Conversely, do Americans believe that Mr. Putin is an insatiable despot bent on reestablishing the Soviet Union? If so, why do we believe that sending a few anti-tank missiles and radar systems will “impose costs” sufficient to stop him? Anyone who answers “yes” to the former question should have to provide a thorough answer to the latter. If the latter answer includes possible further escalation, rephrase the second question accordingly before repeating the process. You are not finished until the answer to question two is a persuasive one that includes nuclear deterrence.

More important, however, is for anyone who thinks that something short of a real war could stop Putin to answer the question of why the United States and its allies aren’t considering whether incentives could stop Putin, too—possibly at a lower price to the United States, our European allies and the Ukrainians whom we expect to fight and die to increase Russia’s “costs.” The fact that the latter question may have moved beyond politically incorrect to border on politically unacceptable threatens not only our ability to succeed in Ukraine, but our foreign policy and ultimately our freedom, because it prevents open and honest debate.

What the United States should do about Moscow’s conduct is a critical question facing America today and our choices could well shape the coming decades by defining enduring priorities, shaping choices by our allies and partners (some of whom don’t support arming Kiev) and potentially transforming the international system once rival major powers and important regional players evaluate their options. Whether we confront Russia head-on or try to de-escalate the Ukraine crisis, America will pay significant direct costs, indirect costs and opportunity costs for its choice. Providing lethal “defensive” weapons to Ukraine would be a half-measure at the very best and will not spare America the costs of making a real choice—it will only delay them. Nor will it spare the Obama administration the political price inherent in making a clear decision one way or the other, unless the president who inherited Iraq and Afghanistan in turn saddles his successor with Ukraine. For both these reasons, deceiving ourselves about the choices we face over Ukraine may ultimately pose the greatest danger.

Paul J. Saunders is executive director of The Center for the National Interest and associate publisher of The National Interest. He served in the U.S. State Department from 2003 to 2005. Follow him on Twitter:@1796farewell.

[1] Washington did arm Afghanistan’s mujahedin fighters, who successfully drove Soviet forces from the country—after a change in Soviet leadership. Turning Ukraine into another Afghanistan would require considerably greater support for Kiev, probably including significant involvement by U.S. personnel on the ground, as was the case in Afghanistan. And it would not inherently improve conditions in Ukraine; U.S. support for the Afghan rebels empowered radicals at the expense of moderates.

Image: Flickr/The U.S. Army/CC by 2.0