Blinken further cites the proliferation of multilateral groupings of like-minded world leaders as the sinews of order: The Transatlantic Trade and Technology Council (TTIP), with the EU, as well as the fourteen-nation Critical Minerals Partnership to develop secure supply chains via a “critical minerals marketplace” for green tech now dominated by China. To address the interests of Global South countries, some of whom, like India, are participating in mineral and tech “friendshoring” efforts, Blinken cites coalitions like the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure, which he says will mobilize $600 billion by 2027 in private investment to build regional infrastructure networks in Africa, and an India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC).

However, like Biden’s Asia economic initiative, the International Partnership for Economic Framework (IPEF), these are reactive projects in response to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). For all its debt-creating flaws, BRI has invested some $1 trillion in over 200 projects in 149 countries. IPEF is an economic grouping largely in response to Asian trade initiatives that exclude the United States: the Comprehensive Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which the United States negotiated and then rejected, and the Regional Comprehensive Partnership (RCEP), which includes China and all U.S. Asian partners.

IPEF, focusing on supply chains, workers’ rights, and climate issues, is called a trade agreement, but it has no market access provisions for opening the U.S. market or partners’ markets for U.S. exporters. Similarly, whether the G7 initiative will result in more than a fraction of the promised infrastructure is an open question. Moreover, the U.S.-EU TransAtlantic Trade and Technology Council, with modest achievements in supply chain cooperation and coordinating tech standards, has not expanded market access. So far, TTC has demonstrated differences between the U.S. and EU trade policies and regulatory cultures, while Europe is adapting to China’s economic dominance. The Europeans are troubled that U.S. subsidies for chips and green tech are luring their firms to invest in the U.S. rather than the EU and have countered with its protectionist industrial policy.

The EU has moved closer to the United States in its skepticism about China’s aggressive mercantilism and strategic challenges. Still, it has been driven more by China’s support for Russia in its invasion of Ukraine than U.S. cajoling. At the same time, there is an understanding, particularly on the part of Berlin, that Europe’s prosperity depends on trade with China. Europe has already endured one major economic shock with the cutoff of cheap Russian natural gas for most Europeans; the loss of the Chinese market wouldn’t be just painful, it would be catastrophic: China is the EU’s second-largest trading partner after the United States. Despite Europe’s posture criticizing both Russia and China, in seeking to cater to both the U.S. and China, Europe is moving gradually toward the multi-aligned posture of many middle powers that depend on economic ties with China but also want the U.S. as a counterweight against China.

Fading Primacy

At a troubled interregnum between a waning era and a profoundly uncertain future—one that threatens to be shaped by war—Team Biden, as Blinken evidences, exudes an unwarranted certainty. As the limits of U.S. power became more obvious, the Biden administration sought to perpetuate a fading primacy. Biden’s economic nationalism has compounded the risk of economic fragmentation and the corrosion of the successful Bretton Woods institutions forged in 1944 with little notion of what would follow. Thus, U.S. allies and partners increasingly hedge even as they cling. The lengthening Global South queue to join the BRICS reflects a search for a post-American world. The start of a new administration in January will prove a good moment to reflect.

Mathew Burrows is the Counselor in the Executive Office at the Stimson Center and Program Lead of its Strategic Foresight Hub. 

Robert A. Manning is a Distinguished Fellow at the Stimson Center working on Strategic Foresight, China, and great power competition.

Image: ArChe1993 / Shutterstock.com.