Since Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons poses the greatestdanger, Mr. Berman's stress on reinvigorating U.S. public diplomacyto empower the government's nonviolent opponents appears misplaced.First, the Iranian people already evince widespread antipathytoward the current regime, with little apparent effect. The recentelection of Tehran's mayor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, as the nextpresident, like the triumph of the conservatives in the voting forparliament last year, highlights the futility of relying on theballot to promote substantial political change. Second, the absenceof a charismatic leader capable of uniting the opposition willimpede its influence and contributes to widespread popular apathyabout political affairs. Third, the substantial domestic supportfor pursuing the nuclear option means that any successor regimeprobably would continue to develop a civilian nuclear powerindustry, with its inherent military potential, even if itcurtailed support for terrorism. Although regime change willhopefully occur at some point, for the time being the strongestforces that could avert a nuclear-armed Iran emanate from outsidethe country--especially from Russia, China and Europe. Working with(and on) these governments therefore should absorb the bulk ofAmerican policymakers' attention.