Review of Donald Prater's Thomas Mann: A Life (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).

Earlier this year, events provided a fitting commentary on the mixture of tragedy and farce that has been the history of the ill-starred attempt to create a European super-state. When the "Intergovernmental Conference" (IGC) convened at Turin on March 29, 1996, to revise the Treaty of Maastricht with a view to expanding the membership of the European Union, the main topic turned out to be "mad cow disease" (BSE) and its alleged link to Creutzfeld-Jacob disease (CJD).

A panic had spread across Europe after an apparent acceptance by the British government that such a link might exist and, in consequence, a decision was taken by the European Commission that Britain should not only be prohibited from exporting beef to Europe, but to anywhere else in the world. The assembled ministers were described by the British prime minister on his return as having agreed that the problem was a "European" one, and as having received a "notable measure of understanding and support." During the next few days, however, Britain's European partners demanded ever more stringent measures to destroy British cattle and refused to set a date for lifting the ban. Even the promise to bear part of the cost of the operation was shown to be less significant than at first thought--since the money would be recovered by cutting down on the British rebate of its dues to the Union, negotiated by Lady Thatcher to make up for the fact that the method by which the Community (later the Union) was financed was particularly ill-suited to Britain's circumstances.

As weeks passed, the beef problem continued to push other European issues off center stage, and the result was to bring over to the Euroskeptic camp several Members of Parliament (MPs) not hitherto so situated. The matter came to a dramatic impasse when, on May 20, Britain's European partners refused to ease the ban--this in the context of a recent visit of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl to London. The next day, responding to public and parliamentary pressures--and perhaps his own good sense as well--Prime Minister John Major took the diplomatic offensive, declaring that Britain would invoke the unanimity rule of the European Union to block all EU activities, including that of the Intergovernmental Conference and, if necessary, its ministerial summit set for June 21 in Florence. Thus through the improbable agency of bovine business has Britain come to its moment of truth about Europe.

No one should have been surprised at the attitude of Britain's "partners." Agricultural protectionism is part and parcel both of the Union's commitment and of the individual policies of its dominant governments--those of France and Germany. For the French especially, finding ways of stopping meat imports from Britain had long figured as an objective of their powerful agricultural interest. Concern about "health" has often been an excuse for blatant protectionism in the past, and so it is again. The fact that cases of cjd had occurred in a number of European countries, with no evidence of a connection with "British beef" or beef of any kind, renders transparent the true motive of the "ban."

The "mad cow" syndrome was not the only element of farce at Turin. The chairman of the meeting--Italy held the presidency of the Union for the first six months of this year--was the foreign minister of Italy, Signora Agnelli. (Since the show was held on the property of her family firm--the makers of Fiat cars--the whole thing, as with so much in Italy, looked like a family matter: the more so in that the Italian government was a caretaker administration pending a general election.) All this did not preclude Agnelli giving interviews which showed that her command of the English language was much superior to her understanding of politics. She proclaimed: the need to go forward to create a federal system for Europe; her certainty that Britain would in the end go along with such a project; that a single European currency would come into being at the beginning of 1999 as the Maastricht Treaty had specified; and that Italy would be part of the new system--though none of the figures pointed to Italy being likely to meet the strict financial criteria laid down in the Treaty. The two countries in Europe keenest on surrendering their sovereignty to the Franco-German partnership, which is the serious factor in the situation, are Italy and Belgium, the two countries with the greatest difficulty in running their own affairs.

One element of farce was largely set aside; after a brief discussion on "employment and competitiveness", the issue was postponed to the next summit at Florence in June. Since what most worries ordinary citizens on the continent, including those in Germany and France, is the rising level of unemployment, and since both governments are pledged to maintain the heavy burden of non-wage costs that handicap their manufacturing and service sectors, it is hard to know what can usefully be said at Florence. No doubt an attempt will be made to end Britain's opt-out from the "social chapter" of Maastricht, so that British costs can be forced upwards and Britain's competitive advantage diminished. And if the beef wars continue until then, Britain, no doubt, will respond with a self-interested vigor uncharacteristic of recent years.

The Meaning of the Euro

In a sense all this is beside the point. The real issues are not those in the IGC agenda but those raised in what are described as parallel negotiations, negotiations looking to the elimination of national currencies in favor of a single "Euro", controlled by a single European bank.

Since the impact of EMU--economic and monetary union involving the creation of a single currency--would be far greater than any changes that might be made in the operations of the European institutions, any discussion of European issues that fails to address the question is nugatory. As a Portuguese member of parliament has put it, "to debate Europe's future without discussing EMU is like studying the Middle Ages while ignoring the plague."

True, it is still possible to find dedicated ignoramuses--like the British chancellor of the exchequer, Kenneth Clarke--who profess to believe that the issue is purely an economic one, to be settled by each individual country on the reckoning of the balance between the economic advantages and disadvantages involved in entering such a system. But no one who is serious about the thing and who looks at either experience or the inherent logic of such a system can fail to see that to surrender control over one's currency is to abrogate national sovereignty in a vital area. Quoting Chancellor Kohl's belief that the forging of a United States of Europe is the true objective of EMU, the former chancellor of the exchequer, Lord Lawson, writes:

"Although this may be the purpose of the principal proponents of EMU, are they right in believing that monetary union and political union must stand or fall together? I believe they are; and it is interesting to note that the institution that has probably given the most rigorous thought to this issue over several decades, the Bundesbank, has long been convinced that the two are inextricable."

It would mean a single control of monetary matters and rates of interest, as now practiced by national banks, and a "binding coordination" of fiscal policy. This "fiscal federalism" would, in Lord Lawson's view, "require full-blown, democratically-based, political union." As he points out, given the likelihood that over a large area differences in economic conditions are certain to arise, what is done by the central authorities may not suit all parts of the Union to an equal measure. In classic federations, for instance the United States, there is a corrective in the form of labor mobility. For a variety of obvious reasons such mobility does not exist in the European Union, nor is it likely to exist in the future. So the only recourse would be to transfer payments such as those already embodied in the existing treaties. Why else would the Republic of Ireland be so passionately devoted to the European idea? But any increase in such transfers to meet the requirement of sustaining support for a single currency would not please the principal paymasters. Hence in part the reticence of much German opinion, this in spite of the chancellor's enthusiasm.

Even if all the existing fifteen members of the Union could be brought within the EMU, what about the "enlargement" that is supposed to be at the heart of the IGC? We know that the hopes of the Central and East European countries that have pressed for membership have been frustrated by the obstacles placed in the way of their trade, reflecting the protectionist instincts of most of the existing members. Can one seriously believe that the inhabitants of Bavaria are going to pay heavier taxes so as to give Slovakia equally good public services? It has been hard enough for them to swallow the burden of "unification" with the GDR.

Britain's Response

Even within the countries of the existing Union the need to meet the Maastricht criteria has involved heavy doses of deflation that have already produced obvious social strains. While objections to Britain's involvement in the federalist drive have largely come from the Right in domestic politics, on the single currency issue there are also grave misgivings on the Left. Tony Blair may reiterate his determination that under his leadership the country would never "be isolated or left behind in Europe." But if not being "left behind" means becoming part of EMU, he has yet to convince his party colleagues. The impact upon Britain's economy of trying to comply with the Maastricht criteria was highlighted in a leaflet, issued at the end of March 1996, sponsored by fifty named Labour Members of Parliament: "Stuck with mass unemployment and deflationary economics, the 'Euro' would be the breaking of Europe, not its binding." Such utterances may give pause to those in Germany and elsewhere who believe that if the IGC and EMU negotiations can be prolonged beyond the next general election, Labour will be in power and Britain eager to go along with the Kohl vision.

Since where governments and central banks are concerned the negotiations that matter go on behind closed doors, it is hard to predict the outcome. As of late May 1996, the most probable outcome on the single currency issue looks to be an EMU restricted to Germany, France, the Benelux countries, and perhaps Austria. But this raises the possibility of the "core countries" being undercut by the countries left outside. We may therefore expect pressure on the remaining members of the Union to enter a new exchange rate mechanism that would enable the core countries to control the exchange rates of all the members, in which case the degree of sovereignty left them would not be much greater than if they had become part of the EMU itself.

Given the ruthless determination of Chancellor Kohl to bring about a federal Europe through the monetary route, we may expect the pressure to take disagreeable forms, even to threatening non-exchange rate mechanism (ERM) countries with exclusion from the benefits of the single market. For someone who, at Louvain of all places, has threatened Europe with a renewal of its internecine wars if he does not get his way, no form of pressure can be ruled out. Kohl's visit to London in late April did nothing to allay such concerns.

Since there is now in Britain an increasing awareness of the consequences of accepting EMU membership, there has been much talk of seeking not only parliamentary assent for it but even popular approval through a referendum. Neither party leader has been willing to make an unqualified commitment to the idea. Mr. Blair has seemingly committed himself to seek popular approval either through a referendum or a general election. Since divisions on the subject exist in both main parties, and since no general election campaign can be made to focus upon a single issue, the second alternative is a non-starter. So one presumes that a Labour government would call for a referendum, although the party's intentions remain obscure.

Where the prime minister, John Major, is concerned it is known that he had to overcome a strong opposition to a referendum in the cabinet, led by Kenneth Clarke. How far the opposition was genuinely based on the expressed claim that referenda were alien to the British constitution--hardly more alien, one would think, than taking the country into a federal system--and how far on the knowledge derived from all tests of opinion that the single currency would be repudiated by the electorate if given the chance, it is hard to say. What emerged just as Parliament was rising for the Easter recess was a compromise. The government would first itself accede to EMU, then pass the appropriate legislation through Parliament, and then put the fait accompli to the voters. Unlike the case when the referendum on remaining in the Community was held in 1975, cabinet ministers who dissent from the policy would be barred from campaigning against it. In other words, the scales would be weighted as far as possible on the side of a yes vote. It seems a high price for keeping Kenneth Clarke in the cabinet, but it is not out of line with precedent. For although dissident Labour ministers were allowed to campaign in 1975, all the weight of the official machine and of the establishment in general was mustered, both publicly and in more devious ways, to see that the vote came out as Harold Wilson desired--not a glorious episode in British constitutional history.

This background must be borne in mind when we consider the British reaction to the issues that are properly the concern of the IGC. Here the general stance of the government would have wide cross-party support:

"We are committed to the success of the European Union, and to playing a positive role in achieving that success. We are confident that it can be achieved if the EU develops as a Union of nations cooperating together under Treaties freely entered into and approved by the national Parliaments of every Member State; a Union which respects cultural and political diversity; which concentrates single-mindedly only on what needs to be done at a European level, and doing it well; which does not interfere where it is not needed; and which is outward-looking, free-trading, democratic and flexible. We shall not accept harmonization for its own sake, or further European integration which is driven by ideology rather than the prospect of practical benefit."

Resistance to the extension of majority voting, and the detailed proposals which are then outlined--the curbing of the powers of the European Court and of the pretensions of the European Parliament; proposals in the fields of justice and home affairs, citizenship and human rights; budgetary policy; the common fisheries policy from which Britain has been a particular sufferer; and finally foreign and defense policy--all fit neatly into this general framework. Why then the worry? The essential point is that the general idea of a "partnership of nations", which can only mean a partnership of nation-states, is wholly at variance with what a majority of the other members of the IGC appear to desire.

If one had to produce an alternative "white paper" setting out the views of the Franco-German alliance and its associates, it would read something like this:

"We are committed to the success of the European Union and its speedy transformation into a federally organized United States of Europe in which all substantial powers shall be exercised by the Union's own institutions--Commission, Court, and Parliament. In so far as national governments retain a voice, they shall always be obliged to defer to the voice of the majority. Since no federal system can tolerate independent foreign policies on the part of the units of which it is composed or separate armed forces, we shall ensure that foreign policy decisions are taken by majority agreement and that the Union, by taking over the Western European Union and severing its link with NATO, shall become fully responsible for Europe's defense. The Anglo-Saxon heresies of free trade and deregulation shall be abandoned and economic policy be dominated by determination to protect Europe's producers and their right to maintain their existing levels of social provision, whatever the competition from low-cost economies overseas."

In the light of such differences over goals, not merely methods, it is clear why the British government could not be over-optimistic concerning its ability to make headway at the IGC. It was already clear from experience that even where Britain achieved exceptions or "opt-outs", the Union would find ways of getting round them, for instance by classifying measures in the economic field--such as the minimum wage and hours at work--as health provisions, and so susceptible of enactment by qualified majority voting. Given a court that regarded its task not as that of interpreting the intentions of legislators but of pushing forward the process of integration, everything was stacked against the British government's hopes for a "partnership of nations."

What has worried the more realistic of commentators is that the government has seemed so oblivious to this fact, and so ready to believe that compromise is possible. "We must", declared the White Paper, "be realistic therefore about the changes we can hope to achieve, just as we are clear about the sort of changes we will not accept. If we were to press ideas that stand no chance of general acceptance, some others would seek to impose an integrationist agenda which would be equally unacceptable from our point of view."

Such a perspective has been wholly inappropriate. Since the most important countries with which Britain would be dealing (as Signora Agnelli was to make plain at Turin) were committed to pressing on with integration even at the expense of enlargement, it would not matter what proposals Britain put forward. None of them would fit in with the integrationist goal. Since, as the White Paper pointed out, the Treaties could only be amended by unanimous agreement, Britain could in the end always use its veto. In that case, there seems to be on the continent some confidence that it was only necessary to wait for the British general election to put the Labour Party into power, when Britain would accept the whole integrationist agenda. Whether Mr. Blair and his colleagues would in the end prove as malleable as the continental governments expect is unknown. But one can understand why continental governments take the view they do.

The Third Pillar

Perhaps the most important area of difference is over defense and foreign policy, the so-called "third pillar" of the Maastricht Treaty. Nothing contentious that has happened in the world since Maastricht has found the countries of the European Union following identical policies. Each country has followed what was thought to be its national interest. The integrationists have drawn from this the lesson that the way to overcome these differences and give "Europe" its proper weight in the world is to bring foreign policy into the general structure of the Union; that is to say, decide on what should be done by majority vote. From this conclusion even the most Europhilic of serious British politicians has felt bound to dissent. Coordination remains desirable and Britain is prepared to see some new European official appointed to facilitate the process and perhaps act as a spokesman for all, where agreement had been reached. But that is a very different matter from having agreement forced against the grain of Britain's national interest.

Defense is an even more vital question from the point of view of national independence. Britain remains convinced that the security of Europe, even after the end of the Cold War, still rests on a close association with North America. The WEU, the only wholly European organ for military cooperation, listed some four years ago a number of tasks for itself: "crisis management, combat operations, peacekeeping tasks, including embargo or sanctions enforcement and humanitarian and rescue missions which European governments might be prepared to undertake without U.S. or Canadian participation." And these conclusions were accepted at Maastricht. But action independent of the United States was never envisaged on the bigger issues. As far as Britain was concerned, its then foreign secretary, Douglas Hurd--no Europskeptic--noted:

"We did not see the European Union itself as playing a direct or immediate part in defense. This is partly because some member states including Britain wanted to emphasize even more emphatically in defense than in foreign policy that defense was a matter for cooperation between governments. It was not to be subordinated to supranational institutions. It was partly because the European Union now included states which have never been members of NATO, and which even in 1996 value something which they used to call neutrality, that is a position outside defense alliances."

Perhaps Mr. Hurd is still too much of a diplomat to add that Germany, the leading protagonist of a European Union defense component, has so far, as in the former Yugoslavia, advocated policies for which Britain, France, and other countries have risked troops while the Germans themselves, on the plea of constitutional or psychological impediments, are careful to keep their forces out of harm's way.

None of this means that European countries do not have to face together the need to bring some Central and East European countries within the NATO protection zone while developing joint policies toward Russia to allay its insecurities. But even here there are troubling signs of countries, notably Germany, developing "special relationships" while preaching European solidarity.

Europe Without Europeans

In the half-century in which I have been following European events, I have constantly marveled at the ease with which Americans have swallowed the arguments of the integrationists and the difficulty they have in understanding why Europeans cannot solve their problems by the tried American expedient of federalism. Yet this assessment, which has been of practical significance, rests upon a misunderstanding of both American and European history. Whatever view one may take of the American Founding Fathers and their work, it is clear that what made the United States of America possible was the existence of a self-conscious American nation, fostered by common origins and two centuries of experience within a single imperial system. With the partial exception of Texas and the territories annexed from Mexico and later Alaska and Hawaii, U.S. expansion to its current dimensions was made possible by an identity of language, culture, and basic legal institutions. For similar reasons federalism was possible for the British possessions in Canada and Australia, although in the case of Canada the development of a feeling of separate nationhood in Quebec now threatens the original achievement.

The obstacle to a "United States of Europe" is that there are no Europeans in the same sense that there were Americans, Canadians, and Australians when those federations were formed. Enacting a common citizenship and issuing identical looking passports does not get one all that far. Europe is still composed of nations and its history over the last half century is the history of their relationships with each other. The drive to set up common institutions as the basis for a federal system was the outcome of particular calculations by particular countries as to where their best interests lay. The idea that Europe has enjoyed an unusually long period of peace because of the setting up of institutional structures is an absurdity too often repeated. The sufferings entailed by the Second World War were enough to inoculate the peoples against a repetition. The only threat to European peace has been from the east, and what prevented it from ending in war was the power and good sense of the United States.

The decisive moment where the process of integration was concerned was the decision by the French elites that they could do better by accepting a permanent partnership with Germany--as Vichy had attempted during the war--in the hope that their greater intelligence and experience would always be able to keep Germany under control despite its greater population and bigger resources. German unification shook that confidence but did not destroy it. And British hopes that a "Gaullist" president in the person of Jacques Chirac would bring about a change in policy have proved hollow; particularly unsettling, for example, was Chirac's insistence during his May 1996 trip to London that Britain join the EMU--just as opposition to the idea was waxing on the English side of the Channel. The European Union as now envisaged would be based upon a Franco-German alliance dedicated to creating something very like the Napoleonic "continental system", familiar to students of the presidencies of Jefferson and Madison. Of such a system Britain cannot now, any more than then, form part. If pressed to do so at the IGC or elsewhere, it will have no option but to find a way of escaping altogether from the system created by the Treaty of Rome and its successors. As de Gaulle foresaw, it will prefer the "open sea" at whatever temporary economic cost.

As to what will happen on the continent itself, no one can be certain. What Napoleon's rule did was to exacerbate national feeling in every country to which it extended. It is likely that, far from assisting in a permanent reconciliation between former enemies, the European Union may exacerbate xenophobia. Certainly Chancellor Kohl's bullying tactics have set back the better Anglo-German relations that were developing in the postwar period. The social costs of EMU in France are clearly awakening old resentments against Germany. And the list could be prolonged. The nation-state may be an anachronism to some, but it has a long life ahead of it yet. France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and other countries will still be there when the activities of the Brussels bureaucracy have been consigned to the archives.