Moreover, while China has, for the moment, eschewed confrontation with the members of the FPDA, the overall shift towards a more nationalistic and assertive China since 2009 has already roused regional concerns that Beijing’s ambitions may grow even further in reach. While PRC President Xi Jinping has, thus far, shown little interest in antagonising Malaysia or Singapore (or, for that matter, the other members of the FPDA), China’s adoption of a more assertive posture in East Asia since 2009 stands in marked contrast to the relatively benign foreign policy of China under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Should Chinese assertiveness in the region continue to grow in geostrategic reach, such a scenario may result in the civilian populations of Malaysia and Singapore being on the front line to face Chinese expansion. Given the unexpected suddenness with which China has turned to a more nationalistic posture in East Asia since 2009, prudent geostrategic planning requires policymakers in the region to consider the possibility that the Chinese leadership will continue to adopt an increasingly aggressive outlook, and one that will further encroach on the security interests of the wider East Asian region.

How might FPDA members respond to such a scenario in a post-Brexit setting? The militarily strongest members of the FPDA after the UK are Australia, Malaysia and Singapore, which maintain some regional power-projection capabilities in the form of varying levels of tactical airpower, airlift capability, surface naval forces and submarines; the New Zealand Defence Force is largely focused on territorial defense. Australia, Malaysia and Singapore also possess some indigenous military industrial capability, as exemplified by their production of armored fighting vehicles, artillery, small arms and naval surface vessels (either based on indigenous designs, or license-produced according to foreign blueprints). However, faced with China’s A2/AD doctrine, FPDA members need more advanced platforms such as missile-defense systems, ultra-quiet submarines and stealth tactical aircraft. Yet, the immense costs involved in undertaking research and design of such platforms would likely complicate any such attempt. Furthermore, given the sheer size of the PRC’s air and naval capabilities, the FPDA’s largely regional security orientation, even if fully mobilized and upgraded, would likely prove inadequate in the event that China mobilizes its full strength to enforce its claims over the South China Sea under the “Nine-Dash Line.”

While a more isolationist, post-Brexit UK should not be taken as a foregone conclusion, the necessity of hedging against such a scenario would likely impel the remaining members of the FPDA to prepare for closer security alignment with the United States. Since 2013, as part of the Obama administration’s pivot to Asia, the United States has rotated Air Force and Marine Corps assets through Darwin, Australia. Likewise, New Zealand, which for years had been sidelined due to Wellington’s opposition to the presence of nuclear-armed U.S. vessels in its waters, has since 2012 been increasing joint military exercises with its U.S. counterparts. Similarly, Singapore, which has allowed the U.S. Navy access to the Changi Naval Base (CNB) since the 1990s, has more recently permitted the deployment of U.S. Littoral Combat Ships from the CNB. In December 2015, the United States and Singapore also signed an enhanced defense pact permitting the U.S. deployment of anti-submarine patrol aircraft from the city-state’s airbases. Moreover, the overall pattern of Singapore’s military acquisitions since the 1990s has shown a growing preference for U.S. military designs, such as Apache and Chinook helicopters, Harpoon antiship missiles, and F-15 and F-16 fighter aircraft (along with tentative interest in acquiring F-35 stealth fighters). Such acquisitions suggest that Singapore’s defense planners have prioritized interoperability with U.S. forces in the event of a regional crisis.

Closer security alignment with the United States carries risks as well. The United States has, on occasion, proven to be rash in undertaking military interventions where core national interests were not at stake—witness, for instance, the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Within the context of the western Pacific, it is possible to identify three scenarios in the foreseeable future in which the United States comes to blows with China and, in so doing, drags a U.S.-aligned FPDA into an avoidable conflict.

The first of these scenarios concerns Taiwan. With the succession of Tsai Ing-wen as president of Taiwan, cross-Strait relations have been marked by increasing antagonism. In light of the increasingly jingoistic sentiments in mainland China, it is all but certain that a Taiwan that chooses independence from the mainland will be met with Chinese invasion. Such a development would place the United States and its allies in an awkward position—with Taiwan’s democratization standing in sharp contrast to the continued repression of the mainland, the U.S. public has reason to sympathize with Taiwan. Moreover, given the geostrategically pivotal position of Taiwan alongside the SLOCs running from Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia, Pentagon planners are loathe to surrender control of Taiwan to the PRC. Should the United States choose to intervene in the event of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan (as it threatened to do in 1995–96), it is unclear if FPDA members would be willing to support U.S. military action. Given that Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand are adherents to the One-China Policy, it is likely that they would regard a proindependence policy in Taiwan as an unnecessarily reckless provocation.

The second scenario stems from the election of Rodrigo Duterte as president of the Philippines. Having established a reputation for brash statements, diplomatic fecklessness and a political platform based on local populism, it remains unclear what Duterte has in mind with regards to territorial disputes with China. On one occasion, Duterte voiced his intention to personally sail to the Spratly Islands to plant the Filipino flag. On other occasions, he indicated his willingness to seek a separate deal with Beijing over the status of the disputed islands of the South China Sea. Such diplomatic volatility runs a severe risk of miscalculation by either Beijing or Manila. A clash of arms in the South China Sea would leave the United States treaty bound to support the Philippines.

The third scenario concerns the U.S. presidential election. At present, it seems likely that Hillary Clinton will be elected to the White House in November 2016. Such an outcome would lead to a degree of predictability and stability in Sino-U.S. relations in light of Clinton’s long experience as secretary of state, senator and first lady. A Donald Trump victory, on the other hand, would be problematic. Trump’s brand of brashness and jingoism is combined with numerous statements that suggest he has very little understanding of the nuances of diplomacy, the intricacies of power politics or the formulation of national-security policy (Trump apparently knows little of the U.S. nuclear triad). Should the Brexit vote impel the remaining members of the FPDA to align themselves more closely to the United States, it will also be necessary for them to ensure that security alignment with Washington does not translate into blind support for any unnecessarily reckless provocations of China.

Clearly, it is too soon to propose concrete post-Brexit policy prescriptions. Amid the economic chaos that has gripped Britain since the outcome of the Brexit vote, there are signs of possible backpedaling. Calls have been issued for a second Brexit referendum, in particular by younger Britons whose Leave vote was a miscalculated signal of protest against the EU’s overly bureaucratic structure. Tellingly, Boris Johnson announced that he will not seek the office of prime minister, evidently acknowledging that a measure intended as a protest vote against the EU had gotten out of hand. Nonetheless, Britain’s FPDA partners must consider the worst-case scenario and engage in geostrategic contingency planning.

Er-Win Tan is a visiting senior lecturer at the Department of International and Strategic Studies, University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. His research interests include security-dilemma theory, strategic culture, and security and diplomacy in East Asia.

Image: Malaysian army rangers and Marines​. Flickr/DVIDSHUB.