In May 2016, the governor of the Bank of England stated that “a vote to leave the EU could have material economic effects—on the exchange rate, on demand and on the economy’s supply potential—that could affect the appropriate setting of monetary policy.” He did not say so, but Brexit would leave the bank between the devil and the deep sea. On one hand, falling growth is likely—the bank has mentioned recession as a risk—which would call for expansionary monetary policy, while falling exchange rates (the pound has fallen 9 percent over the last six months) and maybe higher inflation would point towards higher interest rates.

In such circumstances, it requires a good deal of courage and ability to put facts aside to expect foreign creditors to play business as usual. There may not be a run on the pound, but creditors may reduce pound-denominated assets and be reluctant to lend to Britain.

4. Scotland may decide that the moment has come to break up the United Kingdom.

Polls indicate that the majority for Remain is two-to-one in Scotland. Leaders of the Scottish National Party (SNP) have stated that they will not acquiesce to England taking Scotland out of the EU against the will of the Scottish people, implying a referendum on whether Scotland should remain in the UK. Under those circumstances, the result would probably reverse the 55 percent that elected to stay in the UK in the referendum of September 18, 2014.

Similar movements may surface in Wales, though sentiment is less strong there. Northern Ireland would suffer tremendously from a Leave vote, and could also start to contemplate its future. England itself is divided. A clear majority for Remain exists in London, according to polls, which should not come as a surprise in view of London emerging as a cosmopolitan rather than an English city—geographically in England, but in fact a global city.

Leaving the troubles for Britain and England aside Scotland’s secession rises a number of questions.

The union between England and Scotland entered into force 1707, more than three hundred years ago, and since then a number of international agreements and treaties has been signed in the name of the UK—membership in the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization, to mention a few.

Will England automatically be the successor state to the UK? Without a doubt England will claim so, and point to its share of population and GDP, but what happens if Scotland contests this or if other member states of these organizations raise objections? What happens to bilateral agreements if the other party does not automatically accept England as successor state? When the USSR broke up in 1991, the Russian Federation declared itself to be the continuator state of the USSR; this was accepted formally by the other former states of the USSR and no other country voiced objections. But this cannot be taken for granted. When Yugoslavia broke up in the early 1990s, the rump state named the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia claimed to be the continuator state. This was contested by, among others, the United States blocking the rump state from assuming the seat at the UN. The dissolution of Czechoslovakia took place in 1993 and followed a different path, as neither of the two new nations—the Czech Republic and Slovakia—claimed status as successor state or continuator state to Czechoslovakia. At the UN, Czechoslovakia’s seat was terminated and the two new nations entered in their own new names.

Britain’s seat as permanent member of the UN Security Council may be disputed. Will the other four permanent members automatically welcome England? What will the UN member states say? For years, reform has been deliberated without any result, but England claiming to be the successor state to the UK may trigger not only a new debate, but a long overdue reform of the system—needless to say, with England out of the UN Security Council as a permanent member.

Scotland has let it be known that it would not play host to England’s nuclear deterrent. This position may change, or else a lease covering a number of years may be forged. Whatever happens, the cost for England to maintain its status as a nuclear power will be very high, casting doubt on whether the money is there. If it decides to continue financing nuclear weapons, and relocate them from Faslane in Scotland, the rest of the defense budget will suffer heavily—among other things, sowing doubts on whether the two new aircraft carriers HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales will be commissioned and, if so, whether there will be money to build the accompanying task force without which the carriers would be extremely vulnerable.

Britain used to be an indispensable partner in supporting the United States globally, having endured the two Iraq wars and plugged the “GIUK gap” in the North Atlantic, plus being host (at RAF Fylingdales) to a ballistic missile early warning system and a member of the so-called Five Eyes intelligence system. Withdrawing from the EU, and Scotland leaving the UK, is not synonymous with all of these elements being cast in doubt, but the atmosphere of unpredictability and uncertainty about Britain or England as a privileged partner continuing its special relationship with the United States cannot be brushed aside.

The United States has recently calibrated its relations with Europe, slightly upgrading relations with other countries (France) and intensifying its relations with central and eastern European countries. An American antimissile defense system has just become operational in Romania, and a second one will be operational in Poland 2018. Anakonda-16—the largest NATO exercise for a long time, with thirty-one thousand troops—is currently underway in in Poland. In case of Brexit, America may continue to take these steps. England may try to convey the message that it is still there, but the United States will look for capabilities—that is, hardware—and conclude that it may more easily be found on the continent than in England. This is especially the case if, as rumors have it, Brexit triggers stronger German-French defense cooperation.

The United States may also launch an agonizing reappraisal of its relations with Europe and the future of NATO. The alliance was crafted in 1949 as a military bulwark against the Soviet Union. Today the situation is different. Russia is opting for a belligerent attitude vis-à-vis Europe, but does not constitute a threat comparable to Soviet policy before 1991. The United States may conclude that it will be better off seeking its own accommodation with Russia and leaving the Europeans to defend themselves. In fact, noises to that effect have come out of Washington for some time. Brexit may be the event that turns such a reorientation of policy into reality. It might have happened anyway, but now could be the moment of truth, with the United States facing China, Russia, problems in the Middle East and terrorism, and not seeing why it should bail out the Europeans shooting themselves in the foot.

The United States made its position clear when President Obama visited the UK: it does not want Britain to leave. The Leave camp talks about revitalizing Britain’s ties to the Commonwealth, but no member of the Commonwealth has spoken in favor of this. Most have been cautious, but those who have let it be known what they think take a view similar to the United States. China has not said anything and will not do so, but it is hard to see why China should wish a weaker EU, as it seems to be in favor of some kind of multipolarity—at least for now. Russia is also holding back. Those saying that Russia and President Putin would rejoice if Britain leaves cannot produce any evidence. Russian diplomacy is normally cautious and Moscow can be expected to weigh pros and cons. Like China, Russia favors multipolarity; a weaker EU does not fit into that picture even if it gives Russia the chance to play individual European nation-states against each other

5. The initial reaction among EU member states depends on what happens in Britain after the vote.

A clear majority for Remain would not turn Britain into a genuine and committed member of the EU, becoming “at the very heart of Europe,” as Prime Minister John Major stated in 1991 and repeated in 1993. An indecisive outcome—a slim majority for Leave or Remain—would threaten to overshadow all other items on the EU’s agenda, of which there are many calling for action. It would be most unwelcome, as nobody would know what to do and would be forced to wait for London to sort out the political mess and sketch a course for what it wants. A victory for Leave would at least indicate the road chosen, but not necessarily what Britain or England wants.

Irrespective of the outcome, two scenarios are most likely.

If Brexit proves to be a success, with everything running smoothly, the economy humming along, the British quick to sort out political problems and Scotland not breaking up the UK, some countries may be tempted either to contemplate a new deal or to follow Britain out. That would start disintegration with regard to common policies as well as the number of member states. How deep and how fast it would go is uncertain.