Great Power Competition, sometimes called the Second Cold War, is unfolding on a global scale. The United States is not competing with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in China, nor is the United States competing with Vladimir Putin’s system in Russia. Today, we are competing along a possible “kinetic front” in East Asia (Taiwan and the Nine Dash Line), Ukraine, and Israel. Additionally, there is arguably a “second front” in the realm of technology, encompassing the battle over artificial intelligence, telecommunications, subsea cables, and microchips. Perhaps the most underappreciated yet critical front, a “third front” in this Great Power Competition, is the “Global South,” or the developing world. During the First Cold War, the developing world was a major front, so it is not surprising that the Global South is again a significant theater or—in a scenario where the United States does not end up in a full Great Power War—is the central theater of competition over the next forty years.

The Global South is a notion that comprises many regions, including Africa, Southeast Asia, Latin America, the Pacific Island States, South Asia, Central Asia, some post-Soviet countries, and the Middle East. Historically referred to as the “Third World,” this term is now widely considered to be outdated or even offensive. The “Global South” is a term recently popularized by the CCP—which has spent decades attempting to ingratiate itself within this theater—although the term’s appropriateness is debated. Alternative terms such as the “developing world,” “G-77,” or “new non-aligned countries” have been suggested, though none have proven to be completely satisfactory.

While the United States and allied national security community have focused extensively on the first two fronts—potential military conflicts and technological competition—the third front in the Global South remains critical yet underappreciated. This region represents some of the world’s leading sources of strategic materials, consumer markets, potential allies—as well as current or potential partners in security burden-sharing. China has been actively making inroads in the Global South for well over twenty years, with relationships dating back more than fifty years—some based on Chinese manipulation of anti-colonial sentiments. Russia, in some cases, has relations going back much further, with some lingering, popular appreciation for the Soviet Union’s support during these nations’ anti-colonial struggles.

China views the Global South as a pivotal market and partner in challenging the liberal world order. By leveraging the concerns of the Global South about the current international system, China aims to undermine the influence of the United States. The Chinese leadership, often accusing the United States of initiating a “new cold war,” advocates for the “democratization of international relations.” This narrative is part of China’s broader strategy to reshape the global order around its own interests rather than U.S. ones. Beijing’s asymmetric response emphasizes “non-alignment” and a commitment to helping countries protect their sovereignty, avoiding alignment with major power blocs or external dictates. This approach is presented as a counter to U.S. efforts to restore the appeal of liberal democracy, which China portrays as an outdated “cold war mentality” that threatens Chinese ambitions, both on a regional and global scale.

China’s engagement with the Global South, particularly through initiatives like the Group of Friends of the Global Development Initiative (GDI), underscores its ambition to present itself as a benign provider of international public goods in areas such as poverty alleviation, food security, and digitalization. Over seventy countries have joined the GDI, with over 100 supporting its goals, showcasing China’s role as a development leader. This commitment contrasts with the alleged global protectionism of the United States, which is accused of failing to provide adequate economic support. 

Chinese scholars argue that China’s readiness to mobilize the developing world, especially in regions with historical tensions with Western powers, positions it as a critical player in a post-American global order. This strategy is evident in China’s diplomatic stance on issues like Gaza, where it promotes “peace plans” without concrete proposals or direct condemnation of terrorist actions. China’s investment in these regions is part of its vision of “great changes unseen in a century,” emphasizing the growing economic and geopolitical significance of the Global South and its potential to reshape the international landscape.

China is not only a “Near-Peer Hard Power” competitor but also a “Near-Peer Soft Power” competitor. China can now begin to fill any vacuums left by the United States, which it did not have the capacity, power projection capability, or readiness to do just two decades ago. The economic landscape has shifted dramatically. In 1973, China’s economy was worth $138 billion compared to the United States’ $1.43 trillion. By 2023, China’s GDP had soared to nearly $18 trillion, while the United States’ increased to $27 trillion. Despite the United States maintaining a larger economy, China’s 2023 GDP growth rate of 5.2 percent per annum outpaces the United States’ meager 2.5 percent annually. When the West leaves a void, China now has the financial potential to fill it.

The challenge for the United States lies in offering a compelling alternative to China’s pervasive influence. Over the past decade, the United States has sought to discourage the Global South from engaging with Chinese initiatives like Huawei’s telecom solutions, Sinovac vaccines for COVID-19, or the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—often without providing a viable alternative. This “strategy,” has left many countries with little choice but to turn to China. We cannot fight something with nothing.

Meeting the aspirations of countries in the Global South with a credible, positive, forward-looking agenda is crucial. Failure to do so will result in these nations increasingly aligning with China, which is not in the United States’ interest.

It would be detrimental to the interests of U.S. interests if every developing country’s largest trading partner were China. If Chinese companies manage their ports, if their elites study in Beijing instead of Boston, and if Huawei or other Chinese technology companies dominate their telecom systems, there will be repercussions for U.S. national security. Developing countries may vote with China and against the United States on vital international issues such as the conflicts in Israel and Ukraine, support Chinese candidates for leadership positions in international organizations, and endorse Chinese-led initiatives in multilateral forums.

The United States must present better value propositions in the Global South to remain relevant. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union heavily invested in countries in the Global South, motivated by strategic interests and ideological goals. In the 1990s, Peter Rodman’s More Precious than Peace provided a compelling narrative of America’s engagement in the developing world through a Cold War lens, outlining how this competition allowed developing countries to claim a pivotal role in international political questions. American policy faced a twofold challenge at the time: “to guide the underdeveloped regions of the world through a transition to full-fledged participation in the international system and to do so in the face of a Soviet attempt to suborn them as allies in a radical assault on that international system.”

But this is not your grandparents’ developing world. It is more affluent and more free, and their governments enjoy a lot more options. Foreign aid is a very small part of the puzzle, along with private capital, trade, investment, remittance flows, domestic capital, and the ability to raise taxes in a society with much more significant sources of money than fifty years ago. So, the “theory of change” is not necessarily about more foreign aid or the threat of cutting foreign aid off. These countries do not want to be pawns in someone else’s game, nor do they want to be a hegemon’s vassal state.

Since the turn of the century, the developing world has also experienced substantial poverty reduction and progress across a range of social and economic metrics. Most of these countries now also have cell phone penetration rates that are approaching those of the United States. Additionally, these societies are often more free than in the past and boast more active civil societies. The percentage of free countries worldwide has increased from 30 percent in 1973 to 43 percent in 2023.

Hence, over the past thirty-five years, the developing world has prioritized different things than those in the developed world, including the United States. China and sometimes Russia increasingly offer the Global South what these countries actually want, including the development of energy and mineral resources, infrastructure, ports, and, oftentimes, hard security. The United States and the West have to be sure that we are also offering what these countries actually want as opposed to what our political system finds congenial or easy to deliver. The United States should take advantage of its strong international network, including the European Union, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Canada, and Mexico. Such American allies should be able to play a role in formulating a strategy for more proactive engagement.

Certainly, there are fragile and failed states in the Global South that present unique challenges. These fragile and failed states often are sources of mass migration, breeding grounds for terrorism, and areas where sustainable development progress is extremely difficult to achieve. Fragile and failed states are a problem all to themselves and worthy of a longer discussion somewhere else.