FINALLY, KAUFMAN advances the argument, common among neoconservative authors, that there is a kind of hereditary lineage behind the Bush Doctrine, going back to Ronald Reagan, Harry Truman and, for good measure, Winston Churchill. I admire Reagan, Truman and Churchill as much as anyone, but I am getting a little tired of hearing the current president compared to them. What all of these historic leaders possessed was the ability to pursue long-term goals both strategically vital and morally imperative, with immense short-term flexibility, realism and pragmatism in relation to the facts that stared them in the face. Bush no doubt showed a kind of vision and courage in invading Iraq, but can we honestly say that he showed sufficient realism, flexibility or pragmatism in either the conceptualization or implementation of that decision?

Both Truman and Reagan, for example, rejected preventive war against the Soviet Union in favor of containment. The Bush Doctrine, on the other hand, explicitly rejects the containment of rogue states such as Iran, and instead embraces a stated policy of rogue state rollback, preventive warfare or regime change. This is clearly a break from the quite successful strategy of containment pursued by successive U.S. presidents in relation to the Soviet Union. Kaufman points out, quite rightly, that circumstances have changed since the Cold War. Fair enough, but then do not claim to be working in the tradition of Truman and Reagan. Reagan, for example, was in practice very careful and cautious in relation to any major uses of force on the part of the United States. There was simply no equivalent of the invasion of Iraq during his tenure. Bush's most ardent supporters therefore need to be careful in how they invoke Reagan's name in order to justify the current war in Iraq; it is not at all clear that Reagan would have acted in the same way as Bush on this score. Churchill is even more of a problem for Kaufman's reading of history, since the grand old man was not only the hero of the blitz, but after all called for comprehensive negotiations with the Soviet Union during the 1950s-an uncomfortable fact for Kaufman's overall thesis. But then Churchill was always willing to think with both sides of his brain; he was not slavishly committed to any particular foreign-policy doctrine, if it came at the expense of peace, security or core democratic values.

As of September 11, 2001, the self-evident enemy of the United States was Al-Qaeda and its supporters. Bush showed that he understood the scale of Al-Qaeda's murderous ambitions; he said that he was willing to do almost anything to stop them. That is why he gathered the support of so many Americans in the weeks and months immediately following 9/11. Then he apparently became convinced that the best way to undermine support for groups like Al-Qaeda within the Middle East-while simultaneously demonstrating American strength and taking care of unfinished business-was to directly overthrow Saddam Hussein's dictatorship and put a stable democracy in its place. The arguments offered in favor of such an invasion were no doubt sincere, but not particularly compelling, even at the time. We were told, among other things, that Iraq had a culture unusually receptive to the promotion of secular democracy; that it would be better to fight the terrorists in Iraq than here at home; that the reconstruction efforts would be inexpensive and that American troops would be able to leave behind a stable, democratic Iraq within a few months. Not one of these arguments has been vindicated by events. Instead, Iraq has turned into a foreign-policy and military fiasco for the United States, and continues to degenerate into a multi-directional sectarian struggle of intense brutality. The administration claims that "postwar" events in Iraq could not have been foreseen, but this is simply unacceptable: They were foreseen, and warned of at the time, by numerous diplomatic, military, area-studies and intelligence experts. Yet the administration chose to operate on only the most optimistic assumptions about Iraq, assumptions that had little basis in reality. Now, how is this record comparable to the foreign-policy accomplishments of Winston Churchill, Harry Truman or Ronald Reagan? And how was it, of all things, prudent?

American conservatives are going to have to regroup in the coming months and years around a foreign-policy approach more reflective of traditional conservative insights into foreign affairs. In particular, they will need to re-learn that the traditional conservative skepticism regarding government-sponsored social engineering applies to foreign, just as much as domestic, policies. The notion of forcible democracy promotion in historically inhospitable regions such as Iraq cannot be the centerpiece of any genuinely conservative foreign policy. This is not to say that conservatives will not support the use of force under certain circumstances; far from it. Conservatives understand as well as anyone the perennially violent and dangerous nature of world politics, along with the need for military preparedness. It is precisely for this reason, as Kaufman says, that prudence is of such importance in foreign policy. But an emphasis on prudence ought to lead us to policies much more careful and considered than the current Iraq War. This is not because the French don't like it, or the UN doesn't like it, or Barbara Streisand doesn't like a particular policy. It is simply a question of whether the costs to the United States, in terms of overall national-security interests, outweigh the benefits of a given policy decision.

Any U.S. president should and will reserve the right to use force in a preventive, unilateral fashion under certain circumstances. Clearly the United States must be relentless and aggressive in hunting down and destroying terrorists who would attack it. Yet the Bush Doctrine as implemented in Iraq has not actually contributed to that end. On the contrary, thus far the Iraq War has had a negative impact overall on American national security, particularly in relation to groups like Al-Qaeda. Iraq has given new life to recruiting efforts on the part of jihadi terrorists; provided these groups with an extensive base of operations that did not previously exist; overstretched the American military and given unintended hope and inspiration to our very worst enemies. This does not mean that the United States should now abandon the Iraqis to their fate, however popular that notion might become in the impending months. But it is hardly an argument in defense of the Bush Doctrine-a doctrine that has less and less practical impact on American foreign policy these days, outside of continuing and desperate attempts to stave off disaster in Iraq.

Colin Dueck is an assistant professor in the Department of Public and International Affairs, George Mason University.