The Taliban have also persisted in outreach to Afghanistan’s shrinking Hindu and Sikh communities—many of whom fled the country since the group’s takeover, fearful of potential Taliban mistreatment and deadly attacks from ISIS-K. Narendra Singh Khalsa, the former Afghan parliamentary representative for these communities, recently returned to the country. His return corresponded with a Taliban commission to return private property illegally seized during the Republic era—no doubt in part a diplomatic nod to improving relations with India, but also aimed at domestic audiences. The most exceptional instance of the Taliban’s reclamation of land was the March 2024 seizure of politician and former jihadi leader Gulbudin Hekmatyar. The details of this case were unique, but the likely intended effect in domestic politics was clearly related.

There is no denying that the Taliban’s relations with minority communities are fraught. Even within the Taliban, non-Pashtun leadership figures and members show signs of frustration at being marginalized. Local and international media have covered instances of internal discontent, a few cases of which led to popular unrest—the most recent of which unfolded in the first days of May 2024. However, the Taliban’s proactive efforts to manage such tensions, which the same media outlets rarely cover, reveal close attention paid to elite stakeholder politics—if not necessarily to grassroots community demands.

Outreach and Regime Stability

None of the above negates the many credible reports of Taliban marginalization or mistreatment of various Afghan communities, especially those that offered relatively less support to its insurgency during the war. There are clear patterns of ethnic chauvinism in Taliban behavior, even if it is not always stated in official policy. Reports suggest the Taliban is becoming more exclusionary as the group grows further entrenched in its rule. The most significant failing in Taliban outreach to the Afghan population is defined by its repressive policies toward women, which many human rights experts have deemed to constitute “gender apartheid.” Taliban officials do engage with women in many parts of the country, but on a highly limited basis and in an atmosphere of increasingly shrinking public space. Moreover, these gender policies overlap with and amplify intersectional abuses and disadvantages.

But exclusively dedicating attention to the Taliban’s misdeeds is sure to skew analysis in ways that could mislead policymakers about the Taliban’s ability to manage domestic discontent. The UN’s spotlight on Taliban outreach is an intriguing prompt, one the United States should take heed of and investigate as much as possible. It is unclear to the authors what impact the Taliban’s outreach might be having, either in Kabul, provincial capitals, or deeper into the countryside. But this is a question worth answering. 

Taliban outreach efforts do not constitute inclusive governance—nor even necessarily good governance. Depending on how they proceed, however, Taliban outreach efforts could make a critical difference in the regime’s ability to manage and mitigate political challenges—which U.S. policymakers ought to watch closely.

Multiple pressures—largely domestic—will determine whether the Taliban remains in power or reverses its most objectionable policies. In the murky information environment that exists under the Taliban’s rule, carefully monitoring its outreach efforts might provide the greatest possible insight into community-level pressures on the regime.

Ronald E. Neumann was U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan from 2005-07 and returned frequently thereafter.

Andrew Watkins is a senior expert with the U.S. Institute of Peace and has studied and worked in Afghanistan since 2006. Follow him on X: @and_huh_what.

Image: Shutterstock.com.