The JCPOA also repurposes the underground Fordow site to a medical isotope production facility where no uranium can be present for a period of 15 years.

During the same time period, Iran must also limit its low-enriched uranium stockpile to no more than 300 kg, and accept tough limits on its advanced centrifuge research and development. Given other reporting requirements and monitoring of Iran’s centrifuge program, Tehran will not have the ability to ramp up its enrichment capacity quickly especially if it exceeds its requirements for fueling its electricity-producing reactors. These measures would not, as AIPAC cautioned in its June paper, “grant Iran virtually instant breakout time after 12 or 13 years.”

The JCPOA also requires the destruction of the core of Iran’s Arak heavy water reactor and modifications to ensure it cannot produce enough plutonium for a weapons program. The agreement commits Iran not to reprocess spent fuel to extract plutonium.

Robust IAEA safeguards and inspections under the terms of the additional protocol will last indefinitely to detect and deter noncompliance at known or undisclosed sites in the decades ahead.

Iran, as a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, will continue to be legally-bound not to pursue nuclear weapons. Any future Iranian move toward developing a nuclear weapon beyond the life of the JPOA will prompt a swift response.

Considering these overlapping, long-term, verifiable restrictions, the JCPOA creates long-term limits on Iran’s nuclear capabilities that will effectively allow the international community to block its path to nuclear weapons for more than a generation.

5. Agreement Would Remove, Render Inoperable Some 13,000 Centrifuges; Dismantle Arak Reactor

AIPAC argues that Iran must not be “allowed” to become a nuclear threshold state. The fact is that since 2007, the U.S. intelligence community has assessed that Iran has developed a range of technologies, including uranium enrichment, nuclear warhead mechanics, and delivery systems, that would give it the option to launch a nuclear weapons development effort in a relatively short time frame “if it so chooses.”

The JCPOA walks Iran back from the threshold of nuclear weapons by dismantling, reconfiguring and handcuffing Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, “so that it has no path to a nuclear weapon,” and cannot “breakout” and amass enough weapons-grade uranium for one bomb in less than 12 months, which is another of AIPAC’s June 2015 “Requirements for a Good Deal.”

In June, AIPAC made the common sense suggestion that “a good deal must not accept easily reversible steps” for actions including the disposition of Iran’s excess centrifuges.

However, contrary to AIPAC’s July 15 claim about the final agreement, it does not allow Iran to “disconnect” excess centrifuges in “an easily reversible manner.” In fact, all of the pipework that connects the excess centrifuges and allows them to actually enrich uranium will be dismantled and removed and stored in at a separate facility under IAEA seal. These machines may only be used to replace operating centrifuges that break during normal operations. As a result, it would probably take Iran more than two years to restore the 13,000 centrifuges that will have been removed—and any such effort would be detected within days.

In its July 15 statement opposing the deal, AIPAC is wrong again in claiming that the JCPOA “requires no dismantlement” of any Iranian facility. In fact, the JCPOA requires the destruction of the core of its Arak heavy water reactor and modifications to ensure it cannot produce enough plutonium for a weapons program.

Other Issues

There is another objection to the nuclear deal that AIPAC is now raising that was not in its “Five Requirements for a Good Deal” document from June.

AIPAC’s July 15 statement also claims that the JCPOA “threatens the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime” and will set off a nuclear arms race in the region.

In reality, the P5+1 and Iran nuclear deal will strengthen the nonproliferation regime, and head off a regional nuclear arms race. The JCPOA demonstrates the strength of the nonproliferation regime. It shows that attempts to violate the treaty will be detected and that there are consequences for noncompliance.

In addition to the severe economic constraints Iran has faced from the sanctions regime, Iran's limited nuclear program will be subject to restrictions and monitoring beyond the requirements of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty. A limited, highly monitored Iranian nuclear program poses far less of a threat to the region than an unconstrained program. Without the JPOA, Saudi Arabia would be more likely to hedge its nuclear bets.

The United States, and other nuclear supplier states, can and will continue to employ other measures to discourage the proliferation of uranium enrichment technology to the volatile Middle East.

Alternative to This Strong Iran Nuclear Deal Is No Deal and a World of Trouble

What is most irresponsible of AIPAC is its recommendation that Congress reject the JCPOA and “urge the administration to work with our allies to maintain economic pressure on Iran while offering to negotiate a better deal.”

That is a dangerous fantasy. The alternative to the effective P5+1 nuclear deal with Iran that has been negotiated is no deal. AIPAC’s course of action would condemn the United States, our friends in Israel, and the entire region to a dangerous future.

If the United States Congress rejects this deal, and blocks its implementation:

·      The United States would undercut its European allies and other UNSC members,

·      The necessary international support for Iran-related sanctions would melt away,

·      Iran would be able to rapidly and significantly expand its capacity to produce weapons-grade material,

·      The United States would lose out on securing enhanced inspections needed to detect a clandestine weapons effort, and

·      The risk of a nuclear-armed Iran and the risk of a war over Iran’s program would increase.

On balance, P5+1 and Iran nuclear deal is a strong, effectively verifiable, long-term agreement and AIPAC’s critique of it and its alternative recommendations, are deeply flawed.

Daryl G. Kimball is the Executive Director of the Arms Control Association.

Image: Flickr/SenatorMarkUdall