In this situation, Aliyev’s only recourse will be like that of Iraqi president Saddam Hussein’s in 1990—to distract and play the nationalist card. Aliyev may believe Armenia is weak, but no invasion of Armenia proper will be limited to the two states. Any attack on Armenia proper will draw Turkey, Russia, and perhaps even Iran into the fight, creating an immediate crisis for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Even if aggression brings no outside intervention, an Azerbaijani conquest of Armenian territory will not solve but rather delay the solving of Azerbaijan’s internal problems, weaken its economy, and set the cycle on repeat.

On the other hand, if Azerbaijani pressure forces Armenia to sacrifice some sovereignty for security and enter a broader security alliance with Russia, the United States and NATO would soon face ramifications elsewhere. Russia would use Armenia as an example to push other former Soviet states—not only in the Caucasus and Central Asia but also in the Baltics—into a new Russia-dominated union.

Aliyev may be a dictator, but Western denial of Azerbaijan’s new reality and neglect of his increasing belligerence promise a far bloodier future for justice and democracy in the region than he does. At issue is not simply some theoretical dispute between two small states but the West’s strategic position against retrograde forces like Russia, Iran, and jihadism that want to reimagine the post-World War II liberal order.

Michael Rubin is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.

Image: Reuters