Samuel Byers, in a recent article in this publication, is perfectly correct to ask and answer:

The relevant question is whether the effort we exert in the Red Sea, the resources we expend, and the opportunity costs that those represent are proportional to the value of the results they have achieved. To this, the answer is decidedly no.

However, it is a dynamic situation with the potential to evolve so that we do not have to wait for the next president to consider a “disproportional response” to end the interconnected conflicts across the Levant.

The U.S.-led response to Houthi attacks on shipping in the Red Sea has been defensive, focusing on intercepting Houthi missiles and drones while only striking sites in Yemen supporting the anti-shipping campaign. The Houthi attacks are meant to exact a cost from those who support Israel’s counterattack into Gaza following Hamas’ horrendous terror attacks on October 7. The Houthis and Hamas are backed by the Iranian regime, as is Hezbollah, which has continued to fire rockets and drones into Israel during the Gaza and Red Sea battles.

It must be remembered how far the U.S. has come in its reaction to the escalation of violence in the region. When President Joe Biden entered the White House, he immediately cut off all aid to the Saudi-led coalition fighting the Houthis in Yemen and pushed for a cease-fire. Yemen was called the world’s worst humanitarian crisis (the same argument as in Gaza today). The Obama administration had supported Riyadh’s war effort with logistics, weapons, and intelligence, as did President Donald Trump. Biden’s action reflected the majority view of Congress, comprised of Democrats, including then-Senator Kamala Harris (D-CA) and a handful of isolationist Republicans led by Senator Rand Paul (R-KY). Trump then vetoed their bill. Now, American forces are in direct combat with the Houthis. 

The Biden administration has feared escalation into a regional war, preferring to keep the conflict limited to Iran’s proxies. When Iran escalated with its first direct attack on Israel on April 13, it was successfully met by a united American, European, and Arab response backing up Israel’s air defense. But then Washington pressured Israel not to retaliate in kind. 

Four months later, the U.S. deployment of naval forces in the region looked markedly different. The Navy continues to intercept Houthi attacks, but its most recent deployment of two carrier strikes was not in the Red Sea. The USS Abraham Lincoln and USS Theodore Roosevelt aircraft carriers sailed to the Sea of Oman near Iran instead. In addition to the two carrier groups, three additional guided-missile destroyers are also present to provide offensive and defensive firepower. This is not a deployment merely to sustain a “forever war” but to end it.

Also notable is the deployment of the nuclear missile submarine USS Georgia to the region. This is an Ohio-class vessel, carrying 150 Tomahawk cruise missiles. This is not a warship meant merely to defend shipping from Iranian or proxy attacks; rather, it is intended for retaliation and deterrence. The very public disclosure of this deployment is meant to threaten Tehran with escalation “beyond their ability to reply in kind,” to use Byers’ phrase. 

This seems to have worked so far. Tehran has not launched the promised revenge barrage for the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran. Instead, this mission was passed to Hezbollah, but Israel’s airstrikes preempted its massive strike, so only a small fraction of weapons was launched and easily countered. Tehran then offered to reopen talks on its nuclear program, a possible shift to diplomacy resulting from the threat of escalation rather than U.S. “restraint,” as advocated by left-wing and isolationist critics. Adversaries will only talk of peace if they believe things will get markedly worse for them if they do not.

It is time to apply this same approach to the war in Ukraine. Despite previous commitments to Kyiv, Biden initially refused to do anything beyond imposing sanctions on Russia should Vladimir Putin turn his military exercise into an invasion. The declaration that there would be no serious military response eliminated deterrence. Ukraine’s valor in resisting Putin’s early blitz to wipe the country off the map rallied Western support and generated a flow of aid. Yet, the United States has been behind the curve in providing advanced weapons and has continued to restrict Kyiv’s right to use long-range weapons against targets in Russia for fear of “escalation” into the general war Putin has threatened since the invasion.

After the recent G-7 meeting demonstrated allied unity on Ukraine, Putin declared, “Calls to inflict a strategic defeat on Russia, which has the largest arsenal of nuclear weapons, demonstrate the extreme adventurism of Western politicians.” Yet, the West accepting a strategic defeat in Ukraine will produce a destabilizing effect across the world, inviting aggression elsewhere. The Russian nuclear threat is clearly a bid for escalation dominance based on fear, jumping to the highest rung on the ladder because its leaders know it is at a disadvantage on the lower rungs. European leaders see Putin’s bluff for what it is better than many Americans. The use of tactical nuclear weapons would make Putin’s regime a global pariah state. The claim that Russia has “lost the West but gained the rest” would collapse. Even Beijing has warned Moscow against any nuclear use. And Putin has been assured that there would be retaliation, devastating even if conducted only with conventional weapons (nuclear retaliation held in reserve). The balance of power favors the massive U.S.-NATO alliance, which can escalate beyond Russia’s ability to respond and avoid defeat.

President Biden and British prime minister Keir Starmer were correct to dismiss Putin’s threat that allowing Ukrainian use of Western missiles to strike targets in Russia (the way Russia is striking across Ukraine) would mean NATO “was at war with Russia.” Beyond harsh language, Russia has done little to respond to the escalating flow of weapons to Ukraine and the slow but vital lessening of restrictions on their use. Russia is not trying to provoke escalation but deter it with threats of irrational actions that it knows would doom its own future. The time is thus ripe for direct Western intervention, if not formally by NATO, then by a “coalition of the willing” to use Putin’s fear of escalation to impose an end to the war.

At the NATO-Ukraine Council meeting on August 28, the allies pledged to “send Ukraine additional strategic air defense systems, including more Patriot batteries, and Allies agreed that together they would provide a minimum of 40 billion euros of security assistance in the next year.” Ukrainian president Zelenskyy wants NATO members to provide the same kind of direct defense Israel received. And he should get it. Had the early debate on declaring a “no-fly zone” over Ukraine been resolved positively, the war might have ended quickly. This would be an escalation in defensive efforts that would signal possible further escalation.

Wars are won on the ground. Western deployments could be made behind the lines at strategic points in Ukraine to block any Russian advance, as some have suggested. Odessa should have been garrisoned long ago as part of the larger effort to protect grain shipments vital to world food supplies. The message would be that NATO is intervening to bring peace, preserve Ukrainian independence, and force negotiations from a position of strength. Putin still has not fully conquered the lands he illegally annexed, and Kyiv currently holds Russian territory it could trade for a Russian withdrawal on advantageous terms. This fragile moment should be seized to fulfill U.S. and NATO strategic objectives. Without such an intervention, the war will continue as Putin believes he can wear down Ukrainian defenses and undermine Western resolve to bring victory by 2026. The United States cannot afford to play the “forever war” game favored by our adversaries.

If Biden wants to leave a real legacy to his country and the world after his four years in office (and do his successor an immense favor), he will continue to move forward and upward to end the wars in Europe and the Levant by outmaneuvering the aggressors and restoring credible deterrence in these theaters or any others.

William R. Hawkins is a former economics professor who has worked for conservative think tanks and on the Republican staff of the U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee. He has written widely on international economics and national security issues for both professional and popular publications, including the Army War College, the U.S. Naval Institute, and the National Defense University.

Image: Karolis Kavolelis / Shutterstock.com.