerbated by nuclear proliferation, the economic successes and failures of different nations, and old-fashioned conventional conflicts around the globe-point to an unstable future.

The solution? A policy of strategic independence-that is, of "the military deterrence of potential adversaries achieved by a combination of superior offensive capabilities, arms control, and national missile defense." At its core, this strategy would consist of four elements: a focus on the defense of the United States; avoidance of an arms race with a rival power (or powers) through a combination of arms-control agreements, strategic missile capabilities, flexible conventional forces and missile defense; pre-emption to deal with real threats, especially the threat of attacks with Weapons of Mass Destruction and sufficient conventional forces to allow independence in determining when and how to act in self-defense.

Against those who will claim that their prescription will increase the risk of conflict through its reliance on military force, Rosefielde and Mills respond that theirs is more than a military strategy. To be successful, they acknowledge, it should be "supplemented by addressing the great problems of economic and social development abroad with a culturally sensitive approach", including "accepting limitations on the transference of our own economic and social culture to other nations." Nevertheless, they also remind critics:

It would be wonderful if we lived in the sort of world in which our disarming increased the likelihood of peace; in which [mutually assured destruction] could deal with nuclear proliferation; and in which turning the other cheek dissuaded adversaries-but we do not, and can't afford the pretense of our public culture that we do.

This leads the authors back to the question of how one proceeds strategically in a democracy where mass opinion-hardly the most reliable basis on which objective decisions are to be made, given its domination by illusions and other distortions-governs. The remedy for what Rosefielde and Mills admit, in an innovative reiteration of Niall Ferguson's thesis, is an American public culture "unsuited for global responsibility", is presidential leadership. The authors approvingly quote Franklin Delano Roosevelt's assertion that "the first duty of a statesman is to educate." Of course, it took Roosevelt years to do his educating concerning the threat posed by the German Nazis in Europe and the Japanese imperialists in the Pacific. Even then, he needed a little help from Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's bombers over Pearl Harbor before the American people could be persuaded to enter the war.

And here, a weak link in the overall powerful chain of argumentation forged by Rosefielde and Mills is their positing a "subtle shift" whereby "since September 11, 2001, the American public has gained a new dimension of maturity." While more Americans may have come to recognize that they live in a world far more dangerous than their public culture had hitherto prepared them for, it is still a bit of a stretch to conclude a president could openly contradict the illusions so long embedded in that public culture. In fact, one might argue that the real failure of the current administration is that it failed to free itself from the web of illusions that ensnare our public culture, preventing proper perspective from being brought to the strategic landscape. And, once America was drawn into the conflict, both the president and his critics have largely focused on what Clausewitz would have judged to be the tactics of conducting single combats, while losing sight of the overarching strategy of the war.

No one can take issue with George W. Bush's assertion in his second inaugural speech that the "most solemn duty" of an American president "is to protect this nation and its people from further attacks and emerging threats." After all, the primary obligation of any government towards its citizens is to shield them insofar as possible from foreseeable dangers. However, as Rosefielde and Mills eloquently illustrate in Masters of Illusion, deflecting threats requires not only keeping them in constant sight but also doing nothing that would impair our freedom to respond to even greater challenges, including needlessly constraining ourselves on the one hand or foolishly overreaching on the other. Hans J. Morgenthau, the intellectual father of political realism, once postulated that "it is not only a political necessity but also a moral duty for a nation to follow in its dealings with other nations one guiding star, one standard for thought, one rule for action: THE NATIONAL INTEREST" (emphasis in the original). One may hope for the emergence of leadership capable of combining both that clarity of vision and that forthrightness of intentionality. Expecting it, however, may well prove wishful thinking.

J. Peter Pham is the director of the Nelson Institute for International and Public Affairs at James Madison University.